Ninety-five percent of all Haitian mango exports go to the US and they all must go through a cartel composed of eight export packing houses, ANEM (Association Nationale des Exportateurs de Mangues).
A cartel is a group of sellers or buyers that have been granted government sanctioned authority to organize themselves to behave like a monopoly or, as in the case of mangoes in Haiti, a monopsony, a single buyer, rather than seller, that completely dominates a market.
In the case of ANEM the authority of the cartel is sanctioned by two governments: the government of Haiti through the authority of MARNDR (the Ministry of Agriculture), and the government of the USA, through the authority of the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture).
The taxes, transport costs and profits to the exporters make Haitian mangoes the most expensive in the US. And the lack of competition and constrained markets mean that those exporters limit amount of mangoes that get exported, something they sometimes do unintentionally, because of crashing the market and, in the rare moments they agree, intentionally, so that they do not crash the markets; but which, either way, constrains the access that Haitian producers have to the US market. Indeed, the access that Haitian producers have to the US market is entirely dependent on the disposition, competency and resources of those 8 exporters.[i] [ii]
ANEM did not create the mango industry nor introduce the Francique mango to Haiti. According to mango export Tom Davenport (2000), the Francique has been in Haiti for almost as long as mangoes have been here, about 250 years. Exporting began in 1954 when shipments first went to the Bahamas and the United States. It became a vigorous industry that was quickly regulated (some might say ‘captured’) through the circa 1970 creation of ANEM (formerly called ASDEM). The international community subsequently poured an estimated 120 million in “development” assistance to the industry (IICA 2012). Unquestionably the greatest impact of that assistance has been in helping exporters to reach the US market, destination today for more than 95% of Haitian mango exports.
Although HAP and Haiti Hope have managed to increase the flow of mangoes toward the export houses, ANEM has not yet broken through the 2.5 million box export ceiling lamented in MIF project proposal. One reason they did not increase exports is for the simple fact that, as Lidwine Hyppolite noted in her 2012 graduate thesis, the exporters do not have the capacity or inclination to increase exports,
The combined capacity of current packing houses is insufficient to absorb all the export quality mangoes harvested during peak harvest periods. During these periods exporters cannot accept all available mangoes, and second-level suppliers (fournisseur) are obliged to sell them to madan sara (itinerant female market intermediaries).
Important to understand is that the reason for the lack of increased exports is not, as so commonly assumed among observers, the deliberate collusion among the mango exporters. On the contrary, just as with the small producers, Haiti’s export cartel suffers from limitations of Haiti’s closed economy. The exporters themselves identify the following complications and obstacles inherent in the cartel,
- They sell in the same markets, Miami, Atlanta and Hunts Point in New York City where quite literally a single extra container of mangoes can bring prices down
- Inability or unwillingness to pay for certifications and reach beyond these markets[1]
- Not coordinated in such a manner that they can effectively make decisions in the best interest of the industry, something that, perhaps ironically, those exporters interviewed during the course of the research were the most emphatic and articulate in describing
- At the peak of each season, typically in June, when exports exceed 200,000 boxes per week (boxes of ~10 mangoes), the price begins to fall. At 250,000 boxes per week it crashes below what the exporters claim is break-even point ($4 per box, still the highest prices mango in the US, two to three times the price of the Kent and Tommy Atkins mangoes and consistently 25% more expensive than the Ataulfo mango from Mexico; see the National Mango Board 2015)
- Seasonal peaks that coincide with leading mango export countries Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Guatemala
- Short harvest and official market season
- Refusal of some ANEM members to open the season earlier
- Poor internal structuring that includes seasonal layoffs, and inefficient and under-mechanized processing
- High sales price on the local market, i.e. the export houses must compete with the local market
Moreover, associated with these limitations, if not a consequences of them, the exporters are best described as engaged in a bitter and intense economic struggle with one another such that most would—and have—enthusiastically pushed members from their ranks and taken more market share for themselves. Indeed, the history of Haiti’s mango cartel is one that has gone from 17 in 1974 to 13 in 2008 to 10 in 2010 to 8 in 2015 with—according to its own members– little to no possibility of those numbers ever reversing direction, not so long as ANEM decides whether or not new members are allowed. The extent of the rivalry and bitterness within ANEM should not be gainsaid. It is marked by real and imagined destroying of orchards with fire, machetes and goats; undercutting markets; and in a classic case of prisoners dilemma, entering agreements with co-members of ANEM to reduce shipments—so as not to crash the market–but then increasing them instead.
(for references and more data see here)
[1] Yet, despite the obvious failures of the system a glaring oversight in the strengths and weakness established during the 2010 National Mango Forum was that it made no recognition nor recommendations regarding diminishing ANEM control of the market.
[i] In the case of Haiti that “non producing” class controls the government and the ports. Geographically access is constrained by the Caribbean Sea in the South, the Atlantic Ocean in the North, a heavily militarized and staunchly anti-Haiti Dominican Republic to the east.
[ii] From Enmarcolda S.A website at http://enmarcolda.com/case-studies/mango-crop-export/
“Today 80% of the mangoes exported from Haiti are handled by Enmarcolda S.A. logistics organization. Providing trucking, terminal handling and ocean freight services to the mango industry for more than 20 years, Enmarcolda S.A.’s experience and expertise is now part of the fabric of the Haitian mango industry’s future growth plans.
The management team of Enmarcolda S.A. has been working closely with Association Nationale des Exportateurs de Mangues (ANEM) for more than 20 years. Today, in addition to trucking, terminal handling and maritime logistics, Enmarcolda S.A. is directly involved in creating the future strategies with the mango industry in Haiti.”
