

# FREQUENCY LISTING REPORT

Submitted

to



By

Timothy T Schwartz

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## Introduction

Frequency Listing (Freq Listing) is a statistically robust methodology for identifying local leader-experts (*notab*) and ultimately humanitarian aid beneficiaries. It comes to us from anthropology and mathematical models for studying informal sector and non-literate cultures and rests on the premise of “Culture as Consensus.” More precisely, the premise is that,

- a) any given claim by someone who shares knowledge of a cultural-specific category or domain with others has a certain probability of being true,

which gives way to the corollary,

- b) the more people who share cultural knowledge of that domain and support the claim, the more likely the claim is true.

This rather simple postulate has profound statistical implications. Anthropologists have used it to create algorithms that, almost as if by magic, are able to generate answer keys for true/false, fill-in-the-blank, and multiple-choice questions (see Textbox 1). This is done without ever knowing what the questions are. Similarly, the same algorithms allow us to identify most knowledgeable experts in unknown domains. For example, we can identify most knowledgeable healers, hunters, farmers, fisherman and, not least of all, beneficiaries for aid programs. Regarding aid programs, exactly who is a beneficiary, can be based on a wide variety of objectives that call for different criteria. If increased agricultural production is the objective, then we target farmers with land. If increased fishing harvests is the objective, then we target fisherman with boats. Freq-listing is useful for these and any other type of targeting. As will be seen, it provides humanitarian aid agencies with a network of reliable key informants located throughout the geographical area of interest. These key informants can be drawn on to identify almost any imaginable category of beneficiary.<sup>i</sup> Freq-Listing offers an alternative to using traditional community based targeting, committees composed of political, economic, and religious functionaries who locals often do not identify as legitimate representatives of the community.<sup>ii</sup> It also offers an alternative to community mapping and wealth ranking, both of which are effective but costly and time consuming.<sup>iii</sup> Freq-Listing also provides an alternative to costly surveys that target using socio-economic and infrastructural indicators. The many advantages of freq-listing include,

- **Fast:** can be deployed quickly
- **Cost-effective:** expenditures are a fraction of traditional surveys<sup>iv</sup>
- **Low Skill level:** does not require advanced skills to apply<sup>v</sup>
- **Remote:** can be maintained remotely where there is telephone service, (i.e. via call center)
- **Adaptable:** useful both after disasters and during times of non-emergency
- **Sensitive to change:** can detect changes in beneficiary status
- **Overcomes corruption:** overcomes nepotism & misrepresentation
- **Does not depend on indicators:** rather it taps local knowledge
- **Community Buy-in:** people readily understand the logic and accept the decisions made by consensus of legitimate local leaders

Before we explain exactly how freq-listing is used in humanitarian aid targeting, it is useful to provide a review of why humanitarian aid practitioners so need a mechanism such as freq-listing.

### TEXT BOX 1: THE MAGIC of CULTURAL CONSENSUS ANALYSIS

“...the correspondence between the answers of any two informants is a function of the extent to which each is correlated with the truth.”

[Romney et. al. 1986: 316]



Specialists in Cultural Consensus Analysis build formal mathematical models that allow us to,

- a) determine competence of respondents by asking questions for which we do not know the answers
- b) detect correct answers without even knowing the questions

For example, a Cultural Consensus Analyst can ask a random group of say 50 people about the rules of soccer. Any particular individual's responses will depend on how much that person knows about the game. Soccer fanatics will all tend to respond the same, with the correct answers. Those who somewhat know the game will respond correctly to some questions but will not know the answers to others and will therefore either not respond at all or will respond randomly, i.e. they will guess. Those who know nothing at all about the rules of soccer will consistently not respond to questions, or they will respond randomly, guessing at all the answers.


Thus, a pattern forms. When questions became exceptionally difficult, only those respondents most knowledgeable about the game of soccer will respond correctly. And these people will typically have the same answer, i.e. the correct one. Responses from other informants tend to be blank or randomly distributed. So there emerges what Romney et. al. term a “concordance code” of socially shared information. In this case the information is about the rules of soccer.



Cracking that “concordance code” can be done by systematically evaluating the answer given by each respondent vis a vis the other respondents. It is this ‘analysis of consensus’ among respondents that allows us to determine with mathematical precision the competence of each informant regarding the rules of soccer. And it allows us to determine with mathematical precision the correct answers to questions even when we don't know what those questions are. This is true whether we are talking about true/false questions, multiple choice, or fill in the blank.

These same formulas have long been used in high schools and Universities to inform professors of bad exam questions. For example, when a particular question and/or answer is simply wrong or perhaps the information was not even taught in the course, the students do not know the answer and hence guess. Thus, the pattern of responses from the students on these bad questions goes random. Even the brightest and most competent students—as indicated by the concordance code—tend to get those answers wrong.

What these patterns mean for Humanitarian Aid targeting is that we can build on the freq-listing model and use the algorithms that Cultural Consensus Analysts provide to determine experts or to select most appreciated *notab*. Once we have these lists, we can ask the *notab* other questions and come up with new “concordance codes” that tell us which *notab* are most competent and honest. In effect, we can grade *notab* like students, determining who are the best and brightest.



See, Romney et. al. 1986. 1996, 2000; Weller and Romney 1988; Borgatti 1992

## Beneficiary Criteria: Why We Need Freq-Listing

There are at least six inter-related reasons why humanitarian aid targeting in Haiti is exceedingly difficult: 1) widespread deceit, 2) massive poverty (with 59% of the population living below the poverty line)<sup>vi</sup> 3) heavy investment in social capital and undetectable or hard to detect/quantify assets,<sup>vii</sup> 4) juggernaut urbanization, 5) capture of aid by elites, and 6) dispersed settlement patterns. All six of these factors, explained in more detail below, combine to make the challenges of targeting in Haiti synergistically complex. And all six should be understood before we elaborate on freq-listing and how it can help us to accurately identify appropriate beneficiaries of aid programs.

### 1) The Fog of Deceit

Almost as a rule, those of us who work in the humanitarian aid sector recoil from coming to terms with the ugly fact that many among the impoverished people we hope to help try to fool us. Anecdotes gathered from aid workers during the course of the research for this report include hopeful beneficiaries inflating reports of family size, hiding animals to increase their apparent poverty, and pretending to live in dilapidated houses that have been abandoned or that belong to someone else. Medical practitioners working at two different rural clinics insisted that some among their impoverished clientele starve one child in order to qualify for nutritional benefits that could benefit the whole family. Whatever the true extent of corruption, most aid workers would agree that widespread deceit is a hard fact of the aid industry in Haiti.<sup>viii</sup> But what most sabotages us in the endeavor to reach the needy is, not so much the corruption in and of itself, but our general refusal to admit the corruption exists and to confront it. Yet, not to do so is to overlook the very reason we are challenged to devise intelligent targeting strategies in the first place: because people attempt to game the system. If this were not true, if honesty and fairness prevailed, we would not have to target, we could simply ask members of the beneficiary population, ‘who is most in need?’

This latter point, that we cannot simply ask leaders, politicians or the people living in the area for list of those most in need—not without getting bogus responses or lists of the respondent’s family and friends—is the crux of the entire conundrum of aid targeting. Specifically, the crux is this: the population surrounding the people we seek to target are better equipped than anyone to accurately identify those who fit our criteria. As discussed in the section ‘Investment in social capital and other Hard to Detect Assets’, below, rural Haitians living in any given area know a great deal about their family, friends, and neighbors, far more than a survey or set of indicators could ever teach us. They have real and fictive kinship relations with them, they worship together, they celebrate together, they mourn together, they participate in work groups together, they borrow and lend money to one another, they sell and buy land and animals from and for one another, they care for one another’s children, they even adopt children from one another. They also intermarry and engage in not-so-secret illicit sexual relations. There is no better source of information about potential aid beneficiaries than their kin, friends and neighbors. Freq-listing offers a means to leverage this local knowledge but avoid the potential nepotism that comes with involving community members.

### 2) Widespread Poverty

A World Bank funded survey (ECVMAS 2012), estimated that more 59 percent Haiti’s 10.4 million people live below the national poverty line of US\$2.41 per day; 24 percent are living under the national extreme poverty line of US\$1.23 per day. The problem is especially significant for rural areas where 40 percent of the population lives below the extreme poverty line.<sup>ix</sup> The fact that almost half the population is eking out a living on so little, and within pennies, within pennies per day of one another, makes discerning degrees vulnerability among them difficult. Moreover, as seen in Textbox 2, poverty is not confined to specific regions, but tends to be evenly distributed throughout Haiti. With the problem of deception seen earlier, and now with the sheer numbers of those who really are extremely poor, what is needed is methods of poverty detection that are more sensitive and objective than those currently available.


## TEXTBOX 2: EGALITARIANISM

It is always very difficult to quantify malnutrition in Haiti. ...the data available from actors appears to show that, strictly speaking, there are no pockets of malnutrition. ECHO 2011:24

Although partners in the World Bank and USAID sponsored programs Kore Lavi and Kore Fami have targeted specific departments and communes based on CNSA vulnerability assessments (see CARE 2013a), a longitudinal look at survey data suggest that, with the exception of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Department of the West in which it is located, there is little evidence to justify more than moderate application of geographical criteria in Haiti. Not if the objective is to aid the most vulnerable. For example, in 2002 most departments had essentially equal populations of “extremely poor” people (individuals living on less than US\$1 per day), varying between 62 and 72 percent (FAFO 2001). The only exception was the North East, with 84 percent of its population extremely poor; arguably no exception at all because 67 percent of the country’s rural population at the time was extremely poor and the North East was, at that time, the least urbanized Department in Haiti. In other words, the proportion of the population that is extremely poor is essentially the same in all of Haiti’s 10 Departments. The same egalitarianism among departmental poverty and stress is true for,

- Genie coefficient
- months of nutritional stress
- ecological zones
- proportion of income spent on food
- consumption scores
- dependence on markets
- auto-consumption
- indices of durable goods
- education
- types of livelihood strategies
- remittances from within Haiti
- constraints on livestock rearing
- livestock per household
- agriculture
- number of parcels owned
- land tenure
- access to services
- intercropping
- use of fertilizers
- population engaged in fishing

To be sure, there are some differences, for example in regional migration patterns, remittances, and slight differences in dependency on agricultural strategies. CNSA/FEWSNET (2009) documented differences in vulnerability and infrastructure at the sub-department level. But the same figures vary by survey, a probable consequence of sampling error; and they vary by year, a probable consequence of climatic variation and differential idiosyncratic shocks. The variation over time can be seen in nutritional status of children per department (see Chart, below).



### Investment in social capital and other Hard to Detect Assets

Social capital is the investment people make in one another in the form of favors, loans, or services. It can include major investments in a spouse, raising and educating children. It includes contacts with and mutual support from brothers and sisters. It could even include investment in improved economic position of kin or neighbors whose success will have positive impact on the resources that an individual can call on in time of need, such as a niece or neighbor who one helps sponsor as a migrant to the Dominican Republic and then is expected to return the favor, for example, in the form of assistance during times of need. And it is arguably as characteristic of the rural Haitian economy as “conspicuous consumption”, “keeping up with Joneses” or “a penny saved is a penny earned” is for middle and upper classes.


Inculcation of the values of sharing and reciprocity begin earlier in life. Children are taught very young that food is to be shared. No matter how small the portion or how loathed the parents of the other children, a child must share with all others present. Those who refuse are immediately rebuked. Other children howl in protest. Adults scold the offender. Consequently, “It is not rare to see 15 children drink out of a bottle of kola, or to watch a dozen children eating from a piece of corn,” something that Alvarez and Murray” (1981) called part of a strategy of Socialization for Scarcity, an adaptation to the recurrent epidemiological, natural, political, military, and economic crisis that have plagued rural Haiti for more than 200 years.

As children grow into adults, sharing becomes strategic and targeted. At the core of the strategy is investment in a household, the fundamental unit of both consumption and production. Almost without exception, a household comes into being as the result of social contract between a man and a woman called *plasaj*. The household can be understood as a business enterprise in which the most important assets are children who from the age of 5 years old begin to make significant contributions to the labor pool. By the age of 10 or 11 years of age children are as productive as most adults, fetching water, caring for livestock, maintaining gardens, going to market to buy and sell, making meals, handwashing cloths, and caring for younger siblings.<sup>x</sup>

Dependency on the homestead and its relations of production give way to other opportunities and obligations for investment in social capital.

Godparents must help their godchildren with school and other life expenses. In return they can call on the children for services, such as fetching water, helping with livestock and gardens. The godparent is linked by mutual obligations to the child’s parents through their fictive kinship relation of ‘co-parent.’ An individual with many godchildren engender the godparent with a very real resource--labor. Similarly, individuals invest in social capital as members of rotating labor groups in which they work on one another’s fields to overcome seasonal labor crunches. Investment in social capital extends to lending interest-free spare money to wives, mothers, sisters, aunts, godmothers, daughters, neighbors and friends to underwrite her marketing activities, for as rural Haitians say, *lajan sere pa fe pitit* (“saved money makes no children”). Investment in social capital is also evident in relations between female companions who enter trading ventures together, traveling many miles of trails to distant markets where they sell the goods and buy other items for resale. It extends to the fisherman and the market women

Figure 1: Integrated Household Subsistence Strategies and the Market






he gives his fish to on credit. And in what is one of the most institutionalized expressions of reciprocity, rural Haitians, particularly women, form rotating savings groups called *sol*, each week or two all the members contribute a pre-agreed sum of money and one member takes it all.

Unless one can break away from the mass—for example, becoming a gatekeeper for foreign aid-- there is little reason or even possibility to buck the system described above and accumulate material wealth. Indeed, to survive, one must invest in family, friends and neighbors because it is these people who enable the giver to meet the high labor demands associated with daily survival in rural Haiti. Moreover, reinforcement is not only positive, there is also aversive social pressure to conform. As with the insistence that children share, social censure punishes adults who do not invest in family and social relations. Not to have a wife or a husband and to bear children and invest in a homestead is tantamount to a sin. They call the offender a “millet” (mule), bringing on ridicule, shame, and even life-threatening rumors of having eaten your unborn children, of being *lougarou*, a witch, who might also be eating the children of others (manifest in epidemics where many children die).

The situation is such that lower class rural men who find themselves enjoying access to unusual wealth—typically fishermen, shaman, and skilled craftsmen—and who do not use that money to invest in migration—as seen below-- invest their surplus earnings, not in conspicuous consumption of cars, or large homes, but rather in additional wives and children who live in simple homes and compounds barely differentiated from that of the man’s first family. It’s not uncommon for these “Big Men” to have three or for families bearing a multitude of children. In the extreme, there are men with 10 wives and upwards of 60 children living in 10 discrete homesteads.<sup>xi</sup>

From the productive activities of the household and the potential as a resource for others, evolve other relationships, such as between the common farmer and the store owner and the grain importer, both of whom seek to attract and hold on to clients with credit. Between the preacher and members of his congregation, the healer and his patients, the orphanage owner and the parents of the children he hosts. All are locked in mutually beneficial dyadic relations of reciprocity cemented together with the passage of goods or building of a dossier of favors. One needs the other. All these relations must be understood and appreciated to measure a person’s level of social security and true wealth.<sup>xii xiii xiv</sup>




## Urbanization

Another significant confounding factor that must be understood to fully appreciate the need for freelistings is urbanization. Like most developing countries, Haiti over the past 65 years has been the site of massive migration from rural areas to towns and cities. The entire country has gone from 13 percent urban in 1950 to more than 60 percent urban today (See Haiti censuses 1950, 1971, 2003 and World Bank 2016). While in 1950 Port-au-Prince had a population of less than 150,000 residents, today there are almost 2 million. That is just within the city's borders. There are some 3.7 million in the greater Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. One-third of the population of Haiti. A similar pattern has occurred throughout the country. In Haiti, no one wants to remain in the rural areas. For whatever reasons—crashed agricultural markets or the superiority of urban opportunities—there is no pride in being farmer. They are called 'abitan' (hick), 'dan wouj' (red teeth), 'pye pete' (cracked feet). Even their own children come to view them as ignorant and backward.

### TEXTBOX 4: MULTI-HOUSEHOLD MEMBERSHIP

The household, that special unit of both consumption and production has, with the migration described in the main text, evolved into something more than a static fixed unit. True that most rural houses come into being as the *sine qua non* in a common law union between a man and a woman. But most people living in rural Haiti have some form of stake—if not outright ownership—in multiple houses: for example, a garden house, a house in town, one in a nearby city and, quite often, Port-au-Prince as well. These houses may have separate owners or 'household heads'—the women and men who, as seen in the main text established the household, but they often share members and are inhabited mutually by an overlapping flow of adults: itinerant market women transporting goods to town or the city for sale, and men who work part time in the city may be intermittent contributors to and consumers with a several different households. With itinerant household members usually come and go food stuffs, particularly in the direction of rural-to-urban. Also going with many of them is an unknown but substantial flow of cash.<sup>1</sup>


Children may be as or more transient as adults. To attend school many children spend the week in town but then return to the rural homestead on weekends and vacations. Even for those remaining in rural areas, they may contribute work efforts to multiple households and have access to food in all, including households of godparents, grandparents, older siblings, uncles, aunts, and fathers—or mothers—who do not reside in the child's natal household (see Schwartz 2009, Chapt 14).<sup>1</sup>



One thing that makes the issue of urbanization so important to targeting is investment in urban homes. Houses in towns and cities are the first step to getting out of rural areas. Unless one sends children to work in the homes of family, friends or acquaintances, owning a house in town is the only way of getting children a secondary education. Even for those who still farm, houses in town and urban areas have become critical to doing business and to selling farm produce on the more lucrative urban market. This is true for the female household head or co-heads' who trade in rural produce, bringing it in from rural areas and selling it to urban market women. It is also true for those male family members who seek work in the city or to learn a trade. Having a house in the city also increases the potential for building social capital by extending hospitality to rural family, friends or neighbors who do not yet have a house in the town or city. People sometimes rent rooms or homes, but the objective is to have your own urban home. Adults who cannot afford to construct second and third houses in urban areas invest in family members who have or are constructing one. They seek some kind of stake in the town



and urban based homes of their relatives, or friends. Indeed, it has become unthinkable that one does not have somewhere to stay in town or the city. As seen in the main text, what this has meant for targeting is that our task has been made increasingly complex because of the failure in enterprise, exodus of traditional elites and incursion of well-meaning but poorly monitored aid that came about in association with urbanization.



### Elite Capture



Whatever drove it, in the 1960s and 1970s the urbanization seen above began to have a widespread impact on socio-economic life in the rural areas and, by consequence, our capacity to work with local leaders to accurately target aid beneficiaries. Up to this point in time, the typical *gran neg* or *gran dam*, “big man” or “big woman”, was an individual belonging to a large family that, a) had a better education than most of his or her neighbors, b) powerful urban political and economic contacts, but, c) was heavily invested in land, agricultural production, livestock rearing, the aggregation and processing of local produce destined for export--typically coffee, cacao, rum, sisal, aloe, goat skins, and castor oil-- and very importantly they, like most of their constituents in rural Haiti, d) invested heavily in social capital (as discussed on page 5). All had extensive networks of *kliyan*, “clients”, people who were dependent on them for credit, to purchase their produce, and for sharecropping arrangements that gave those with fewer resources access to land and animals. The elite themselves typically had many children. It was not uncommon for the wealthier men among them to have 20 or more recognized offspring. Some had upwards of sixty. They also had myriad of godchildren, something that linked them not only to the children—and gave them additional access to a labor supply--but also linked them to the parents of the children in the system of ‘co-parentage.’ These economic patwon/*kliyan* relations, and fictive kinship relations meant that it would have been rare during the 1960s to find an individual in rural Haiti who could not trace some kinship relationship to a local leader. Today these leaders are typically remembered as honest *notab* who would judge local disputes, whose decisions were respected, who were above reproach and who, not only dominated the Community Councils that were then used as mediums to distribute foreign and government relief, but whose presence and consent was indispensable in the acceptance of any community decision (See Textbox 5 on page 10).

With political turmoil that came in the 1980s, the collapse of the formal economy and exports, economic and social rural leaders increasingly invested, not in the local economy, but in getting themselves and their children out of the region. Investment in out-migration created an economic vacuum. Enterprises that hitherto thrived in rural areas collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s. Since that time, the single most lucrative entrepreneurial opportunity for those remaining in the rural areas has


become gaining access to those entities responsible for vectoring overseas aid, i.e. the churches, clinics, orphanages, and schools mentioned above, but also cash and food-for work, canteens, and positions with NGOs--such as drivers, landlords, secretaries and overseers. Whether for selfish or altruistic motivations, be it preacher, priest, orphanage owner, clinic owner, association director or those few non-charity endeavors such as merchant, ship owner, land owner, or politician, the major stakeholders earning money in rural Haiti and who are determined to keep a stake there have moved their families to Port-au-Prince, Florida, New York, Boston, or Montreal while keeping an economic base in rural Haitian countryside or provincial city whereby they can remain as active gatekeepers in the aid industry. Many political representatives of rural areas do not even live there. And for those who do and who win office, the first thing they typically do is move to the town or city. The situation is such that most scholars focusing on the issue in Haiti look on Community Based Targeting as hopelessly corrupted (see Textbox 5).

### **TEXTBOX 5: LONG HISTORY OF COMMUNITY BASED TARGETING IN HAITI**


During the 1950s, 1960s and early to mid -1970s Community Councils made up of village elites were the prevailing rural targeting strategy in Haiti and considered highly effective (USAID 1983; Lavelle 2010). By the 1980s the consensus among those who studied them had changed. Maguire (1979: 28) was calling the gran neg (Big Man) who had been instrumental in making the councils successful their “gravest problem.” Honorat (cited in McClure 1984) wrote that the councils had “became ‘citified’” and composed of “clusters of people waiting to receive and control some development project benefit.” Smucker (1986, p. 109) too concluded that they, “became project oriented and the widespread perception was that they became dependent on the Food and tried to capture it.” In the 1990s, Kaufman (1996, p. 10) described the CBOs that had succeeded the Councils as “formed in response to community development programs” and little more than, “groups of symbolic participation.” Even Jennie Smith (2001), a champion of Haiti rural grassroots organizations, referred to them up as “plagued with corruption, mismanagement and other problems.” Arguably the best way to understand what had happened is in the context of increasing migration out of rural areas. Before the 1970s and 1980s, rural community leaders invested in property and social capital; this made Community Based Targeting not only viable but organic and arguably unavoidable. With support from community leaders-- “gran neg” and “gran dam”--humanitarian aid programs won community buy-in and support. But in the 1980s, 1990s until the present, political instability and migration out of the rural areas has sapped rural society of its hierarchical integrity. By the 1990s most traditional leaders and their children were gone. With their exodus export production and post-harvest processing industries all but completely disappeared from the rural areas. International aid soon took their place as the greatest sources of rural revenue. The extent to which humanitarian aid became a business is evident in the fact that while in the 1950s and 1960s humanitarian aid organizations had to partner with a rural elite comprised of traders, big farmers, and local politicians in order to reach the most vulnerable; but by the 1990s those same organizations found themselves dealing with an elite comprise of individuals who had made their money off of aid itself: pastors, orphanage owners and cooperative presidents. The trends are reflected in national statistics for declining agricultural production and skyrocketing emigration rates, both of which were occurring simultaneously with the apparent rise in corruption of Community Based and Extension Targeting resources.



**TEXTBOX 6: NOTAB SHIFT IN SOURCE OF SUPPORT**



**New Rural Notabs/Gran Negs/Dams**



### Dispersed Settlement Patterns

Complications for targeting that come from urbanization and the associated culture of elite capture are compounded by yet another issue: dispersed settlement patterns. Settlement patterns in rural Haiti—where in fact a great proportion of the population is extremely impoverished<sup>xv</sup>—are highly dispersed. Technically, they fall into a category of clumped to random dispersion (see Figures 1 – 6 below). Dispersed settlement patterns have a significant impact on targeting strategies. Traditional community based targeting overwhelmingly depends on village based leaders who today, because of the rampant migration discussed earlier, often know few people in the countryside (Schwartz 2011: 33). The juggernaut urbanization mentioned earlier also means that those individuals who obtain “leadership” roles tend to use the new position as a stepping stone out of rural areas and into the town and/or city, compounding the problem of rural under-representation. Thus, aid organizations and the State need a cost-effect targeting strategy that will allow them to reach beyond traditional mechanisms to accurately identify dispersed rural beneficiaries who conform to selection criteria.

### SETTLEMENT PATTERNS




Figure 2: Nucleated

Figure 3: Linear

Figure 4: Random dispersion




Figure 5: Uniform dispersion





Figure 6: Clumped dispersion

Figure 7: Household dispersion pattern in Des Chapel, Haiti





## FREQ-LISTING


The freelisting technique offers a mechanism overcoming the challenge of dispersed settlement patterns and bypassing the political and social elites used in traditional community based targeting but who the State and aid agencies have learned can no longer be relied on to give sincere recommendations (See Schwartz 2015). Freq-listing also offers an alternative to effective but costly community mapping and wealth ranking. The greatest advantage to the freq-listing strategy lay in that it taps local knowledge. Neither outsiders nor survey questions can readily measure social capital. However, like the leaf doctor seen in the example below with his or her herbal remedies, the typically competent adult in rural Haiti is an expert in judging the resources and social capital of his or her kin, friends, and neighbors. We expect from studies in Cultural Consensus Analysis that when a minimum of respondents identify the same individuals as qualifying for a specific criteria, those individuals will indeed most accurately fit the criteria.<sup>xvi</sup>

### Freq-Listing Mechanics


As seen, freq-listing is derived from Cultural Consensus Analysis. Even more specifically, it is derived from freelisting, a first-step technique used to elicit and describe categorical cultural knowledge. An example of freelisting is a researcher studying types of medicinal plants that healers who share a particular culture use to treat ailments. The researcher could ask a sample of 20 to 30 healers or elders to give the names of plants used to treat illnesses and afflictions. The healer freely, and without conscious regard for order or any other criteria, rattles off names of plants. Responses from all the healers are then correlated. Those plants mentioned often-- for example, by three or more respondents--are accepted as part of the taxonomic category of 'medicinal' plants used by the people in question. Plants mentioned only once or twice can be dismissed as idiosyncratic.

The technique is simple in its conception and application and yields a depth of information.

- The more frequently respondents mention a plant indicates its **legitimacy**
- Earlier the mention of a response suggests **salience** or greater importance.
- The postulate that greater consensus for most question indicates correctness can be built on to develop mathematically complex algorithms that yield answers keys for unknown questions and hence allow us to detect competence and **experts** in particular cultural domains (see Textbox 1).



In adapting the strategy to humanitarian aid targeting, we increase the accuracy of the technique by applying it at two stages. We first seek the most credible respondents. To do this we freq-list among the population to identify competent and honest adults who are regarded by their peers as local leaders (*notab*). We then further increase the probability that we have credible *notab* when we then use Cultural Consensus Analysis techniques to evaluate their performance, comparing reports from the different *notab* to evaluate and filter out the sincere from the self-serving.



Similar, to the expert healer with his or her herbal remedies, the typically competent *notab* can be thought of as a type of expert in judging the resources and social capital of his or her friends, and neighbors. The most competent ‘expert’ *notab* with overlapping networks of people known to them tend to recommend the same beneficiaries. In this way exceptionally competent *notab* can be identified in a methodical, objective and statistically robust manner (see Romney et. al. 1986 for the mathematical algorithm for identifying experts). The contrary and equally useful inference that can be made is that those *notab* with low or zero correlation between their recommendations and those of other *notab* can be assumed to be either attempting to game the system--recommending family or friends who are not qualified—or they are simply not competent in the subject domain and therefore can be removed from the master list of *notab* that are used as key informants

Once we have a data base of *notab*, they can be drawn on as source of information for a wide variety of needs. Whether it’s the identification of specific type of farmers, fishermen, a search for indigenous medical practitioners, the evaluation of schools or almost any other conceivable criteria. They can also be used to assess the urgency associated with drought or storms, identify especially hard-hit areas, identify most needy households, and verify the delivery of aid and evaluate its impact. In places such as Haiti, where cell phones are widely available and most of the country has cell phone coverage, contact with *notab* can be accomplished over the telephone for a small fraction of the costs of traditional household surveys. But even in cases where phone service is knocked out or not present, *notab* lists mean that surveyors or aid workers have statistically valid representatives of the local population who they can seek out to determine most needy families or to evaluate aid already delivered, and at cost much lower than that of traditional survey strategies.

## **TEXTBOX 7: CRITERIA FOR A GOOD METHOD**

A good place to begin understanding our own conceptual limitations regarding data collection methods and how we determine which method is most appropriate, is with the impossible triangle. Most researchers argue that data is limited by three inter-related factors: Cost, Time, and Quality. Known as “The Impossible Triangle, the assumption is that we cannot have all three:

- an inexpensive and fast survey means that the quality of data will be low
- a high-quality and fast survey means that the data will be costly
- a high-quality and in-expensive survey means the data will take too much time to obtain



But as seen with Freq-listing, the impossible triangle, while intuitively appealing, is a fallacy. There is no insurmountable or mathematical reason why inexpensive and high-quality data cannot be collected rapidly. Moreover, Cost, Time and Quality of data are by no means the only desirable attributes of data collection, particularly regarding targeting. Targeting strategies should also be verifiable in that we can ascertain with a high degree of certainty that the data tells us what we want to know, i.e. that a person really fits the proposed criteria. It should be replicable, meaning that, if we repeat it, we will get similar results. It should be cumulative, meaning that every time it is used it yields additional data, ultimately creating individual histories (for example, a history of a household’s conformance to vulnerability criteria). Ideally, it should be useful both during times of emergency to detect hardest-hit households and times non-emergency to detect chronic non-resiliency. If it is going to be acceptable to the community and not cause conflict and disruption, targeting must also achieve community buy-in, i.e. members of the community accept the method and the choice of beneficiaries. Similarly, it should support legitimate State institutions. Freq-listing offers us a technique for achieving all these objectives and at a cost far below traditional Proxy Means Testing and/or surveys.

**TEXTBOX 8: SUMMARY OF WHAT MAKES FREQ-LISTING GOOD  
TARGETING METHOD**

- 1) Methodologically *robust* in that it,
  - 2.1 Low-cost: inexpensive to deploy and maintain
  - 2.2 Fast: deploys rapidly
  - 2.3 Remote: can be maintained by telephone
  - 2.4 Non-disaster: useful in detecting beneficiaries during normal times
  - 2.5 Disaster: is useful in detecting beneficiaries after a disaster
  
- 2) Statistically *robust* in that it has the following qualities,
  - 1.1 Avoids **sampling errors** caused by observing a sample instead of the whole population
  - 1.2 Avoids **non-sampling** errors known as “coverage errors” and “response errors”
    - 1.2.1 **Response errors:** errors from definitional differences, misunderstandings, or deliberate misreporting. Specifically,
      - 1.2.1.1 Avoids committing to controversial or what may be erroneous or wrong indicators, (e.g. many that may be in the HDVI)
      - 1.2.1.2 Avoids deception that may come with asking beneficiaries and depending on honest responses from informants with a material interest in misleading data collectors (e.g. lies about assets, house ownership, number of children, missed meals...)
      - 1.2.1.3 Avoids elite capture at level of data collection (e.g. *notab* who might stuff lists with family and friends)
    - 1.2.2 **Coverage errors** come about from failure representatively sample the entire population, or inability to obtain information about all sample cases. Thus, the ideal targeting detection strategy,
      - 1.2.2.1 Detects material resources, i.e. wealth, such as ownership or access to land, animals, material goods, and income (without being obscured by the response errors that come with asking beneficiaries or elites interested in capturing aid)
      - 1.2.2.2 Detects social capital, i.e. material support that can be drawn on from networks of family, friends, business and sexual partners (without being obscured by the response errors that come with asking beneficiaries or elites interested in capturing aid)
      - 1.2.2.3 Sensitive to changes in material or social capital, i.e. can be used to detect changes in access to wealth and hence determine when a beneficiary no longer qualifies for aid or a non-beneficiary suddenly does qualify (without being obscured by the response errors that come with asking beneficiaries or elites interested in capturing aid)
  
- 3) It is socio-developmentally *robust* in that it is,
  - 3.1 Bottom up: rooted in the community
  - 3.2 Government: supportive of legitimate representatives of local
  - 3.3 Corruption: resistant to it
  - 3.4 Buy-in: achieves community buy-in at the local level, meaning that it is accepted among members of the community as a fair and just means to determine who deserves assistance.
  - 3.5 Monitoring capacity: is self-regulating in that it has the capacity to taps beneficiary knowledge to correct corruption, targeting and distribution error
  - 3.6 Institutional memory: amenable to cumulative record keeping

### **TEXTBOX 9: PROXY MEANS TESTING, WHY IT DOESN'T WORK**

PMT and indices such as the PPI depend on what Hashemi, and de Montesquiou (2011) call “easily verifiable indicators, such as family size, and type of housing.” In rural Haiti they are neither easily identifiable nor is there much statistical support for them. Using the algorithm for the most statistically significant predictors of children malnutrition found in the 2013 CNSA survey, the Proxy Means Test would be wrong 68% of the time. A history of PMT investigations yielded similarly poor results (HLCS 2001; Wiens and Sobrado 1998; IDB 1999; FAFO 2003, 2001; 2006; EMMUS 1995, 2000, 2005, 2012; Schreiner 2006; CFSVA 2007/2008; Verner 2008; ECHO 2011; ENSA 2011). The poor statistical applicability of “criteria” can be understood in part by the fact that people living in Haiti comprise a mass of poverty that includes some ~80% of the population (see Textbox 2). In the historical absence of any State social security system, the population has adapted to surviving lean times by depending on one another: they invest heavily in social capital. Thus, households already living on the margins of subsistence are interlocked in a network of reciprocal relations that support one another (see Textbox 3), reducing the vulnerability of the lone household and leveling out poverty across the population. Also important to understand is that detecting differential rural vulnerability using material variables is obscured by the orientation toward urban migration seen in section on Urbanization of this report, i.e. it is difficult to detect material differences in the rural areas when most people living there are trying to migrate to the city or overseas. People prefer to invest in urban rather than rural residences and they make heavy investments in getting their children into urban schools or to the US and Canada.

Examples of the Most Common Beneficiary Criteria Used in Rural Haiti And that Do Not Apply <sup>1</sup>	
Criteria	Reason it does not apply
Electricity	85% of rural HH's have no electricity; and more “non-poor” vs. “poor”
Cooking Fuel	73% of rural HH's use wood
Water source	95.2% of rural have <i>no</i> water; 42.6% travel over 30 minutes to get it
Latrine	20% of rural HH's have an ‘improved’ latrine; 67% have either a simple hole in the ground no latrine at all
Waste disposal	100% of rural HH's either burn trash or throw it in a ravine
Single Female Headed	No survey has found them significantly poorer than average HH; most find them equal and some find them less vulnerable
Crowding	Rural houses are highly standardized in size; membership tends to increase with temporary or long-term increase in resources
Child Dependency Ratios	More children 7+ years of age = greater labor force
Elderly	May be an indication, <i>not</i> of poverty, but wealth and land ownership or remittances from descendants living overseas
Handicapped	May indicate long-term capacity to care for a non-contributing household member
Coping Strategy Index	Refers to 7 days before survey: confounded by respondent aid-fishing
No land	Increase in 1 hectare of land results in only a 2% increase in income; salaried labor—not land-- is <i>least</i> vulnerable income category.
No livestock	Livestock difficult to impossible to confirm and even if confirmed could be temporary due to sell-off
No labor capacity	Definition of labor capacity obscure; rotating labor groups, hired labor and family labor not resident in household may compensate
Dependent on petty trade	Commerce is a major source of income
House construction	Multi-household ownership and tendency to invest in urban homes
Presence of orphans	25% of children raised by grandparents or other family member



**TEXTBOX 10: THE “OTHER” BENEFICIARIES**

The *de facto* greatest beneficiaries of most aid programs are often consultants and aid workers. Other beneficiaries include nationals hired as staff, accountants, drivers, mechanics and, not least of all, surveyors. In the case of food distributions, they include those who lease out warehouse space, those who provide freight services as well as dock workers and porters.

In the case of voucher programs *de facto* beneficiaries include businesses that produce the coupons and vendors who exchange the coupons for food, tools, seeds or other goods. *De facto* humanitarian aid beneficiaries also include elites who rent apartments and houses to NGO and UN agency staff, the banks that transfer money, and phone companies that provide transfer and communication services. All are beneficiaries of aid projects and often at monetary figures far greater than the value of what reaches the targeted beneficiaries. Frequenting offers a means of significantly reducing costs so that we have more resources for the intended beneficiaries.




## The Freq-Listing Strategy: Step by Step

### A) STAGE ONE: *NOTAB* SELECTION


#### Maps and Selecting GPS Sample Points

At the first stage, surveyors interview respondents who recommend 5 *notab* who live within a one hour walk from you. The respondents are selected randomly but in a geographically systematic manner so to assure that people are adequately represented throughout the region. Specifically, a grid is laid over a map of the region and then, beginning at a random starting point, the researchers mark waypoints every kilometer (the actual distance can be adjusted based on population density, the greater the population density the more frequent the points). The researcher then uses Google Earth to adjust the points to the nearest households, thereby creating a geo- and demographically uniform coverage of the area in question. Interviewers should attempt to balance sex ratios of informants: thus they should ask for a male household head and at the next house a female household head.<sup>xvii xviii xix</sup>



#### Loading selected points into GPS App

Once the points are selected, a KML file with the points are loaded into a GPS tracking application for telephone devices. The surveyors then use the device to locate the points and interview a specified number of houses closest to the chosen point. As with the frequency of intervals of the points (i.e. 500 meters or 1 kilometer), the determining factor is population density. The greater the population density the higher the number of points and the greater the number of people interviewed. The number of people interviewed per point is also related to the number of points. The more frequent the points, the fewer the number of sampled households needed at each point. Ideally, the more the points and greater the number of people interviewed, the more representative the sample. However, another factor is cost. Seldom are enough resources available to interview everyone. Moreover, the goal of any efficient targeting strategy is to seek the most representative sampling for the lowest cost. In the end, the rule of thumb should be to sample, depending on available resources, from 10% to 20% of the total population of household heads. This gives the maximum likely coverage for the minimum cost.<sup>xx</sup>



## B) FIELD SURVEY

Surveyors visit GPS points throughout a region interviewing a specified number of household heads closest to the specified point. How many are interviewed at each point varies with population density. In the case of very high population density, such as an urban area with

The respondent should be male or female household head and/or spouse of household head.

As with any survey, the surveyors should carefully note absentee houses and refusals. For absentee household heads, surveyors should revisit the household at least once before replacing the house with the nearest neighbor. More than 20% refusals or absentees should be considered unacceptable and in such a case the survey directors should take corrective measure, first checking surveyors to verify they are making a due effort to locate household heads and then working with local political leaders to inform the population and increase compliance.

Each interviewee is asked for a recommended number of *notabs*. Specifically, each is asked in a clear and concise language: “Give me a list of five male local *notab* and five female *notab* who you believe are fair, honest and impartial.” At least in Haiti, the concept of *notab* is known and is intimately bound with the concept of a fair and honest leader, advisor and judge of conflicts.

Even in the most rugged areas surveyors should be able to gather 12 lists per day. (See Text Box 13 Maissade).

## C) CLEANING THE *NOTAB* LISTS

Daily, the lists of recommended *notab* are then sent electronically to the home office where they are cleaned of spelling incongruities and correlated to detect the most frequently cited *notab*. For example, all individuals cited by three or more respondents may be qualified as bona fide *notab*. If the sample is very large, there is a high level of correspondence between recommendations, or if the number of *notab* needed is small, the frequency a *notab* is cited on lists can be increased as appropriate. The *notab* are then used as a resource for identifying beneficiaries.

## D) *BENEFICIARY LISTS*

Once a master list of *notab* is obtained, each are contacted. In areas where there is no telephone service, this can mean physically tracking down and visiting each *notab*, involving a high level of effort but significantly less so than a traditional survey or proxy means test. In areas where cell phone coverage is nearly complete, such as Haiti, telephone networking strategies can be used to establish dependable contact links with as much as 95% of the *notab*.

To clarify, we know from experience 50% to 60% of *Notab* will be contacted by telephone immediately and without complications. The remaining 40% to 50% become increasingly difficult to contact. Fortunately, there are networking techniques that guarantee high rates of contact. The most important of these techniques include:

- a) Contact information gathered for respondents who recommend the *notab*. In the event the office team cannot reach a *notab* by telephone, they call one of the respondents who originally recommended the *notab*, and they ask the person to go physically visit *notab* and have the *notab* call the office team. A 25 HTG transfer of telephone minutes is given as a reward.

b) Cluster sampling (interviewing 5 household heads closest to specific sample points), means that, in the event that those who recommended a *notab* cannot be contacted, the office team can contact a neighbor of one of those who recommended the *notab* and use that person to contact the original respondent who is then asked to contact the *notab*. Similarly, any person living in the same localite as the *notab* can be contacted and asked to visit the *notab* and have the *notab* call the office team.

Once the *notab* is contacted, he or she is asked to provide a list of people matching the targeting criteria. The precise criteria for a targeted beneficiary depends on the objective of the targeting and the interests of the humanitarian aid organization.

The lists of beneficiaries are requested from the *notab* upon first contact. The *notab* is given a time that he or she will be contacted again, at which point the names and addresses for those recommended “most vulnerable” individuals will be given either over the telephone, as in the case of Haiti or, in the case of areas where there is no cell phone coverage, physically retrieved by surveyors—a grueling task but one that, as mentioned earlier on, is considerably less costly than traditional survey strategies.

#### E) CLEANING THE BENEFICIARY LISTS

As with the lists of *notab*, the lists of beneficiaries are cleaned to correct for variation in spelling of names and locations. In cases of ambiguity, the beneficiary is verified by reference to location, nickname and house name. The names are then correlated to identify those individuals mentioned by more than two *notab*. For example, all individuals mentioned by at least three *notab* qualify as a beneficiary. As mentioned above regarding creation of a master *notab* list, this number can be adjusted as required. If assistance for more beneficiaries is available, the number of those who qualify can be increased by lowering the requirement to mention by two *notab*. If less beneficiaries are needed the criteria can be made more stringent by increasing the number of mentions by *notab*.

## RESOURCES NEEDED

### HUMAN RESOURCES

From past experience (see Textbox 13), we know that to accomplish in 30 days the freq-listing of a commune in which there are 20,000 households, a freq-listing team should include:

- 10 field workers competent in field surveyors, and 5 of whom can drive a motorcycle
- 4 list cleaners and telephone operators competent in networking strategies
- 1 consultant with intermediate level competency in statistics and EXCEL

### MATERIALS AND SOFTWARE

It is recommended that:

- Maps and GPS point selection are made using Google Earth.
- GPS points be loaded into the Android application, MapsWithMe.
- Samsung Galaxy tablets be used as phones (Samsung tablets are one of the only tablets on the market that have independent GPS chips, making them useful even in areas where there is no cell phone service)
- The questionnaire that gathers the lists and location information be programmed in the platform Open Data Kit.
- Data be downloaded and cleaned in Micro Soft EXCEL.
- Surveyors travel on motorcycle and foot

### FREQ-LISTING INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE

Scholars note that a pervasive problem with freelisting is informants simply forgetting to list all the items they know (Brewer, D. D. 2002. Brown 1923; Lazar and Buschke 1972; Brewer 2000, Hutchinson 1983). The number of responses on lists can be increased by 20 percent if the interviewer will simply prompt the respondent. This is done in two stages. First, the interviewer simply repeats the original question. Thus, in the case of *notab*, the surveyor would record all the names the respondent readily offers and then say, “who else do you know that qualifies as a *notab*?” The interviewer then reads back the list of *notab* and asks if the respondent can think of anyone else who qualifies. Other important points are,

- Interviewers should attempt to get 50 percent female and 50 percent male respondents. This can best be done by rotating respondents male, female, male, female.... At times this is not always practical and surveyors may have to adjust for the practical reality of the field. Nevertheless, just as surveyors seek to get 5 recommended female notab for every 5 male recommended notab (something rarely attainable), they should seek gender balance regarding respondents.
- Surveyors may wish to take 6 households per GPS point, something that is logistically more practical as surveyors can work in 2-person teams, each conducting 3 households surveys per point.



- When surveys arrive at a GPS point and cannot find 6 household heads, they should simply take as many as they can. But additional points should be included in the original sample to account for the inevitable shortfalls.
- In cases where a yard has more than 1 household (in Haiti yards may have many households), surveyors should not interview more than 1 respondent per yard.
- Surveyors should strive to interview respondents in private. The respondent can be permitted to consult others, but the actual interview should be between the interviewer and respondent. To accomplish this the surveyor should explain the task and importance of confidentiality—as with voting.

## QUESTIONNAIRES

FREQ-LISING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STEP 1 *NOTAB*

1. Where interview occurs
  - a. Commune
  - b. Section
  - c. Habitation
  - d. Lokalite
2. Name and contact for Main Respondent
  - a. Last Name of Respondent
  - b. First Name of Respondent
  - c. Nickname of respondent
  - d. Telephone contact number 1
  - e. Telephone contact number 2
3. Give me the name of 5 female *notab* who live who live within a 1 hour walk of you and who you believe are fair, honest and impartial.”
  - a. LastName\_\_\_\_\_FirstName\_\_\_\_\_ Nickname\_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Commune\_\_\_\_\_Section \_\_\_\_\_ Habitation\_\_\_\_\_ Lokalite\_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Telephone number 1: \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone number 2: \_\_\_\_\_  
(SURVEYOR: Call the numbers and verify)
  - d. Telephone # 1 verified: Yes/No Telephone # 2 verified: Yes/No

**[repeated for 4 more *notab*]**

**Repeat for 5 Male Notab**

## FREQ-LISING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STEP 2 BENEFICIARY

1. Name and contact for *notab* (entered prior to telephone call)
  - a. Last Name of Respondent
  - b. First Name of Respondent
  - c. Nickname of respondent
  - d. Name by which neighbors and friends identify beneficiary’s household
  - e. Telephone number 1 for contact
  - f. Telephone number 2 for contact
2. Give me the name of 20 to 30 household heads who live within a 1 hour walk of you and who you believe would be least capable of surviving a serious disaster or shock. For example, if there was a devastating hurricane or if an adult in the household died.
  - a. LastName\_\_\_\_\_FirstName\_\_\_\_\_ Nickname\_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Commune\_\_\_\_\_Section \_\_\_\_\_ Habitation\_\_\_\_\_ Lokalite\_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Telephone number 1: \_\_\_\_\_ Telefon number 2: \_\_\_\_\_


**[repeated for 19 more beneficiary]**

### TEXTBOX 11: FREQ-LISTING MAISSADE<sup>1</sup>

In May 2014, at the behest of CNSA, surveyors for Socio-Dig, a Haitian survey company, freq-listed the commune of Maissade (area 288 km<sup>2</sup>, pop ~ 60,000). The objective was to identify the most needy households. Twenty field surveyors traveled on 10 motorcycles and 6 office workers took 13 days to complete the survey. Two survey selection strategies were applied equally throughout the commune: one involved focal-gathering points, whereby surveyors coordinated with local authorities to identify two rendezvous points per Habitation and invited people to come and be interviewed for lists of *notab*. The other strategy involved predefined waypoints every 250 meters with the goal of interviewing 1 in every 10 household heads. Surveyors asked respondents,

“Could you recommend 5 *notab*, either male or female, who live in the area, are honest, who people respect, and who are always willing to render service to help others.”

The surveyors gathered an average of 12-13 lists per surveyor per day, a total 50 interviews per habitation, varying from 150 to 250 per day for all the teams. Each evening all the surveys from that day were aggregated and transmitted digitally to the office in Port-au-Prince where the office team reviewed and modified them for spelling consistencies. They were then correlated to identify *notab*.



GPS point for Maissade Freq-Lists

Totaled, 1,985 people were interviewed. 47% female and 53% male, yielding a broad list of 5,265 *notab*. Of these, 508 *notab*--one for every 55 adults living in Maissade—were mentioned by at least 3 respondents. The exact number of mentions per *notab* varied from 180 *notab* mentioned 3 times to 1 *notab* who was mentioned by 54 respondents. Socio-Dig used networking strategies discussed on page 20-21 to successfully contact 451 of those *notab*. The *notab* were asked for a list of five beneficiaries, “people who are hungriest in the township or neighborhood where you live.” The 451 *notabs* created a broad list of 3,900 beneficiaries, 105 of which were mentioned 3 or more times, approximately 2% of households in Maissade. Drawing on these lessons from Socio-Dig the technique has been modified in this report as follows:

- Field surveyors now use a mixed waypoint and focal-gathering point, seeking out waypoints every 1 kilometer and interviewing the closest 5 household heads; this increases capacity, assuring that each surveyor is capable of obtaining at least 12 lists per day
- Instead of asking for 5 either male or female *notab*, surveyors ask for 5 male and 5 female *notab* (Maissade respondents overwhelmingly mentioned male *notab*, reflecting a Haitian cultural tradition of men dominating political and formal administrative roles).
- Instead of asking for only 5 recommended beneficiaries, *Notab* are asked for 20 to 30 recommended beneficiaries.
- *Notab* who give lists that do not correspond with those from other *notab* (see page 20), are removed from the master list.
- *Notab* who demonstrate expertise through high correlation are marked as a resource for additional recommendations.

In this way the Freq-Listing strategy should allow practitioners to reach the 10% or greater mark of beneficiaries and at very little additional cost.

**TEXTBOX 12:****BENEFICIARY TARGETING AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE**

Targeting is a fundamental component in the State provision of services, economic development programs, and guarantees of social security. It is precisely these undertakings—assistance and services to the citizenry—that reinforces the State and gives it credibility and support among its citizenry. The inverse of the State being reinforced in the role of protector and nurturer of the population is that targeting, governance, and provision of services and social security that does not involve the State works against the integrity of State institutions. It undermines the credibility of the State. Targeting in which local ASEC, KASEC, Mayors, Departmental and National government entities are excluded creates competing power brokers. Indeed, with little or no other services and aid, targeting that does not involve State entities runs the risk of rendering them inert, or worse, pushing State functionaries into a role of opponent or antagonist of aid and services intended for the good of the population. The Government of Haiti (2010) developed the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti., a whole-of-government approach built on three strategic pillars,

- a) investment in agriculture
- b) provision of basic social services for improving health, education, and nutrition, and
- c) creation of social safety nets for the most vulnerable and during crisis

The plan involves multiple ministries (MAST, MCPE, MARNDR, MCI, MSPP, MEF, MCFDF), para-State agencies (CNSA, FAES, IHSI), international donors (USAID, IFAD, WFP, EU, WB, IDB, IMF), international governance and facilitating agencies (WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO, OEA), and NGO implementing partners (CARE, ACF, WV, Concern, PADF, CRS, Oxfam, and ACTED, to name only a few). A crucial ingredient to the success of all these programs, from agricultural assistance to farmers to nutritional relief to the most vulnerable households, is correctly identifying the recipients: Targeting.



Haiti Food Riots 2008.  
Photograph: Kena Betancur/EPA



Haiti Food Riots 2008.  
Photograph: Eduardo Munoz/Reuters

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## ENDNOTES

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<sup>i</sup> In the case for which we are currently proposing to use it in Haiti, we are referring to targeting households and specifically those “least resilient.” More specifically, the reason we target households is because they are, in rural Haiti, the primary unit of both consumption and production. The household is the primary mechanism of social security for all people living in rural Haiti. And with extremely rare exception, all people in rural Haiti are members of households. What is meant by “least resilient” is those households that are most likely to perish in the event of an environmental disaster (such as drought, hurricane, or earthquake), a political or economic crisis (such as insurrection or embargo), an internal household shock (such as an illness or death of a productive member), or simply those already in dire need of assistance.

The conclusion that we are targeting the ‘least resilient’ is based on two categories of presuppositions,

- 1) The goals of WFP and MAST,
  - a) social protection (providing a minimum social safety net),
  - b) food security (assisting those least able to procure food), and
  - c) intervening to assist the most impoverished people

- 2) The amount of aid available is limited.

The State and humanitarian agencies typically cannot help everyone impacted or everyone living in a particular region. Even if there were enough resources to give everyone aid—and their seldom, if ever, is--the State and humanitarian relief agencies should not want to help everyone: to do so is to encourage dependency and discourage the population from helping themselves.

<sup>ii</sup> Rural Haiti abounds with examples of leaders not considered legitimate representatives of the local community: for example, mayors were appointed by the executive between 2011 and 2016; many religious leaders obtain their status, not by election and support from local parishioners, but rather by financial support from overseas churches.

<sup>iii</sup> For example, the Wealth Ranking and Community Mapping that Concern Worldwide and FONKOZE use in Haiti take two to three months and require one skilled field worker per ~50 households.

<sup>iv</sup> The simple fact is that MAST nor any other Haitian government institution can afford depend on labor intensive household surveys or highly skilled analysts. Not unless WFP, USAID or the World Bank continue to pay for it. In short, is not sustainable unless one those entities plans on making a commitment to continue to foot the bill until Haiti is sufficiently solvent to pay—if the Haitian authorities will even want to do so when they, and not international institutions and consultants, become the decision makers.

<sup>v</sup> Regarding the scarcity, expense and impracticableness of using targeting methods that require highly skilled practitioners, the Kore Lavi Mid-Term Evaluation (2016) noted that,

Inadequate compensation of MAST staff involved in information system operations and management is contributing to recruitment and retention difficulties of MAST SO1 staff. Both Kore Lavi staff and senior MAST officials point to inadequate compensation as the primary difficulty in recruiting/appointing MAST staff to SO1/information management positions. The skill set required (even basic skills) command \$2,000 per month from NGOs versus \$400 per month most MAST staff members make. Additionally, MAST staff see appoint to Kore Lavi-related activities as uncompensated addition to their workload (this is true for all SOs).

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2016

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<sup>vi</sup> According the World Bank funded survey (ECVMAS 2012), in 2011 more 59 percent Haiti's 10.4 million people lived under the national poverty line US\$2.41 per day; 24 percent were living under the national extreme poverty line of US\$1.23 per day.

<sup>vii</sup> See Schwartz 2015

<sup>viii</sup> What has arguably become an aid culture characterized by widespread deceit and fraud became most apparent in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. The IDP (Internally Displace Person) camps grew for seven months after the earthquake, long after the last aftershock. They went from 370,000 people living “under improvised shelters” on January 20th (IOM), to 700,000 on January 31st (USAID 2010), to 1.3 million on March 1st (UN 2010), to Nigel Fisher's claim of 1.536 million in 1,555 camps on July 9th. In coming to understand why they grew, one USAID (2011) study estimated that 19 of 20 households living in camps did not come from destroyed homes. In effect, people were pouring into the camps to get aid. In the 2015 book, *Rocks in the Water, Rocks in the Sun: A Memoir from the Heart of Haiti (Our Lives: Diary, Memoir, and Letters Series)*, Haitian Vilmond Joegodson, who grew up in Cité Soleil, one of Port-au-Prince's poorest neighborhoods, and who moved into several of the camps, described the process:

All that was needed was eight long sturdy branches and some sheets to hang from them to represent walls... The NGOs decided to visit them and to distribute whatever tents or tarps they still had. To qualify for those donations, or other aid, Haitians needed to have a place etched out in one of the camps and to have demonstrated some proof of residence.

Everyone kept their ears open to find out where the NGOs were distributing the tents most generously. The objective was to go to that camp and demonstrate a presence. Then wait. Sometimes people squatted in a number of camps at the same time in order to cover all their bases.

[Deralcine, Vilmond Joegodson and Paul Jackson. 2015. *Rocks in the Water, Rocks in the Sun: A Memoir from the Heart of Haiti (Our Lives: Diary, Memoir, and Letters Series)* Paperback – April 23, 2015.

But access to the aid, even for those who were pretending to have had their home destroyed, was anything but democratic. Erns Maire Clair, a primary school teacher an 43-year-old mother of three, explained to researchers for the CCCM OCHA Cluster, March 12, 2016

The camp committee took everything that was given for the camp. They took the tarpaulins and if you needed one you had to buy it from them for 250 or 300 gourdes. If not, you lived in the rain. Sometimes we saw trucks come with food. But they took everything to store at their houses. They didn't give us anything. Some of these people had houses in good condition. The camps offered them more advantages than staying in their own houses.

Cadio Jean, a 43-year-old ironworker and father of four who was in the camps explained to the CCCM OCHA Cluster researchers on March 13, 2016

What I saw happening was that they sold the food. Sometimes they made arrangements with other people and gave them food several times. These people sold the food and shared the money with them.



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Although almost as a rule, humanitarian aid agencies avoid acknowledging the corruption and widespread gaming of the system, the World Bank would note in its 2014, *Rental Support Cash Grant Programs: Operations Manual* that, “one interviewee gave some idea of the scale of the challenge when he noted that of 600 complaints received following registration at one camp, 70 were found to indeed live there.” In what was one of the few examples of a verifiable rental subsidy beneficiary list, Concern Worldwide wrote in an internal report that:

Over 3000 persons declared not having any ID during registration; however verification by local organisation ACAT (contracted to provide birth certificates) found that the great majority of those persons do in fact have ID. ACAT’s verification brought down the number of paperless beneficiaries to 379 .... (For the quote regarding only 379 of 3,000 people claiming to have lost their ID cards being legitimate see, Concern Worldwide Report to the European Commission - Directorate General - Humanitarian aid and Civil protection – ECHO eSingle form for humanitarian aid actions App\_version Agreement; page 6.)

The corruption is sometimes violent. The house the consultant is sitting in as he writes was home to a colleague and Haitian national NGO director who cut off food aid to a particular local association. The leaders of which, he believes, subsequently tried to kidnap his children, an attempt thwarted by a quick-witted chauffeur (but not before a gun was discharged inside the vehicle in which the children were riding). Only two weeks ago a Haitian director of PNSC (school feeding programs) was attacked in his home. The assailants fired some 500 bullets into the house and cars, something the director blames he government for and their desire to oust him from his job and take control of the food aid. Any Haitian national or foreigner one in the country for any length of time could recount plenty of other stories, such as one recent incident involving one the World’s largest federations of humanitarian workers whose “beneficiaries” threatened to burn down the houses of new beneficiaries who they interpreted as intercepting aid they had come to come to see as their own.

<sup>ix</sup> It is not really clear how impoverished rural Haitians are. Underscoring the problems with targeting, the data that exists is controversial and of poor quality. This includes the 2001 HLCS and the 2012 EVCMA, World Bank funded studies upon which rests the logic behind the PPI and HDVI indicators. The questionable quality of the data is something widely recognized among the analysts who worked it but only admitted behind closed doors of humanitarian aid board rooms.

<sup>x</sup> *Plasaj* an institution that is essentially as arguably as credible as marriage, the key ingredient to both being the founding of a household. The man provides land, livestock, and builds a house. The woman provides furniture, linen and cutlery. While the man plants gardens, tends to large livestock such as cattle, labors or migrates in search of work, the woman is responsible of the home, her primary obligations are to make meals, retrieve water, harvest, process and sell crops and small livestock, all labor intensive endeavors in rural Haiti, where electricity is essentially non-existent, water must be fetched from distance springs, the primary cooking fuel is wood, and the primary transportation is by foot (see Table N1 for labor). The woman must also, more importantly than anything, bear the children who will help her with these labor-intensive endeavors (see Table N2 for children). The woman is thought of as the owner and manager of the home. Without children to help accomplish the extremely labor intensive demands of making a household productive, a household cannot survive. So extreme is the demand that households without children essentially does not exist.

Table N1: Average daily labor requirements for principal household tasks

Task	Frequency per day	Days per week	Avg # hours per week	Avg. time per	
				Min	Max
Morning house cleaning	1	6	1–2	6.0	12.0
Weekly house cleaning	1	1	3–6	3.0	6.0
Water carrying	1–4	7	1.2	8.4	33.6
Morning meal	1	7	1–2	7.0	14.0
Afternoon meal	1	7	2–4	14.0	28.0
Gathering fire wood	1	7	1–3	7.0	21.0
Laundry	1	2	6–12	12.0	24.0
Walk to garden + harvesting	1	3.5	2.5	8.8	8.8
Trip to market	1	2	4	8.0	8.0
Total	—	—	—	74.2	155.4

Source: Schwartz 2009

Table N2: Adult sexual division of labor (N = 1,482) (Schwartz 2009)

Task	Male, female, and both					Total
	Male	Female	Both	Neither	Total	
Housework	5.4%	86.0%	6.7%	98.1%	1.8%	100.0%
Cooking	5.6%	87.6%	4.6%	97.8%	2.4%	100.0%
Childcare	5.3%	77.1%	7.4%	89.8%	10.3%	100.0%
Carry water	6.7%	79.1%	7.8%	93.6%	6.4%	100.0%
Sell produce	6.1%	75.2%	4.6%	85.9%	14.2%	100.0%
Sell livestock	24.4%	34.6%	22.3%	81.3%	18.8%	100.0%
Tend livestock	58.4%	11.7%	16.4%	86.5%	13.5%	100.0%
Garden work	58.7%	13.8%	20.9%	93.4%	6.6%	100.0%
Wage labor	24.4%	5.8%	3.0%	33.2%	66.9%	100.0%

Note: Neither means no children in the household perform the task. Includes households with no children and only toddlers.

Table N3: Child sexual division of labor (N = 1,482) (Schwartz 2009)

Task	Male	Female	Both	Male, Neith	Total
Housework	11.7%	49.2%	14.8%	75.7	24.3 100.0%
Cooking	12.4%	46.9%	13.5%	72.8	27.2 100.0%
Childcare	9.8%	40.4%	12.3%	62.5	37.5 100.0%
Carry water	13.4%	28.7%	31.5%	73.6	26.4 100.0%
Sell produce	10.9%	10.6%	10.1%	31.6	68.4 100.0%
Sell livestock	5.1%	22.1%	5.7%	32.9	67.1 100.0%
Tend	40.7%	5.6%	10.2%	56.5	43.5 100.0%
Garden work	39.1%	4.4%	9.2%	52.7	47.3 100.0%
Wage labor	5.6%	1.2%	1.5%	8.3%	91.7 100.0%

Note: Neither means no children in the household perform the task. This includes Households with no children and only toddlers.

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<sup>xi</sup> Moreover, no matter how many wives and homesteads a man has, it is rare that he would leave a wife with whom he has established a production homestead; for all are social relations, they have value, they provide material goods and resources in time of need, they are social security.

<sup>xii</sup> The preacher is nothing without a congregation, but a preacher that does not offer some social security will not have many followers, whether food in time of need or free goodwill cloths sent by affiliated church is the US, or access to lower cost or free school for children, Similarly, the shaman, who may force the sale of large possessions when a family member is sick, will give when his patients are in need, for without being appreciated and having reputation for generosity the shaman would be loathed and scorned.

<sup>xiii</sup> What makes social capital so important to targeting in rural Haiti is that it is only in knowing the extent of these relations that we can determine important targeting criteria such as an individual's capacity to meet crisis, what is called "resiliency." The resiliency of a household's members includes assets and skills, but arguably as or more important is the sum social capital of its members. It is these relations, as much as anything else, that the household draws on to in times of need. Or in times where it simply seeks to make an investment. The relations are the measure of the resources of the household, but they are a measure that no surveyor or indicator can easily detect, not with the depth and instantaneity that kin, neighbors or friends living in the area can. Moreover, a confounding challenge of measuring a household's social capital is that it can change instantly. A son arrives in the United States and gets a job or a daughter goes to the Dominican Republic and marries a Belgium millionaire, everything changes.

<sup>xiv</sup> While the flow of goods and cash certainly differs based on the individual household capacity, for the bulk of households most cash probably moves, not from urban to rural, but from rural household to urban kinship-linked households, particularly in the highly frequent case where children who originated in the rural household are now in a town or urban school in urban areas.

<sup>xv</sup> IFAD. 2014 Rural Poverty Portal. <http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/haiti>

<sup>xvi</sup> Role of the State: Yet another advantage of freq-listing is that State authorities can be involved without vitiating the quality of the data. There is sometimes antagonistic views of the State's role in humanitarian aid. But if freq-listing is to achieve credibility and not undermine the role of State representatives (ASEC), those representatives should be contacted, informed about the process, and their endorsement secured. For the freq-listing process to reinforce the State it must be a State sanctioned undertaking clearly explained as a strategy to achieve a high degree of impartiality in the choice of beneficiaries, to detect those who may be recently vulnerable and to exclude past beneficiaries who are no longer among the most vulnerable. Some ASEC appreciate the strategy as a mechanism for removing suspicion that they are manipulating the targeting process to the advantage of their own partisans. But ultimately, the extent to which freq-listing or any other targeting strategy reinforces (or does not undermine) State entities depends on the acceptance among the humanitarian aid sector of the State's role in humanitarian aid targeting and the consistency in terms of rights and duties with which that acceptance is applied i.e. a definitive policy decreed at the level of parliament, the executive, or in the absence of the former at least a policy agreed upon among the most important donors, aid agencies and State ministries.

<sup>xvii</sup> Our experience over some 26 years of doing surveys in rural Haiti, is that informing the population prior to the survey is not necessary. Nor is it necessary to work with or through local political representatives (ASEC and KASEC). Moreover, because freq-listing for aid beneficiaries is meant to bypass nepotism and attempts by local officials and leaders to monopolize the distribution of aid, it is recommended that politicians and local leaders *not* accompany surveyors. This will,

- 
- a) de facto prevent unethical monopoly of the aid
  - b) assure the population that it is a politically impartial process

<sup>xviii</sup> One hour is the most convenient figure and it fits well with the average size of a commune, which will be the most common geographic target area. The average commune in Haiti is 186 km<sup>2</sup>, which is approximately 14 x 14 kilometers. Thus, for a fast walker, like most Haitians, that's a radius of about 6-7 kilometers. This means that for a person living right in the middle of a commune, 1 hour distance is enough—on average—for the person to reach anywhere in the entire commune. If the respondent lives on the edge of the commune, then 1/2 he or she can, on average, cover 1/2 of the geographic space of the commune. All of this is hypothetical as no commune is perfectly circular. But using averages allows us to create algorithms that predict overlap in people known and ideals for *notab* per km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>xix</sup> Units of Analysis are Households and the delimited geographical area is the Habitation, also sometimes referred to as lokalite, a term that also applies to sub-Habitation level geographical areas. Although a habitation may be composed of two or more lokalite, Habitation are the smallest territorial unit recognized by the Haitian constitution. They typically have less than 500 households per Habitation and average less than 5 km<sup>2</sup> in area. They are based on French Plantations that were split up after Independence was declared in 1804, but their borders have never been officially delimited. It was not until 1994 that political representation at the Habitation level was effectively put into practice and, even then, not all Communes applied the traditional concept and identification of Habitation equally. Thus, in some areas of Haiti people readily recognize and agree on the limits of Habitation. In other areas the limits are completely unknown. Frequency listing allows us to circumvent this problem. During the first step, the field survey stage, interviews with informants enable us to define the approximate geographical bounds of Habitation and smaller area lokalite.

#### GOH 2006 DÉCRET PORTANT SUR L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES SECTIONS COMMUNALES BONIFACE ALEXANDRE PRÉSIDENT PROVISOIRE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Donné au Palais national, à Port-au-Prince, le 1<sup>er</sup> février 2006, An 203<sup>e</sup> de l'Indépendance

Article 4.- Le territoire de la Section communale est organisé en quartiers, en habitations et en villages. Les quartiers sont des zones d'habitats rapprochés que ce soit en milieu urbain ou rural. Les habitations sont des zones d'habitats dispersés identifiés comme tels par la tradition. On distingue l'habitation de 500 habitants ou moins, de la grande habitation qui en compte plus. Le village est le chef-lieu de la Section communale. Il regroupe les services administratifs et sociaux de base de la Section communale.

Article 9.- Les membres de l'Assemblée Municipale (AM) sont élus au suffrage universel indirect par les Assemblées de Sections communales (Asec) sur des listes de candidats (es) proposés (es) par les associations des habitations ou des quartiers de la Section communale, régulière régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune. Chaque association habilitée présente à l'Asec deux candidats : un homme et une femme. Les membres de l'Assemblée municipale sont indéfiniment rééligibles.

1987 Sous-section 2.1.-De la Section communale

Article 15.- La Section communale est la collectivité territoriale de base. Son territoire est organisé en quartiers, en habitations et en villages. Le village est le chef lieu de la section communale.

Article 29.- Les membres de l'Assemblée de Section communale sont élus au suffrage universel direct au niveau de chaque habitation ou quartier, sur des listes de candidats proposées par les associations de ces habitations ou de ces quartiers régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune. La loi détermine le nombre de membres à l'assemblée au prorata du nombre d'habitants dans la Section communale. Article

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30.- Les membres de l'Assemblée municipale sont élus au suffrage universel indirect par les assemblées de Sections communales, sur des listes de candidats (es) proposées (es) par les associations des habitations ou des quartiers de la Section communale régulièrement enregistrées à la mairie de la commune.

<sup>xx</sup> The mathematical challenge here:

We sample a 14 km square county (average size of a commune in Haiti) at 1 km intervals. 5 people at each interval. A total of 980 people. We ask each for a list of 10 honest local leaders (*notab*)—5 male and 5 female—who live within 1 hour walk from the home of respondent. For a fast walker that's a radius of about 6-7 kilometers. So if the respondent lives in the middle of the county, 1 hr distance means he or she could cover the commune in one hour. if the respondent lives on the edge of the commune, then 1/2 of the geographic -social space of the commune can be covered in 1 hour.

So the mathematical question: how do we calculate overlap? More specifically,, how do we calculate the shared people known by the interviewers?

Fortunately, because the respondents were almost all born in the areas, because the area is small—same county of ~14 km<sup>2</sup>—and because we have defined the area to ‘within 1 hour walk, we can assume that the overlap in people known approaches 100%.