



## Report

### **Assessment and Programme Guidance for Food Security – Health Programming in North-West and Artibonite, Haiti**

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with support from Guy Pavilus and Stephanie Pierre

"A new approach to secure future food supplies is needed, one that is based on local control of food systems, securing locally-procured and accessible grain stores and building on the knowledge of the world's main food providers – small-scale producers – that defends their production systems, which work with nature. The multilateral agencies will need to work more effectively together and with States and meso-level institutions to implement such approaches."

5/14/2008 **THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME AND  
GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY**  
UK Food Group submission to the International Development  
Committee



The survey team on Morne Mare Rouge, from left to right

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## 1. Executive Summary

- 1) This study and the recommendations focus on Haiti's Department of the North West and Northern portion of the Department of the Artibonite with the objectives of, a) helping CARE prepare for a new relief and development initiative in the region and, b) conducting an assessment of the current food security situation.
- 2) Three consultants and two surveyors applied 353 questionnaires to peasants associations and women's group leaders, farmers, and NGO staff. Another fifty plus interviews were conducted.
- 3) Because of 3 years of intermittent drought and unseasonal rains, food insecurity is particularly acute at the moment: 96% percent of respondents interviewed reported this year crop harvests as "bad" or "very bad;" 98% reported the food security situation as either "bad" or "catastrophic." Clinic data from Bombardopolis suggested an extremely dire food security situation arrived two months ago and continues while clinic data from Mare Rouge is less severe than in normal years. But recent heavy rains, while damaging, are promising with regard to yams, sweet potato, peanut, manioc, and millet yields. When asked what was their greatest needs. 96% of farmers and organization leaders mentioned seeds.
- 4) The consultant recommends a development strategy based on and integrated voucher-VSLAs-Transformation/intrant boutique strategy fueled with CAREs voucher system as developed in the SW of Haiti over the past two years.
- 5) Immediate assistance in the form of vouchers could and should be given to nutritional clinics, old age asylums, and HIV assistance programs.
- 6) A program of VSLA women's groups should be developed together with food processing and storage centers with store outlets operated and managed by the women.
- 7) Redemption for vouchers given for subsequent infrastructural development and rehabilitation projects can be limited to redemption at the boutiques, providing an impetus to local production and processing centers as well as assuring profitable investment for VSLAs
- 8) This 2nd stage voucher system can and should be jump-started with bulk purchases and storage in emergency warehouses, as called for by the Office of the First Lady's Aba Grangou initiative
- 9) To assure immediate and maximum impact and low start-up costs CARE should funnel money to a series of infrastructural projects managed by reputable missions working on the ground. Longer term projects should follow CARE community partnership strategy.
- 10) CARE should bring its M&E system up to modern standards through use of Tablets and an alliance with GW University's Latin American Studies Department.
- 11) Readers should read the Annex which includes an overview of CARE's 56 year history in the region as well as a review of past failings and successes.

## 2. Introduction

This study focuses on Haiti's Department of the North West and Northern portion of the Department of the Artibonite. The objectives were to,

- 1) Undertake community consultations and field based assessment in the North-West/upper Artibonite on food security and health to identify most at risk communities, food supply, coping mechanisms, etc.
- 2) Undertake quick mapping of actors and their programmes in the NW/upper Artibonite related to food security-health.
- 3) Co-ordinate with NGOs and the Government of Haiti to identify programme areas potential CARE interventions.
- 4) Assess resource requirements and constraints (human, financial, material, logistic) and costs (salaries, rent, transport, favourable exchange rates, etc) associated with starting operations

and to provide options and relevant recommendations for a strategic programming;

- 5) Quick SWOT with partners and community participants/leaders (including assessment of local capacity, priority needs, CARE competence/experience)
- 6) Recommend appropriate programme intervention options based on the underlying causing of poverty.

## 3. The North West and Artibonite

### 3.1 Demographics

The Department of the North West and the upper portion of the Artibonite covers an area of 2,312 km<sup>2</sup> and has 1,025,014 inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> Most of the population lives in lone homesteads, clusters of homesteads and small villages. Houses in the more remote areas are made of rock or wattle and daub plastered with lime or clay and covered with thatch or tin. Block and cement houses are more common in villages and towns. Agriculture is far and away the most important economic activity followed by livestock rearing, marketing, charcoal production and, to a far less extent, fishing. Large land owners are rare. Families work an average of 6 acres of land (2.3 hectares) spread among three different gardens or plots. About 70% is owned, but sharecropping is common and virtually all farmers have access to some land. Their most important crops are corn, beans, pigeon peas, sweet potatoes, cassava, peanuts, millet and pumpkin. Also available are at least 14 fruits and nuts from trees and vines, including mango, avocado, breadfruit, and citrus trees. Petty livestock is also common. Eighty percent of households have several chickens, one to five goats or sheep and about half of households have at least one cow. Pigs are less common, with about 40% of households having at least one. No households manage large

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<sup>1</sup> The area described excludes the island of La Tortue (180 km<sup>2</sup> or 69 mi<sup>2</sup> and an estimated population of 25,936 in 2003),



numbers of animals and livestock is tethered, rather than corralled, making it a labor intense endeavor as the animals must be frequently led to water and moved to fresh foraging areas. Regarding both crops and livestock, farmers make little to no investments beyond time and labor, the cost of purchasing the animals, garden tools and seed. Fertilizers and pesticides are used on less than 2% of crops planted.

There are two major cities in the area, Gonaïves, on the far southern portion on the coast of the placid Gulf of Gonave; and Port-de-Paix, in the far Northern portion of the region on the rough and windy Atlantic ocean. Gonaïves was founded by the Taino Indians, in 1422, 70 years before Columbus arrived. In 1804 it was where the victorious slave armies and mulatre plantation owners declared independence. Today, with 300,000 people has arguably usurped Cape Haitian as Haiti's second largest city; it is also the capital of the Department of the Artibonite, one of the country's most important ports, and continues to be a flash point for revolution and coups. Port-de-Paix is also one of Haiti's largest cities with 100,000 people; it is the capital of the Department of the North West and also a major port. Founded in 1664, it was first a pirate and privateer haunt; then the siege of the first French garrison; and from 1676 until 1711 the capital of the French Colony. In colonial times tobacco and coffee were major exports. During the US occupation (1915-1934) it was a major point of export for US owned United Fruit company bananas. Today, due to its remoteness, it is a renowned point of entry for contraband. The city, indeed, the North West, is largely out of control of the government. More recently drug trafficking has become far and away the largest industry, something that hit highs in the late 1990s. In addition to the two major cities the region has seven important towns with populations of 1,500 or more (see Table 3.2).

Figure 3.1: Map of Haiti



Table 3.1: Communes: Population, Area, and Sections (Source: IHS)

Commune	Sections		Commune	Sections	
Bombard 32 764 hab. 203,72 km <sup>2</sup>	Plate-Forme Plaine-d'Oranges	Des Forges	Port-de-Paix 250,000 hab 351,75 km <sup>2</sup>	Baudin La Pointe Aubert	Mahotièr Bas des Moustiques La Corne
Baie-de-Henne 24 812 hab. 203,72 km <sup>2</sup>	Citerne Rémy Dos d'Ane	Reserve L'Estère	Gros-Morne 141 587 hab. 397,03 km <sup>2</sup>	Boucan Richard Rivière Mancelle Rivière Blanche L'Acul	Pendu Savane Carrée Moulin Ravine Gros Morne
Môle-St-Nicolas 30 795 hab. 227,07 km <sup>2</sup>	Côte-de-Fer Mare-Rouge	Damé	Les Gonaïves 324 043 hab. 573,58 km <sup>2</sup>	Pont Tamarin Bassin Petite Rivière Bayonnais	Poteaux Labranle
Jean-Rabel 134 969 hab. 488,13 km <sup>2</sup>	Lacoma Guinaudée Vielle Hatte La Montagne	Dessources Grande Source Diondion	Ennery 46 581 hab. 216,89 km <sup>2</sup>	Savane Carrée Passe-Reine/Bas d'Ennery)	Chemin Neuf Puilboreau
Anse-Rouge 39 463 hab. 434,35 km <sup>2</sup>	Sources Chaudes	L'Arbre	Total 1,025,014 hab. 2,312 km <sup>2</sup>		

Table 3.2: Towns and Cities in the North West and High Artibonite (est, based on IHS)\*

Town/City	Population 2005	Town/City	Population 2005
Bombardopolis	2,107	Chansolme	9,561
Baie-de-Henne	1,971	Basin Bleu	3,480
Môle-St-Nicolas	5,559	Gros-Morne	12,072
Jean-Rabel	9,779	St Louis du Nord	17,700
Anse-Rouge	4437	Ansafaleur	4,765
Port-de-Paix	99 580	Les Gonaïves	200,000
		Ennery	1,767

\* All figures are from IHESI – RGPH 2003 except Port-de-Paix and Gonaïves. The latter estimates are based on unofficial sources as well the consultants estimates derived from metropolitan surface areas. The assumption, based on the consistency of household size (~5 persons per hshld) and urban living space in Haiti, is that the size of urban areas will correspond with total population: thus the real metropolitan area of Port-de-Paix is 4 km<sup>2</sup>, Gonaïves 11 km<sup>2</sup>, Jean Rabel 0.7 km<sup>2</sup>, Gros Morne 1.0 km<sup>2</sup>, Port-au-Prince 150 km<sup>2</sup>. etcetera. All of which approximately corroborate the cited figures.

The cities and the towns have all have experienced meteoric growth over the past 50 years. Port-de-Paix went from 30,000 1982 to 100,000 today; Gonaïves from some 50,000 to over 200,000. The same process is true in small towns. The town of Jean Rabel went from 3,000 in 1982 to over 10,000 today. Overall, the proportion of the population living in urban areas of the North West Department grew from 11% in 1982 to 23% in 2003; over the same period of time the Artibonite went from 16% to 26% urban. The process is a dynamic and constant flow out of the region: from rural areas to town to the regional cities to Port-au-Prince and then overseas. The process is such that in a 2001 study of 69 of the elite living in the village of Jean Rabel in 1960, researchers found that 31 had left Jean Rabel before their death, 21 of these had emigrated to Miami. Of the 287 offspring identified, 76% had left Jean Rabel and 57% had emigrated to the

United States. The same process is visually evident in changing skin color: photos from the 1940s and 1950s show Port-de-Paix elite as largely *mulatre*. Today it is entirely dark skinned men and women mostly of provincial origin.

Despite the flow out of the region, even the rural population continues to grow, something made possible by rural birth rates in excess of 7 children per woman. In a 1997 study of Jean Rabel commune, 32% of women equal or exceeded the median 10 births per woman, a figure equal to attained by early to mid-20th century Hutterite women--the healthy, well fed, and fecund world champions of high fertility. Population density in many rural areas is currently as high as 270 people per square kilometer.

Table 3.3: Jean Rabel Population Growth 1971 to 1997 (Source Schwartz 2001)

Year	Population	Number of years	Population increment	Mid-point population	Rate of Increase	Population density (km <sup>2</sup> )	Source
1971	46,378	21	13,006	39,875	1.55%	99	Census
1982	67,925	11	21,547	57,152	3.43%	145	Census
1997	130,320	15	62,395	99,123	4.20%	279	NHADS

\*Rates calculated from previous population estimates

\*Rate of population increase estimate = midpoint population/ (total population increment/number of years)

### 3.2 Geography

The majority of the region forms the approximately 40 kilometer wide by 100 kilometer long North West peninsula of Haiti, bordered by the windy and rough waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the North and the calm and protected Gulf of Gonave to the South. The *Mountagnes du Nord-Ouest* and *Terre Nueve* mountain ranges extend east into the peninsula ending in Saint Nicolas mountain range (highest altitude point 840 meters high), and the Jean-Rabel mountain range (highest point is 850 meters). Lowlands are found only close to the coast and the most important are the Jean Rabel Valley, the Valley of the *Trois-Rivières* on the northern part and the Plain of *L'Arbre* on the southern part of the department. At higher elevations *Mare Rouge* and *Bombardopolis* Plateaus are important rain fed agricultural areas. Five rivers in the north, each corresponding to the major coastal towns and cities, feed into the Atlantic ocean (*La Gorge* River in at the most western point in Mole St. Nicolas, *Jean Rabel* River in Jean Rabel, *Trois-Rivières*, in Port-de- Paix, *St. Louis* River in St. Louis, and a river at *Anse-a-Foleur*). In South side of the peninsula, in Gonaive, the *Quinte* River flows into the Gulf of Gonave. Small rivers reach the Gulf at *Anse Rouge* and *Baie de Henne*.

The varying altitudes of the mountains and the position in the cross currents of North and South American continental weather systems means that moving north to south widely varying microclimates characterize the region. Neighboring mountains such as *Bombardopolis* and *Mare Rouge* plateaus have completely different rainy seasons. Despite the North/South microclimates, broad ecological zones run the east-west length of the region. The area from the edge of the Department du Nord where mountains come to the edge of the sea to the city of Port-de-Paix experiences rains in excess of 1000 mm per year. Moving west, at *Trois Rivie* a drier zone begins. Desert chaparral is interspersed with fertile plains that depend largely on run off from the mountains. The far western portion of the peninsula is largely desert with rainfall of 400 mm at lower elevations. However, some areas of the western plateaus, such as *Mare Rouge* and *Bombardopolis* to *Creve*, are areas of high rainfall. The entire Southern coast of the peninsula is

desert. Scattered throughout the area are irrigated areas such as La Gorge ravine, a ring of springs that encircle the Mare Rouge mountain, and the flood plains of Trois Rivie. The region is largely deforested. In the humid mountains there are pockets of large trees such as avocados, and colonial introductions such as mangos and bread fruit. As with the rest of the island of Hispaniola, the region lies directly in the path of the Western hemispheres hurricane belt, but direct hits from hurricanes are rare because the five mountain ranges on the rest of the island shields the region from the Southeast to Northwest moving storms, breaking up the winds and leaving only heavy rains.

Table 3.4: Geo-ecological livelihood zones

Geo-ecological livelihood zone	Crops and animals
1) Dry coastal	Livestock: goats, chickens, guinea fowl, pigeons, and cows where water is close; Charcoal from chaparral. Crops: peanuts and where possible manioc and sweet potatoes, millet, corn
2) Dry foothill	Same as above
3) Dry mountain	Same as above
4) Humid mountain	Livesatock: goats, cows, pigs, chicken; charcoal from some trees; lumber; Crops: peanuts, beans, millet, sesame, melon, castor beans (for non edible oil), corn; plantains, bananas, manioc, yellow yams, sugar cane, pigeon peas, fruits trees,
5) Humid plain	Same as above
6) High altitude mountain	Livestock: goats, cows, pigs, chickens, guinea fowl, pigeons; Crops: beans, yams, carrots, cabbage, lettuce, spices...(some, but few types of fruit trees). Lumber.

Table 3.5: Comparative Population by Year (Source: IHS)

Department	1950	1971	1982	2003
Artibonite	567,221	765,228	732,932	1,070,397
North West	168,279	217,489	293,531	445,080

### 3.3 Crisis

The Upper Artibonite and especially the North West Department of Haiti is an area long characterized by chronic need. Regionally the population is as or more impoverished than the rest of Haiti. Each year 30 percent of people are ill with debilitating diseases such as malaria, typhoid, and hepatitis; 40% of children are chronically malnourished; childhood mortality rates in some areas are as high as 20 percent. Infrastructure has historically been exceedingly weak, even in comparison to other regions of Haiti. Doctors are scarce, less than one per 20,000 people. Roads are few and wash out rapidly; rain and mud can bring trade and commerce to a halt for days and sometime weeks; and in the near total absence of state institutions, foreign NGOs are the only non-traditional source of emergency relief, a geographically unfortunate point because the region experiences periodic natural disasters.<sup>i</sup>

What is known as the Far West (the communes of Mole St. Nicolas, Bombardopolis, Baie-de-Henne and Jean Rabel) has long been one of the most remote and climatically severe regions of

Haiti. A drought has struck the region at least 14 times since 1921; four times in the past 20 years. During the same time period (1921 to the present) the region has been directly hit by at least three major hurricanes.

The more humid Port-de-Paix region suffers less from drought but periodic floods are a problem and since year 1600 moderate to severe earthquakes have struck the city on average once every 43 years, a foreboding trend given the past 50 years of explosive urbanization and shoddy construction using cement and iron rebar (the next one is currently overdue as the last hit in 1958):

The upper Artibonite is especially prone to sudden catastrophic flooding. In 2004 Gonaives (pop 140,000), was hit with a 2 - 4 meter high flash flood. Hospitals, water sources, and drainage canals were decimated. An estimated 80% of the population was affected. 1,400 people in the city were killed. Another 1,000 people died in the 18 surrounding rural communities (notably in nearby Poteau). Elsewhere: at least 56 people died in Port-de-Paix, 18 in Chansolme, 14 in Gros-Morne, nine in Pilate and eight in Ennery. In September of 2008 the region was struck twice again by two floods of similar proportions but with less fatalities. Floods are not new to the region, but deforestation and urban sprawl in vulnerable flood plains increase the probability of injuries, fatalities, and famine. <sup>ii iii iv</sup>

Drought and storms ruin crops and increase the number of people in need certain areas tend to suffer crisis more frequently than others. But there is chronic and intermittent need throughout the area. Moreover, extensive kinship ties throughout the region mean people readily more toward opportunities and away from hardship, largely equalizing the distribution of need across the region. Moreover, crisis for specific households comes at differential rates based on the resources the family has to draw on; specifically, livestock, agriculture, cash, property, or family in Port-au-Prince or overseas that can send aid. Moreover the population is mobile. People walk from Mole Saint Nicolas to Gros Morne and from Bombardopolis to Port-de-Paix. If there is available relief, most of those who really need it will seek it out.

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Time Schedule

In order to accomplish the mentioned objectives the three consultants and two surveyors spent a total of 16 days visiting rural areas. The first phase of the research was carried out between November 1st and November 20th; the second phase between November 25th and December 8th. The consultants met with representatives of NGOs, farmer associations, and with missionaries and government officials.

### 4.2 Questionnaires and Interviews

Open ended qualitative interviews were conducted with NGO staff, government officials, missionaries, community leaders and farmers. Questions focused on problems in the region, work performed by NGOs, government, and farmer associations; opportunities to improve the local economy; suggestions regarding proposed programs and how to best identify vulnerable populations. To assure a minimum standard in consistency of the data across the target areas two short survey instruments were applied. One instrument was for farmer associations and one for a sample of farmers. The Association Instrument inquired about areas of operation, activities, number of beneficiaries, length of time the organization has been operant, and what the

organization representative interviewed thinks about storage and seeds as prospective points of intervention. The second instrument targeted for the farmers and focused on current food security situation in the region (see Annex).

### 4.3 Selection of Informants and Samples

Informants were selected based on their positions of leadership. They were either government functionaries, peasant organization leaders, or farmers of significant recognition among their peers. Selection of respondents for both questionnaires often overlapped. Because the survey was a rapid appraisal the area in question large (~8,000 km<sup>2</sup>), the selection was only representative in the sense that we tried to interview at least on informant in each Section Communal.

### 4.4 Tablets and Programs and number of Surveys

The surveyors used 5-inch Samsung Tablets with questionnaires programmed in Open Data Kit platform and processed at Columbia of University's Formhub site. The consultants and surveyors met with over 400 individuals and recorded 168 surveys with local leaders, missionaries, government officials and NGO workers and 183 surveys with ordinary farmers, for a total of 353 surveys on Tablets. The Island of La Tortue was not included in the sample; all but 3 Sections of the Northwest Department and Upper Artibonite were visited.

Figure 4.1: Map of Distribution of Interviews with Organization Leaders n = 169




Table 4.1: Location of Interviews with Organization Leaders


Commune	Number of Interviews	Commune	Number of Interviews
AnseRouge	4	Bombardopolis	14
BassinBleu	7	Saint-Louis	15
Baie-De-Henne	8	Gros-Morne	17
MoleSt.Nicolas	8	Ennery	21
Chansolme	8	Gonaives	26
Port-De-Paix	11	JeanRabel	29

Figure 4.2: Map of Distribution of Interviews with Farmers n = 183



Table 4.2: Location of Interviews with Organization Leaders

Commune	Number of Interviews	Commune	Number of Interviews
AnseRouge	2	Saint-Louis	12
Baie-De-Henne	6	Port-De-Paix	17
MoleSt.Nicolas	7	Ennery	18
Chansolme	9	Gros-Morne	25
BassinBleu	10	Gonaives	31
Bombardopolis	12	JeanRabel	34



## 5. Findings from Research

### 5.1 Current Situation


The situation in the Far West has recently been aggravated by the 2012 return of drought. Over the entire areas, unseasonably late rains in 2010 and 2011 meant that many stored seeds sprouted in storage rendering them useless. Heavy rains from Hurricane Isaac in August of 2012 and then two months later in October from Hurricane Sandy caused crop loss. Ninety-six percent of respondents interviewed during the surveys reported the recent crop harvests as "bad" or "very bad;" 98% reported the food security situation as either "bad" or "catastrophic." Data from Bombardopolis malnutrition clinic is alarming as well. The number of severely malnourished children spiked in 2012; hitting its highest level since 1997, something considerably more dramatic when it is taken into account that 108 of the 283 malnourished children treated in 2012 came in the months of November and December. One mountain plateau over, in Mare Rouge, which has a different rainy season the had a normal to low number of malnourished children but the mission director, an American who has lived there for 30 years, predicts severe famine in 2013 if again the rains do not come on time.

Table 5.1: Mare Rouge: Nutrition Data


Year	Malnourished children	Severely Malnourished children
2004	629	19
2005	816	14
2006	660	26
2007	470	39
2008	-	80
2009	-	54
2010	-	45
2011	-	52
2012	-	30+

Table 5.2: Bombardopolis: Nutrition Data

Year	Malnourished children	Severely Malnourished children
2004	-	-
2005	-	-
2006	180	-
2007	104	-
2008	180	15
2009	97	22
2010	144	18
2011	50	8
2012	283	10







## 5.2 Organizations

The best way to understand the social organizational framework in the proposed activity area is in terms of charity, international intervention agencies, and overseas donor institutions. This is as true for the Haitian State as it is for NGOs and religious missions. The incursion of NGOs and missionaries into all of Haiti began in earnest during the 1940s and 1950s and accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966 to 1979 CARE itself became part of a USAID funded Haitian government-NGO conglomerate in the North West Department (HACHO) that was larger than any corresponding government institution in the area and that observers considered a "quasi state" (see Annex). In 1981 the NGO model became the dominant development force in all of Haiti when USAID and other donors redirected foreign aid dollars from the Haitian government to NGOs. The result was what State Department consultant Robert Maguire has called a "wave of development madness." Local farmers long ago adapted to the process with a proliferation of local organizations, some legitimate and some exclusively designed to capture funds for personal use of founders. This tendency to treat development as an entrepreneurial opportunity continues at all levels: farmers associations, credit union, NGOs and religious practitioners. In recent decades a new twist in the organizational evolution of development has occurred as the process has come full circle with the Haitian government forming what could be called 'quasi-NGOs.' We begin with a summation of the two government 'quasi-NGOs' that operate in the region and then move to farmer associations, lending institutions, NGOs, and finally health clinics, hospitals, poor houses, and nutritional centers.

### 5.2.1 Government

#### FAES

Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale (FAES) was created in 1990 by Haitian government decree and falls under the auspices of the Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (MEF). Largely invisible until the present decade, FAES operates very much like an NGO: it works in

agriculture, microfinance, education, infrastructure, lodging, and transportation; target groups are "very much a part of the poorest of the poor";<sup>v</sup> it competes for funds from the same donors, such as Cooperation Espanol, BID, and the EU; and similar to current trend among NGOs it defines itself as a mechanism for community driven development, i.e. rather than telling communities what they need, it responds to demands coming from community based organizations (CBOs). It has bureaus in six of Haiti's ten departments; the Artibonite is not one of them but FAES has a well-equipped and active North West bureau located in Jean Rabel. FAES is political in the sense that its directorship and job change with politics, making it patronage. But it is also respected in Jean Rabel for effectively working with local organizations. For example, since 2002 it has worked with Movement Solidarity pou Developman Lakay (MOSODEL) to build 14 retention ponds for livestock, give away 60 sheep in a re-stocking program, and launching adult education program staffed by educated local farmers.

### PRODEP

Begun in 2004 as part of a campaign to reduce opposition to the ouster of President Aristide, Le Projet National de Développement Communautaire Participatif (PRODEP) is the second Government organization that could be understood as the Haitian States answer NGOs. The project focuses on building and refurbishing community infrastructure, including schools, irrigation works, potable water sources, and electrification. It also invests in productive enterprise such as mills and fishing boats. Similar to FAES and most NGOs, its conceptual foundation is Community Driven Development. It employs mechanisms of community involvement, decision making, and transparency. After seven years PRODEP has worked with 3,500 Community Based Organizations and benefitted 2.3 million people in 59 Haitian municipalities, including in the North West Department Jean-Rabel, Bassin Bleu, and Baie de Henne; and in the Artibonite Department Gros Morne, Grande Saline, and Ennery. It has been heralded as a tremendous success. A recent World Bank evaluation claimed that 75% of its productive/income-generating subprojects were "operational and are being maintained 12 months after completion"; all had, "successfully managed direct transfers for community subprojects." PADF calls it "the empowerment approach par excellence," and "the Haitian State's symbol of commitment to decentralization."<sup>vi</sup>


On a more critical note, PRODEP is made possible through US\$61 million in loans from the World Bank with an additional \$10 million from the Caribbean Development Bank. For all the acclaimed success, only 60% of people in the 59 municipalities where the project were carried out knew of PRODEP. And while it might be called a Government project, it falls under the direction of the Bureau de Monetization, an institution left over from the days when the Haitian government was the direct recipient of aid and that today that handles the sale and distribution of monetized food aid and petroleum products. It is not clear to most observers what the BdM does beyond taking a cut of the loan. And PRODEP in fact does not work through the Haitian government at all but channels funds through quasi-state organizations, just as in the past. Among them are the same international organizations that have been handling USAID funds for over 30 years, including PADF (Pan American Development Foundation), CARE itself, and CECI (Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation). PRODEP has bypassed and according to critics even undermined Haitian government officials; and in fact, the only independent investigation of projects suggested that there were not so successful, In December 2012 Baint COPRODEP community council member Emile Théodore told Haiti's Grass Roots Watch that, regarding PRODEP projects, "The majority of them have disappeared. You can't find a trace of them. There are others that are run by a husband and wife... a little group of

people...” In CAREs Gonaives activity area PRODEP appears to be working. CARE staff attest to this. But several informants in the Far West described PRODEP as corrupt, political patronage monopolized by insiders that construct petty projects.

The bottom line with PRODEP is that while the model of Community Driven Development with mechanisms for transparency and community involvement is encouraging, it is the same model that CARE used in the 1960s and 1970s (see Annex): same notions of community involvement and decision making, same quasi-state role, same NGOs and International institutions; none of which is necessarily bad, but it is not at all clear that PRODEP has been any more successful. None of which is to say that the consultants recommend not allying with PRODEP. On the contrary, we see no other rational option. But what CARE should do is focus on bringing accountability and true transparency to its projects (see Recommendations).

### 5.2.2 Farmer Associations


Primary traditional reasons that farmers self-organize are for mutual assistance during the planting, weeding and harvest times, when there is a labor crunch and the household labor pool is not enough to meet work demands; as mutual savings groups, particularly with regard to what are called locally *sol* (see section Lending, page 22); and to manage local markets. But the hegemony of NGO development model in the region gives farmers additional reasons to organize and has given way to a plentitude of farming associations. Donors and NGOs need to interact with organized recipients to effectively deliver aid and carry out projects. Farmers are encouraged to organize in order to participate in cash or food for work programs, latrine construction projects, and livestock and seed distributions. Women are organized to participate in health seminars. Farmer "intran boutiques" are often restricted to member organizations. Microlending is made only to organized groups, usually women, and then organized at multiple levels. Other types of NGO initiated organizations are bare foot health agents and bare foot veterinarians.



The formation and maintenance of these organizations are the criteria for receiving aid, a lesson not lost on farmers and, unfortunately, the unscrupulous. Many organizations are created specifically to capture aid and nothing more. Farmer illiteracy rates in excess of 50 percent aggravate the situation. It is common, for example, for shrewd individuals to create an officially

recognized organization, open a bank account, and then search for funds on the part of legitimate groups of farmers, but under the condition that the funds be deposited in the "seekers" account. Outwardly this looks good to donors because the farmers are organized in a manner they support. For farmers it usually means little to no real support arrives. Gate keepers working with NGOs, politicians, and organizations like PRODEP perpetuate the system.

Unless donors acknowledge the problem and build discriminating selection and follow up accountability mechanisms into their programs prevarication, embezzlement, and project failure will continue to be the norm. Public presentation of funds and community project christening ceremonies are two mechanisms that PRODEP and CARE have used to assure transparency and accountability. And they are mechanism that help make aid effective. However, informants in some areas complained that "gate keepers" are often able to make sure that only "their people" get invited to such ceremonies and even when the entire community participates, individuals are often apprehensive about challenging community leaders who tend to be repeatedly be the same people and thereby monopolize the aid. NGOs could add to their selection process rapid random interviews with a sample of farmers in any given region; determine the reputable associations and the leaders; and then use an anonymous rating and feedback system to follow progress and keep people honest (See Recommendations).



### 5.2.3 Lending Institutions

Microlending can be understood as the favorite and most promising current NGO activity in Haiti. It fits into the new investment-production-return ideology that donors most appreciate and in which, we are often told, Haitian farmers are eager participants. But there are aspects of the industry that are disturbing and ring of past failure. Microlending began in Haiti in the 1940s. It was introduced by Catholic missionaries. Charitable organizations from outside of Haiti continue to dominate it. Primary funders are overseas government and charitable institutions, such as CIDA, EU, and NGOs such as WVI, ACF, ADEMA, CARE, and the Red Cross. In 2009 USAID and the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation made US\$36.7 million available to the Haitian microlending industry and the WOCCU (World Council of Credit Unions) is lead implementer on a three-year US\$34.4 million multi-partner program. Totaled, that's \$23 million

more than the US\$47,236,431 the entire industry had on loan in 2010 and only US\$10 million shy of combined US\$80,631,795 assets of all Credit Unions in Haiti.

Table 5.3: National Credit Union Data 2010 (Source WOCCU<sup>viii</sup>)

Credit Unions	69
Members	400,379
Savings (USD)	55,213,022
Loans (USD)	47,236,431
Reserves (USD)	N/A
Assets (USD)	80,631,795

Moreover, while interest rates hover at levels that would make most Wall Street investors salivate, the industry is not and perhaps never has been self-sustaining. Even FONKOZE, which bills itself as successfully engaged in building a financial sector, has been at it for 20 years, and is the largest rural lending institution in rural Haiti (with 273,212 members), operates in the red.

Equally important to understand is that most peasants do not like microcredit. At 60% to 72% per year for small borrowers, farmers consider FONKOZE rates absorbent and worthy of eschewing. Why farmers eagerly join the lending organizations may have more to do with inducements other than borrowing. FONKOZE, for example, might provide high interest loans, but it also gives impoverished borrowers stipends, has a default rate close to 10%, and borrowers who do default can re-enter the program and default all over again. An excellent illustration of the degree to which the institution is charitable rather than developmental is that following the 2010 Earthquake FONKOZE "forgave" 10,000 loans and then gave clients another US\$125 each--five times the amount of their introductory loan. This is noble. After all, there was indeed an earthquake. But just what the point was is not clear. Most of FONKOZE beneficiaries live in rural areas, meaning the earthquake was unlikely to have directly impacted them. However, what one can be certain of is that those rural farmers who were not members of FONKOZE before the earthquake regretted it; membership increased from a 2009 level of 198,740 members to a 2011 level of 273,212 members.

Also important to know is that there was indeed a moment when business minded individuals governed Haitian microlending. In 1995 the Haitian government removed interest rate ceilings on loans and lowered reserve requirements. Unscrupulous lenders knew opportunity when they saw it. In 2002 they used the promise of 20% plus monthly interest rates to convince impoverished citizens, many of them farmers, to deposit their savings. The credit unions, loosely regulated but linked and publicly endorsed by the administration of then president Aristide, bilked farmers out of US 220 million dollars. Consumer confidence crumbled. Today all credit unions are regulated and linked under federations ANACAPH (Association nationale des Caisses Populaires haïtiennes) and/or Levier (Fédération des Caisses Populaires Haïtiennes), KNFP (Konsèy Nasyonal Finansman Popilè) program, ANIMH (Association Nationale des Institutions de Finance d'Haiti) or CECUCCH (the Credit Union of the Christian Co-Ops in Haiti).

Nevertheless, in 2010 there was still only US\$55 million in Credit Union savings accounts, 1/4th the stolen 2002 sum.<sup>viii</sup>

There are other critiques that can be made of microlending in Haiti and that should, at least, cause one to pause and contemplate what really drives the industry and what are the consequences. Two decades of microlending have been targeted almost exclusively to women and, more specifically, women who use the money in marketing activity. Giving more money to women for marketing while there is no corresponding investment or increase in production--or even a decrease--is a zero sum endeavour. Moreover, giving many poor market women more money arguably diminishes the success of larger marketers who can accumulate capital and invest in productive enterprise. And neglect of investments in productive enterprise does not stop with the poor. While FONKOZE tells donors that "it is in FONKOZE's Business Development Program that you will also find larger loans to rural agricultural cooperatives producing for export," and that "this program helps clients become part of the formal economy and create jobs in rural areas where there is very little employment" it's not clear if it really works that way. In 2008, there had been no new loans to cooperatives "for a long time" and eight that had borrowed money, each of which received at least \$100,000 in loans-- amounting to 1.8% of the organizations portfolio-- were in default.

Today, although FONKOZE's webpage for its Business Development program shows a smiling lower income woman in her boutique, at least US\$1.8 million of FONKOZE's US\$10 million in outstanding loans is in the hands of 36 individual women. Each borrows \$50,000 for three month periods. They get the money at 30% interest rates, half the rate the poor have to pay. At least one, Marie Yanick Mezile, the current Minister of Women and Women Affairs, is not now and probably never was a poor rural market woman. But like the poor, these elite FONKOZE borrowers also gravitate toward non-productive ventures, such as flying to China on buying ventures, good for the Chinese economy but highly questionable in terms of what it does for impoverished could-be Haitian producers. The point is not that there is anything inherently wrong or evil going on. But it certainly makes one wonder why the major microlender in Haiti, one thriving on donations attracted by billing itself as lifting poor rural market women out of poverty, finds itself gravitating toward elite entrepreneurs flying off to China.<sup>ix</sup>

Those interested in lending among the poor in Haiti should be also aware that there are alternative strategies to borrowing money, strategies that are more attractive to marketers but arguably damaging to the local economy. For example, Mare Rouge market women take sacks of imported rice, corn, and beans on credit. They have 22 days to pay. But instead of retailing the produce in small quantities, they dump it all in exchange for below cost prices. They then take the money and buy and sell local produce, an endeavor that yields much higher returns (over 100% compared to 20% for retail sales of the imported produce). The net effect is a type of subsidy for the imported food stuffs.

There are also more attractive informal systems of borrowing and capital accumulation. All rural adult Haitian women who have children are engaged in some kind of trade and the traditional

strategy is for local women to use money from family and friends, particularly men (sons, fathers, lovers and husbands). Harvests are not stored but sold as rapidly as possible and the money used in female marketing endeavors. The women put the money to work in itinerant trade, rolling the money over in purchases and re-sales in local and distant markets. Indeed, it is the engine of the Haiti's internal marketing system. A common saying is, "lajan sere pa fe pitit" (saved money makes no children), and what they mean is that money should be at work and not saved.

Another popular means of getting money in lump sums is the revolving savings groups called *sol*. Members each contribute a fixed sum of money at a specified period of time (weekly or monthly) and then the members each take turns in taking all the money. The *sol* is so entrenched in Haitian culture that it is found at every level of society: it is also common in urban areas, among professionals and in the overseas Haitian diaspora. The "sol" is surely one reason why Haitians so readily adapt to VSLAs; the significant difference is the introduction of the notion of borrowing, interest, and continuing capital accumulation.

In summary, microlending remains largely a charitable enterprise that has enormous appeal to donors. But, in Haiti at least, arguably the most significant profits generated are not from borrowers but rather from donors. Moreover, many of the most successful institutions appear to use hidden inducements to appear successful and attract and maintain clientele, necessary ingredients in wooing the donors. VSLAs, on the other hand, use a strategy familiar to all Haitians farmers and with more attractive interest rates. The missing ingredient from a development standpoint is providing productive investment opportunities.

Table 5.4: Cooperatives/Credit Unions


KOPLES	Koperativ Pou Lespwa (Levier)	Port de Paix
SOCEM	Société Coopérative d'Entraide Mutuelle	Port de Paix
SOCOMEK	Société Coopérative Men Kontre	Port-de-Paix
FONKOZE	Fondasyon Kole Zepol	Port-de-Paix, Jean Rabel, Gros Morne, Gonaïves
COCANO	Cafeiere et Cacouyere du Nord'Ouest*	Port-de-Paix area
COOPECS	Coopérative d'Épargne et de Crédit de St-Louis	Saint Louis du Nord
SOCOREDNO	Société Coopérative pour le Développement Economique Du Nord-est	Jean Rabel
CAPOMAR	Caisse Populaire de Mare Rouge (Levier)	Mare-Rouge
KPEGM	Kès Popilè Espwa	Gros-Morne
CAPOR	Caisse Populaire pour la Reussite de	Gros Morne
CECUCCH	La Caisse	Gonaïves:
CAPOFRAGO	La Caisse Populaire Fraternité des Gonaïves	Gonaïves:
CPBS	Caisse Populaire Bon Secours	Gonaïves
COOPECRA	Coopérative Épargne et Crédit Petite Rivière	Petite Rivière de 'Art.

\*Coffee Cooperative that exports coffee. Associated with CRS, Amor in Action, Catholic Church and St. Thomas University

### 5.2.4 NGOs and Missions

Similar to the rest of Haiti, International NGOs (Non Governmental Organizations) dedicated to developing the county began arriving in the region in 1950s. By the mid 1970s there were more than a dozen. In 1981 they got a significant boost when the US and then other donor nations began to reroute aid from the Haitian government to international NGOs. By the mid 1990s there were seventeen organizations of foreign origin working in the commune. Included among them were British Child Care, German Fonds Agricole followed by Agro Action Aleman (AAA) and PISANO. There was also Dutch Bureau of Nutrition and Development (BND). French InterAid and Initiative Developpment (ID). Funded by donors in the United States, there was CARE International, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), The Baptist Mission, the Mission to the Greeks (MG), Unenvangelized Field Missions (UFM), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Vision (WV), and Compassion International. Others were International organization, such as UNICEF and the World Food Program of the United Nations. Currently the largest secular NGOs operating in the area are ACF (Action Contra la Faim), AAA (Agro Action Aleman) and ID (Initiative Developpment), all in the Far-West. CARE works in Port-de-Paix and the Gonaives area. TechnoServe managed program, “Mango as an Opportunity for Long-term Economic Growth” is operant in the Gros Morne region (for a complete list of names and activities see Table 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Number of NGOs Entering Haiti by Year (Source CGD)



From, "Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?" Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz Centre for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 004 May 2012, p 17

Some projects carried out by small evangelical missions rival those of secular organizations. As many as half the enduring two-tract cement roads that transect the Far West chaparral and make it possible to get up and over the rocky hills were built by a lone German missionary employing teams of local men. A lone Mennonite missionary financed and oversaw the construction of the 5 mile road to La Plateforme. Two UEBH missionaries installed and maintain 30 miles of water pipe in the Pas Catabois area. Over the past decade a lone IMF missionary overseeing a crew of four local masons put in 300 cisterns on the Bombardopolis Plateau. The Catholic Church built many of the significant infrastructural projects in the region including the current water system in the Village of Jean Rabel and irrigation at Gwo Sab. Another Catholic funded project that should get consideration is Clarke Farm, with its fish pond and hectares of tall millet and thick eggplant appearing like a miracle in the desert outside of Gonaives.





### 5.2.5 Clinics, Hospitals, Nutritional Centers and Poor Houses

The consultants did not focus on the health sector during the fieldwork phase. But clinics, hospitals, and nutritional centers in Bombardopolis, Mare Rouge, Anse Rouge, Port-de-Paix, Gros Morne and Gonaives were visited and the consultants updated information from previous research and studies in the region (notably The Most Vulnerable, CARE, 1999). Data on regional health indicators were drawn from the most dependable and stable institutions in the region, those with the most extensive and best kept records. Moreover, the health sector is an important component in reaching vulnerable populations and a review of the sector highlights features that CARE should consider.

The health sector is overseen by the Haitian Ministry Health (MSPP). There are State run hospitals in Anse Rouge, Jean Rabel, Port-de-Paix, Gros Morne, and Gonaives. Cuban doctors provide support in most of the hospitals. CARE will have to coordinate with MSPP and there are well known and established channels to do so. But it is critically important to understand the role of foreign and domestic religious missions in the health sector.

The most successful hospitals, clinics, nutritional centers were found by and are maintained by religious institutions and missionaries. Unevangelized Field Missions (UFM) founded Beraca Hospital in Port-de-Paix in the late 1940s. Faith Medical Clinic founded Nan Sentren clinic in Mare Rouge in 1983. International Missionary Fellowship (IMF) founded Hospital Evangelique in Bombardopolis in 1986. North West Haiti Christian Mission (NWHCM) founded a clinic that is now a hospital in Saint Louis du Nord in 1986. And Christian Aid Missions (CAM) has a clinic at La Source outside of Anse Rouge that it founded in 1996. There are also an evangelical clinics in Creve. All have become the primary and most reputable institutions in their area. All were CARE partners during the 1990s and 2000s. All maintain the most reliable medical records for the region, offer family planning services, maintain malnutrition centers and manage vaccination drives. Many participate in PEPFAR--indeed are the mainstay of the program as most government institutions have failed to meet the reporting and accounting standards. The missions and missionaries that support them are mostly interdenominational, maintain close links with one another in terms of mutual support, and they work with the Catholic institutions, specifically the many different denominations of sisters, most of whom have some type of clinic or asylum for the poorest and most vulnerable people in their areas.

Most hospitals in the region were at one time or still are Catholic and the Church is deeply involved in the Gros Morne hospital and an important ingredient in making it one of the most efficient institutions in the region. Catholic orders have the single largest network of nutritional clinics and old age asylums. The Missionaries of Charity have two missions in the region with more than 500 ARV recipients and another 2000 plus aged and malnourished beneficiaries. Soeurs de Sagesse have three nutritional centers, two age asylums and a deaf school. There are at least three other orders of Catholic sisters in the region serving the most vulnerable. If it were a race to help the vulnerable as fast and effectively as possible, neither CARE nor any other outside organization could hope to compete with the Catholic sisters, women married to a spirit who is dedicated to helping the poor; women who dedicate much of their waken moments to identifying and relieving suffering.

It is also important to recognize that in each area the State has a system of reaching out and identifying malnourished children. In the commune of Gros Morne, it is the Women's group

AFAGM (Association Femme Action de Gros Morne). AFAGM has three resident members in each of the commune's eight sections who are responsible for identifying malnourished children through brachial measurement and then referring their parents to the Gros Morne Hospital where they are given rations of enriched peanut butter for the children. In Jean Rabel, Mare Rouge and Bombardopolis malnourished children are identified at *pos rassembleman* where the children are measured and weighed. The children are then referred the nearest state recognized nutritional clinic.

Table 5.6: Hospitals, Clinics, Nutritional Centers and Poor Houses

Name of organization or the Congregation	Type of service	Location	Department	Estimated Beneficiaries
Fille de la Sagesse	Poor houses	Boneau	Northwest	16
Fille de la Sagesse	Poor houses	Jean Rabel		18
Fille de la Sagesse	Poor houses	Port-de-Paix	Northwest	16
Frères de l'Instructions Chrésiennes FIC	Poor houses	St. Louis du Nord		8
Sr St Joseph de Cluny	Poor houses	Gonaïves	Artibonite	11
Sr Salésiens de Don Bosco	Poor houses	Gonaives		40
Sr de St Joseph de Cluny	Poor houses	Gros Morne		20
GOH	Poor houses	Banyonnais		7
Sr St Joseph de Cluny	Handicapped Children	Gonaive		162
Fille de la Sagesse	Handicapped Children	Lavaud		190
Sr St Joseph de Cluny	Surg Recup C. Handicapped Children	Gonaives		~13
Beraca: Hs of Hope	Surg Recup C. Handicapped Children	La Pointe		~20
Faith Medical	Nutritional Centers	Nan Sentren		~6
Sr St Joseph de Cluny	Nutritional Recuperation Centers	Gonaives		112
Beraca: Hs of Hope	Nutritional Recuperation Centers	La Pointe		53


Table 5.6: Hospitals, Clinics, Nutritional Centers and Poor Houses

Name of organization or the Congregation	Type of service	Location	Department	Estimated Beneficiaries
Mare Rouge	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[ii]	Mole St Nicolas		6
Cal Vert	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[iii]	Mole St Nicolas		12
Notre Dame	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[iv]	Jean Rabel		45
Hospital Bombard	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[i]	Bombardopolis		7
Beraca	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[ii]	La pointe		104
Immaculée	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[i]	Port-de-Paix		112
AFME	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[ii]	Anse-Rouge		-
Anse-à-Foleur	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[iii]	Anse-à-Foleur		12
Bonneau	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[i]	Bonneau		18
La Providence	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[ii]	Gonaives		100
Roboteau	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[i]	Gonaives		
Ebenezer	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[ii]	Gonaives		
Centre Medico-Social	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[iii]	Gonaives		

Table 5.6: Hospitals, Clinics, Nutritional Centers and Poor Houses

Name of organization or the Congregation	Type of service	Location	Department	Estimated Beneficiaries
Alma Mater	Hospitals and Health Centers with Beds[i]	Gros Morne		35
Beraca	TB Sanitariums	La Pointe		
Immaculée	TB Sanitariums	Port-de-Paix		
Notre Dame/ Fille de la Sagesse	Aide pour la communauté	Jean Rabel		12
	ID Clinic	Beauchau		6
	ID Clinic	Guinaudee		6
	Faith Med.	Nan Sentren		
	ID Clinic	Temps Perdu		6
	CHH Clinic	Mare Rouge		
	Clinic	Anse-a-Foleur		
	Hospital	Bombardopolis		6
	Clinic	Ennery*		6
	Hospital			
Much Ministries	Clinic	Gonaive (Jumbali)		
Fille de la Sagesse	Aide pour la communauté	Mare Rouge		n/a
Misionaries de Charity/Communauté Présence et Vie	Aide pour la communauté	Gonaices	Northwest	+800
Misionaries de Charity/Communauté Présence et Vie	Aide pour la communauté	Port de Paix	Northwest	+1,000
Cœur sacré-de-Jesus	Aide pour la communauté	Bombardopolis		

Figure 5.6: Distribution of Clinic, Hospitals, and Dispensaries (Source MSPP)



Modified from <http://www.mspp.gouv.ht/cartographie/index.php#>

## 6. Policies and Wants: USG, UN, GOH, and local Farmers

Understanding what CARE could and should do in terms of relief and development strategies in the region should depend on the interests and needs of regional farmers. But of equal importance in terms of funding are GOH policies as well as the interests and mandates of the donors who will provide funding. Both GOH and donor policies have changed dramatically in recent years.

### 6.1 Local Farmers

The most important allies in bringing development to the North West and Upper Artibonite are the people that we are supposed to help. Until recently, NGOs and International organizations have given little support to local farming strategies and the needs that local farmers identify as priorities. Indeed, some of the help they/we bring have been catastrophic for farmers who accept them. Seed programs are a good example. Aba Grangou manifesto pointed out that in 2011 emergency seeds were distributed in the SW. But they were not adapted to the region. They were 6-month long season varieties unsuited to the 2-3 month rainy seasons that prevail in the region. Farmers who planted and cultivated the seeds harvested little to no produce for their efforts. This has been a common occurrence in the NW. From 1994 to at least the early 2000s the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR) in association with NGOs throughout the North West delivered similar maladaptive seeds. They encouraged farmers to purchase the seed with assurances that they were high quality and by offering them at below market price. The seeds yielded nothing for the farmers who planted them (the farmers eventually took to eating the seeds). The program lasted for at least 6 years. Seed is always a problem for Haitian farmers and

it is particularly acute in the wake of three years of poor harvest and offseason rains that cause stored seed to rot. When we asked in our surveys what was the greatest needs in the area, 96% of farmers and organization leaders mentioned seeds.

## 6.2 CARE

CARE first came to Haiti in 1954 after Hurricane Hazel ravaged the island. In 1966 it participated in the formation of HACHO, a USAID and West German Government funded alliance with the GOH that was created to develop Haiti's remote Department of the North West. HACHO became what CARE staff and USAID evaluators referred to as a "quasi-government" for the region. It carried out projects in health, education, governance training, small enterprise, agriculture extension services, micro-credit, reforestation, water projects, sanitation projects, and rehabilitation of roads and irrigation works. HACHO also provided widespread emergency food relief during droughts in 1965-68, 1974-77, 1978-79, and after Hurricane David in 1979. In 1979 USAID ended support for the program.

In the 1990s CARE re-entered the North West with USAID support. Between that time and 2007 CARE became far bigger and more influential than even HACHO before it (see Appendix). But in 2006 CARE planners decided that the system of US monetized food aid that provided financial support for CARE's North West and Upper Artibonite activity area was out of step with CARE's principal mandate of helping the poorest and most vulnerable people and of helping develop sustainable livelihood strategies. In June 2007 CARE withdrew from the monetization program. CARE subsequently reduced activities, closed many of its facilities, including its three rural guest houses, and re-focused its development strategies on providing emergency assistance and addressing the root cause of poverty: weak governance, social exclusion, lack of economic opportunities, and insufficient access to quality education. Its new development strategy involved allying with communities and the government development organization PRODEP.

## 6.3 USG and Development

For most of CARE's 59 years working in Haiti, its primary sponsor has been the U.S. Government (USG). Much of that assistance ended with CARE's 2007 withdraw from the food monetization program. But in 2008 the USG re-defined its development strategy introducing the Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative. The principal goals of FTF are similar to those of preceding USG policies in Haiti in that it prioritizes improving nutritional status, particularly among vulnerable women and children and, not least of all, the 60% of the Haitian population that continues to be directly dependent on agricultural production. But it differs in that two of the principal means by which increased food security is to be accomplished are,

- 1) increased yield per hectare for staple crops (they emphasizes beans and corn) and
- 2) exports of agricultural commodities (most importantly mangos and cacao).

FTF is also a break from past USG programs in that it highlights local production with an emphasis on purchasing locally and it specifies the importance of farmers, rather than NGOs and international organizations, as determining what crops and what inputs should be prioritized. The USG is also making monitoring, evaluation and transparency significantly more important than in the past. The change in USG priorities brings it in synch with CARE's own goals and earlier objections to food monetization programs. <sup>x xi xii</sup>

### 6.4 Government of Haiti (GOH)

The Haitian government has recently made a strong statement in support of a new food security system, one that, not unlike the USG goals, links food security to food sovereignty. The First Lady's Aba Grangou program has four overarching objectives,<sup>xiii</sup>

1. Améliorer l'accès à la nourriture for the most vulnerable
2. Augmenter la production agricole
3. Augmenter les services et infrastructures de base
4. Communication, suivi et evaluation


The plan is comprehensive, integrated, and targeted to promote national production. CARE has already participated in Aba Grangou in the Gran Anse with its voucher system. New areas that Aba Grangou highlights and where CARE can have an impact are availability of appropriate seeds, improved processing, storage, and availability and use of fertilizers, all the factors that will assure increased yields. CARE is well suited and has the experience to make serious and aggressive contribution in these areas, particularly in view of an integrated Voucher-VSLA-Farmer Support program outlined shortly.<sup>xiv</sup>

### 6.5 UN and the World Food Program (WFP)

In 2008 the WFP made what it called a "historical shift" from a *food aid agency* to a *food assistance agency*. WFP's overarching goal became to eradicate hunger and malnutrition but with the ultimate goal of eliminating the need for food aid. Two corollary goals that echo that of the USG, GOH, and CARE are,

- 1) achieve nationally owned hunger solutions and
- 2) prioritize local purchases.

As with the USG and the GOH, WFP is also emphasizing monitoring and evaluation.<sup>xv xvi xvii xviii</sup>



Summarizing to this point, the shift in development strategies and the new Aba Grangou policy opens a passage for change. As seen in the discussion of donors, their goals are now closer in



line with the interests of the Haitian farmers and with the CARE mandate. The objectives can be summed up as,

- 1) Provide immediate nutritional relief to those who are most in need, particularly women, children and the elderly and infirm, a need especially acute at the moment in the North West and Artibonite because of erratic weather over the past two years and the impact of recent storms. Defining and identifying these vulnerable populations should be left to the discretion of organizations already engaged in serving the sick, hungry, and destitute (see Table 5.6), but with CARE follow-up monitoring and accountability mechanisms (see Section 7.5).
- 2) Prepare for disaster mitigation and recovery
- 3) Enhance food security for the population at large through increased food production and employment
- 4) Work with communities to achieve the preceding
- 5) Improve monitoring, evaluation and transparency to better achieve all the results

## 7. CARE Program Goals and General Structure

### 7.1 Relieve, Reinforce, Build, Follow (RRBF)

CAREs new NW and Upper Artibonite programs should,

- 1) **Relieve** suffering through aid to the most vulnerable (CARE priority #1)
- 2) **Reinforce** programs that are already operant
- 3) **Build** on what has worked for CARE elsewhere
- 4) **Follow** the lead and direction of community groups and follow what is going on, i.e. institutional memory (M&E)

**7.2 Relieve:** As seen, there are and always have been a sector of the population in the North West and Upper Artibonite that suffer from chronic caloric deficits and disease. Periodic drought, floods, and tropical storms aggravate the situation and give way to episodes where a much larger segment of the population suffers or is at risk of famine. We should immediately help those most in need.

**7.3 Reinforce:** Some hospitals and clinics in the region, missionaries and female Catholic orders specialize in bringing aid to the malnourished, sick and aged. Most of these organizations have worked in the region for decades; indeed, most of the permanent staff for these organizations have worked in the region for decades. They are highly effective. CARE should immediately reinforce their efforts with vouchers and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, such as cisterns and nutritional centers. There are also secular organizations such as AAA and ID that have a strong presence in the region. CARE efforts should be coordinated with and build on

their efforts. But the most cost-effective, immediate means to erect life-giving and live saving infrastructure such as cisterns, water networks, and flood barriers is through evangelical missionaries who are on the ground. They have skills, infrastructure (vehicles, garages, tools, guest houses) and local networks of trained workers. They are eager to perform the work, pay their own expenses, have decades of experience in the region and know the local prices and the people they deal with. Without moving its directors into the region and having them live there for decades putting pipes into the ground and feeding people, no outside organization or expert can begin to compete in local knowledge and competence with these people. Not least of all CARE should, despite mentioned critiques, expand its work with PRODEP and COPRODEP and engage FAES. Partnership with both organizations should be sought at every level of project implementation and relief efforts. Direction integration with the GOH would be commendable but is not recommended. Even the Haitian government has avoided direct intervention through local politician by creating PRODEP and FAES. Until the Government effectively does something different, neither should CARE.


**7.4 Build:** Since withdrawing from the North West, there are two tools that CARE has developed that have proven effective and should be central part of expansion into the NW: the voucher (EFPS) system and Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs). Since 2010 CARE partnered with the government and local communities to share both strategies with vulnerable people in the Grand Anse. Both should serve as essential mechanisms for helping people in the North West and Upper Artibonite. Both are focal points for the strategy recommended below.

**7.4.1 Vouchers** offer an exciting gamut of possibilities. First off, a voucher is a promissory note that can be redeemed for specific amount of money or value of commodities. In the case of CARE, vouchers have been provided to vulnerable households in the Grand Anse to be redeemed with licensed vendors in exchange for food staples. An immediate and significant advantage to vouchers is that they eliminate the logistic complications that came with delivering food aid (shipping, storage, delivery, handling, embezzlement). But vouchers are promising in other ways. They can also be tailored to purchasing local produce; tailored to purchases from specific vendors, such as the women's transformation groups; and they can be used as pay on infrastructural projects, creating the potential for an integrated, mutually reinforcing aid-production-infrastructure cycle. To complete the system, they can be used to jumpstart production, seed storage, introduction of new crops, enriched flour blends and other processed foods all of which are potential investment opportunities for VSLA groups. In summary, although CARE's current voucher system is limited to the distribution of coupons redeemable through specific state-licensed vendors, recipients can be expanded to include,

- Those given to vulnerable households and individuals at any given time
- Those distributed to specific populations during times of crisis
- Those given to institutions to be distributed to needy individuals and households
- Those used as payment in "voucher for work" infrastructural projects

Vendors can be expanded to include female food processing cooperatives (that make enriched local peanut butter, jams, and flours), cooperatives that conserve local seeds and stored grains, and CARE authorized "intrans boutiques" that sell tools, fertilizers and pesticides.

Figure 7.1: Voucher-Boutique-Production Cycle



**Vouchers** can help facilitate building social strategies for reducing fallout from disasters. They can be used to initiate dialogue with business leaders responsible for dealing with recurrent and unnecessary spikes in costs. When a crisis threatens any area in rural Haiti, food prices tend to spike in anticipation of disrupted supplies. Recognizing this after the 2010 earthquake, missionaries in Bombardopolis paid transport to Port-de-Paix for the Bombard community's largest *marchann*. They did so under the condition that the *marchann* would not raise the prices of the staples they purchased (the logic being that if they could get the food there was no reason; and the incentive being that by not paying transport the *marchann* were making higher profits). The tactic stabilized prices. CARE can formulate similar strategies with a streamlined voucher system and working with an organization of the largest merchants in the region.

**7.5 Follow** Beyond the basic strategy described above, CARE should continue with its community driven development approach as it is currently doing with schools in the Gonaives and Gros Morne area. It should continue using CARE/PRODEPs 17,500 grants equally distributed at the section level to community organizations; and it should back the current strategy of transparency and accountability (involving ceremonies with community groups present, publically presenting checks to the individuals responsible for overseeing the project, and public ceremonies where those responsible give follow-up accounts of the work accomplished).

CARE cannot hope to second guess or out-perform organizations already serving the most vulnerable populations in the proposed activity areas. Staff in these organizations know their populations, are in daily contact with recipients, and are either best suited to identify the neediest individuals or, on a more pessimistic note, best suited to mislead and embezzle aid intended for the needy. What CARE can do is monitor, evaluate, and make these organizations accountable,

meaning quickly eliminate disingenuous partners and reinforce those who are sincere. (See Section 8.6, Data Collection and Management System).

Moreover, CARE should make institutional memory an integral part of its program. At the end of the 1966 - 1979 period when CARE worked in the North West under the umbrella of HACHO, a USAID evaluator concluded that, "HACHO had little capacity to identify in any systematic way where it had been, what it had done, and where it should go." (p 8: 1983). CARE improved their monitoring and evaluation systems in the 1990s. It would now be a contribution to all--CARE staff, the people we are trying to help, scholars, and other development workers--if CARE would set an example in the area of monitoring and evaluation and institutional memory and 1) digitalize its vast collection of reports, 2) create an online library of reports, 3) produce an annual summary of data and reports on the region, 4) finalize the long and agonizing process of setting up a NW Food Security Warning System by putting in place a data entry system in the three evangelical clinics in the Far West that have reliable data, in one clinic complete data goes back to 1983.

The NW Food Security and Institutional Memory project could be linked to George Washington University (GWU) in Washington DC, which has expressed interest in such a project, has a similar data repository for Haiti as a whole. GWU also has a link with Haiti in that it is the educational resource the US State Department uses to prepare embassy officials before they come to the country, all of whom must take a 10 week course at the school. GWU will be responsible for maintaining the data base and library and annual reviews. This could be a model program for other NGOs, exemplary of CARE's commitment to transparency and accountability.



Women and Children at Nan Sentren Nutritional Center

## 8. Recommended Activities

### 8.1 Integrated Voucher Program

The CARE strategy should be focused on the objectives defined earlier: it should Relieve-Reinforce-Build and Follow, and its program should use the vouchers as a mechanism to drive and integrate the system making each component reinforcing to one another and to the overall objective of augmenting production: what can be called an Integrated Voucher Program should begin immediately by,

#### 8.11 Phase 1

- Provide vouchers to reputable hospitals, nutritional centers, MCHN programs, and clinics that already have established programs
- Identify established merchants who will redeem the vouchers

#### 8.12 Phase 2

Reinforce existing women's and HIV organizations, form new ones, and train in VSLA then link to upgraded voucher system that targets processed foods produced locally. The system would develop as follows,

- Women's processing groups identified to act as vendors thru Transformation Boutiques
- Plan and train the women in processing (conservatives, flours, enriched peanut butter blends)
- Introduce new storage and processing techniques
  - manioc: garni, pudding, chikwangué, fofou
  - pitimi: flour, bread
- Introduce new or little used recipes (pitimi bread, cakes)
- Training in seed preservation storage
- Train in VSLA strategy
- Have them participate in capitalizing new Intrans/Transformation Boutiques for tools, pesticides, fertilizers, seeds, and processed local food stuffs

**8.13** Link vouchers to purchases from Intrans/Transformation (groups for processed foods, tools, seeds, etcetera)

**8.14** Aba Grangou Voucher-for-Work programs: fully linked VSLA-Boutique-Infrastructure-Production cycle

### 8.2 Tech, Farmer School, Mangos, and Artisans

**8.21** CARE should reinforce the few agricultural and professional schools in the region and support any reputable program in mechanics and agricultural. Two examples are ACF, which has a partner that works as a subcontractor teaching agricultural techniques to local farmers. And Clarke Family Farm outside of Gonaives is a highly successful farming project that is in the process of becoming an agricultural university.

**8.22** TechnoServe is an NGO working with Mango Producers in Gros Morne, Ennery, and Gonaives. They have successfully organized producer groups to increase production, quality control and to reach overseas markets. They are currently expanding their program into peanut production and will eventually include other crops. CARE, together with PRODEP, should seek advice and partnership with TechnoServe in this endeavor.

**8.23** With HACHO CARE helped train artisans. In Bombardopolis this training survives in the form of highly skilled basket weavers. WTOs Ethical Fashion Initiative and Fair Winds Trading Company have shown interest in the purchasing baskets in bulk. Both have clients, including Macy's. CARE should coordinate with them to establish an artisan center in Bombardopolis that will help close the gap between the artisans and the international market.

### **8.3 Emergency Disaster Relief**

**8.31** Warehouses associated with women's groups should be maintained in specific locations throughout the region (as called for in the GOH Aba Grangou program)

**8.32** The goods should be purchased with contracts from women's transformation groups, serving as a mechanism to jump start production

**8.33** At the end of each hurricane season the food should be given to the GOH school feeding program (as called for in the GOH's Aba Grangou initiative)

**8.34** CARE should participate in the organization of a group of the most capitalized regional merchants responsible for dealing with recurrent and unnecessary spikes in costs

**8.35** CARE should participate in the organization and formation of community emergency groups with a contingency plans for disaster that identifies points of refuge, key leaders and their roles in event of disaster, how and where the injured will be cared for; where food will come from and how it will be distributed. This should be done in association with the merchant organization mentioned above

### **8.4 Infrastructural Programs**

**8.41** Rehabilitation of reputable clinics and nutritional centers that will partner with CARE

**8.42** Building of Female Group Transformations Centers and Intrans/Transformation Boutiques

**8.43** Road, canalization, erosion control projects conducted with NGO and peasant associations using Vouchers redeemable at Intrans/Transformation Boutiques

**8.44** Immediately fund a cistern project in Mare Rouge and Bombardopolis, and Creve plateaus

All else should be community driven development using the same strategy as CAREs school grants program: formation of community decision making councils, projects choices made by election, accountability achieved through public disclosure at community project and infrastructural christening ceremonies.

## 8.5 Agricultural Fairs

**8.51** CARE should organize and sponsor SSFFP Farmer Fairs (Seed-Storage-Food-Fertilizer-and-Pesticide Fairs) in collaboration with peasants associations and NGO partners. Farmers have enthusiastically participated in similar USAID funded seed fairs in Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria, but they have yet to become a significant part of NGO strategies in the North West Haiti or the Upper Artibonite.

**8.52** VSLA women's groups should take the lead in organizing the fairs. As discussed in section 5.2.3 on Lending Institutions, via the tradition of the *sol* Haitians are well adapted to the tradition of VSLAs. What they need, and what the economy could benefit from, is productive investment opportunities. Seed Fairs can be conceived as a step in that direction. These are opportunities for VSLAs to showcase and share new foods, storage techniques, and seeds as well as for other NGOs, missionaries, scholars, and entrepreneurs and corporations to promote new ideas and technologies.

**8.53** The fairs should be held in market places and on market days, assuring an audience of thousands.


## 8.6 Data Collection and Management System

CARE should set up a Data Collection and Management system using Open Data Kit (“ODK”) platform that CARE field workers can access via Tablets equipped with SIM chips. In this way data can be uploaded from the field to CAREs central office server. Staff can submit data from the field offices while sitting in a provincial restaurant, even while asking questions directly from association members in a village hut or standing in a farmer’s field or a partner's clinic. The entry system is user friendly: much of it involves a simple touch screen selection of multiple choices, checks, boxes, and simple numeric entry all controlled and cross-checked with project specific programming in ODK software. Staff only need enter the data into the tablet and upload recently submitted data.

Although simple in its formation and interaction, compared to other M&E systems the capacity to calculate data and generate results is complex and extraordinary. Tablet data is funneled through Excel data bases to Access, a user friendly icon driven office based operating system. Access makes extracting data, obtaining updates, generating tables and charts simple. It can be tailored to users such that CARE staff computers screens have click-on icons specific to the

charts they need to maximize job performance. It also can be tailored for USAID staff; a list of icons can be created for specific functions that immediately generate weekly status reports. Results can be illustrated in GIS format via user friendly point and click icons. The GPS coordinates from Tablets will allow for instant location of project activities and pictures in Google earth.

Figure 8.1



The Data collection and Management system should include a selection and monitoring protocol for partner farmer organizations, and projects carried out with partners. CARE can monitor the selection of farmer organizations through random sampling of farmer opinions of different organizations. The target respondent farmers would not be members or representatives of an organization but rather individuals selected randomly in the activity zone. Subsequent performance can be monitored using the same process. The monitoring should be subcontracted to an independent institution or consultant in order to avoid conflicts of interest and/or manipulation of the system. The proposed system offers CARE the opportunity to verify that organizations are sincere and accountable to the populations that we serve. The system could be linked to the proposed George Washington University (GWU) Food Security and Institutional Memory project.



## 9. Specific Programs: Beneficiaries and Partners

### 9.1 HIV and Nutrition

#### 9.1.2 Population

There are clear points of entry where CARE can have an immediate and effective impact on the population. Assistance to the most needy is one. Specifically, ongoing nutrition programs and PEPFAR centers would derive immediate benefit from vouchers. All those associated with PEPFAR spoke of the importance of getting patients to come pick up their medications. A problem is that many AVR recipients begin to feel well and do not come to the centers as scheduled. Vouchers would give them a material incentive to come to clinics, and it would help with their nutritional status and raise their status among family and dependents by giving them greater resources. It is perhaps the purist form of charity that CARE could offer and to one of the most vulnerable populations. Similarly, nutritional clinics can be given an immediate boost through the voucher system.

Hospitals are another point of entry in providing support to the critically ill and injured. There is a necessary tradition in Haiti that families care for members interned. In the court yards and behind every hospital one can find family members cooking over small fires. At night they sleep on mats on the floors or under the eaves of the building. In impoverished Haiti it is a system that works. Rather than attempting to second guess, CARE should depend on the hospital in distributing vouchers. Hospital staff know which family is most in need and who has no family at all. Vouchers to families in need or patients with no family would ease the suffering and help in the recuperation process. The exact numbers could be based on number of beds per hospital. CARE should follow up with spot checks of the system to assure accountability.

#### 9.1.3 Partners

see Table 5.6

#### 9.1.4 Recommended Action

- Identify vendors in each major town and village that can redeem vouchers
- Provide vouchers to all HIV programs, nutritional clinics, old age asylums and hospitals. Priority should go to those programs that reach the poorest and most vulnerable populations and that have demonstrated performance and efficiency. Catholic orders and protestant missionaries along with the Gros Morne hospital and other PEPFAR participants should be prioritized.

### 9.2 Infrastructure

#### 9.2.1 Population

As with nutrition, there are clear points of entry where CARE can have an immediate impact on infrastructure. Specifically, rehabilitate nutritional clinics, provide irrigation and water supply systems.

## 9.22 Partners

The impact that CARE can have funding ongoing projects such as those conducted by the missionaries could be immediate, efficient, require no infrastructural or administrative investment from CARE beyond monitoring and evaluation. It would give an immediate and powerful uplift to the image of CARE in the region. It would put people to work, inject needed cash into the region at a time of crisis, and provide enduring and life giving results. Specifically, the missionaries in Bombardopolis--where there few springs and many people depend on rain water-- work with a four man crew of local masons to build 512 gallon cisterns. They can build 4 per week. But lack of funding means that they have built only 300 in ten years. With the proper funding 5 crews could build 20 cistern per week, 500 in a single year. The largest and most obvious candidates are ACF, AAA, ID, PEPDEV and FAES. Smaller organizations that should be targeted as partners are UEBH, IMF, and Clarke Farm.

## 9.23 Recommended activities

- Rehabilitate Nan Sentren Nutritional Clinic and provide Cistern (\$20,000)
- Provide immediate support to Clarke Farm and Agricultural Tech School sponsoring students, seed development program, and storage research and training seminars.
- Fund MIF Cistern project in Bombardopolis and Mare Rouge for construction of 1,000 cistern
- Reinforce Gonaives water distribution through Much Ministries
- Coordinate with TechnoServe to bring Mango program and mango tree production to the area and develop market linkages for peanuts and other crops
- Coordinate with Ethical Fashion Initiative, Fair Winds Trading Company and local artisans to establish and center and to close the market link between them.

All other infrastructure and agricultural projects should be community driven development carried out with PRODEP, FAES, community councils, peasant associations, and women's organizations as discussed earlier.

# 10. Logistics

## 10.1 Where to Base Field Operations

Field offices should be located in proximity to markets. Markets are held in specific villages and towns. They are the focal points of economic, social, and political activity for broad regions, what can be called market sheds. A market place usually has two markets per week. In going to markets people are literally walking across the entire activity zone. Men in Mole St. Nicolas walk their animals to the livestock market in Gros Morne. Trains of market women walk from Jean Rabel, Mare Rouge and Bombardopolis to the market in Port-de-Paix. The advantages of locating in market towns will accrue to both CARE-- in terms of economic, agricultural activities, seed fairs--and to the population as most households have at least one person visiting a market several times per week. Other advantages are that field bases must have access to services and partners. It would be expedient to reactivate prior CARE guest houses and operation bases in Pas Catabois, Bombardopolis, and Barbe Pagnol, all market towns/sites. Other candidates for field bases are the market towns Beauchan, Mare Rouge, and Anse Rouge.

### 10.12 Recommended Rent

NGOs and foreign nationals typically pay excessive housing and service costs. Where an NGO often pays US\$2,000 per month rent for a chic house or apartment, a Haitian or expatriate with experience and contacts in the country will pay the same amount for six months. This was true before the earthquake. It became more extreme afterward. In 2010 UN and NGO personnel were paying \$1,000 for a room and \$3,000 per month for a typical apartment; Haitians and resident expatriates were paying \$150-\$200 for the same room and \$350 to \$500 for similar apartments. The same is true for some services. Even 3 years after the earthquake water companies put a 20% surcharge on water going to NGOs or foreigners (after the earthquake they jacked the price up 300%).

If we are seriously here to help, there is no reason why NGOs have to pay 5 and 6 times the going rates. Nor is there any reason why we cannot get rental and services for reasonable prices. Vacancies abound (even after the earthquake; most upscale buildings did not collapse, particularly in the Petion Ville to Kenskoff area, and 37,000 of the upper class had left). To assure that CARE is paying fair rates a consultant should be hired to perform a cost analysis of housing and services in villages where CARE will set up field offices.

### 10.13 Recommended Actions

1. Reopen Pas Catabois and Barb Pagnole guest houses
2. Sign contract with Mayor of Bombardopolis to rent the former CARE guest house
3. Negotiate with ID for office space and housing in Jean Rabel or rent a house for an office
4. Open Guest house in Gonaives

## 10.2 Employees and Structure

### 10.21 Decentralized Decision Making

CARE should invert the chain of decision making. In 1983 one of the first USAID evaluator's first critiques of HACHO was that the organization was too centralized--with the main office and major decisions being in Port-au-Prince while operations were a long and brutal one day drive up into the North West. CARE today is centralized.

It is impractical given the structure of Haiti that management abandon its Petion Ville headquarters and move to Gonaives or Port-de-Paix. But CARE should consider a reversing of the order of priority and flow of command. Just as CARE is now listening to community groups as leaders in the decision making process, it should put in place a strict in-house regime of field-driven decision making with the urban offices settling back into the role of support, monitoring and accounting functions.

### 10.22 Consultants

To establish its new structure, CARE should hire as consultants Patrick and Marie Josette Delorme, two international consultants of Haitian origin. Both worked in the region for almost a decade, were employed at one time or another by all the major organizations in the area except

CARE and ACF, both are familiar every level of the system from rural clinics to Port-au-Prince (Patrick was an MSPP sub-minister and Joseph worked as high level administrator with WFP for 7 years). Both are honest, dedicated, and imminently qualified to consul CARE through the process.

### 10.23 Recommended Pay Scales

CARE has traditionally paid more for salaried employees than most organizations working in the NW, much more. There are advantages and disadvantages. Working class Haitians men and women are often engaged in a wide gamut of part-time income generating endeavours. This fact, coupled with the history of State jobs being granted as a type of patronage, engenders the idea that work, per se, is seldom expected and that authority over job performance rests not with the supervisor, but with the giver of the job--the patron. It also yields an annoying expectation that one may send substitutes (brother, sister, uncle) to "hold one's place" at a job.

With this in mind, paying a decent living wage assures that employees do not send substitutes and that job responsibilities do not get shunned for alternative economic activities. But it is also important to acknowledge that paying too high of a rate creates expectations, incites jealousies, and contradicts the message that CARE is working at tasks beneficial to the community. It also overlooks the fact that in for most people in the area a stable job is preferable to a higher paying temporary employment opportunity.

With that in mind CARE and its employers should 1) make every attempt to recruit skilled labor in the area where it is working 2) pay a marginally higher price for permanent in-house labor but keep short-term contract labor at a competitive norm, 3) pay urban salaries to people who it recruits from urban areas, and 4) avoid whenever possible paying per diems and covering travel costs (once again, it sends the wrong message, creates unrealistic expectations and it undermines CARE objectives by encouraging an industry of living for *per diems* whether the participant considers the work, seminar, or project worthy). With that in mind Tables 6 thru 8 gives a range of wages in both the formal (taxed and regulated), informal (untaxed and unregulated), and entrepreneurial sectors.

Data in Table 6 is from DeMattee 2012 is based on 876 observations from 79 formal sector employees, including the banking, airline, construction, petrol, hotel, manufacturing, medical, telecom, IT, and humanitarian sectors. Table 7 and 8 show mostly inform sector employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. The data come from 15 independent studies conducted by Haitian students and CARE researchers who interviewed friends, family and neighbors engaged mostly in informal sector occupations. (all data is in US dollars annual wage; daily wage earnings are based on 25 working days per month).

Table 10.1: Formal Sector Employment (USD) (Demattee 2012)			Table 10.2: Informal Sector Employment		
Occupation	(USD/year)	USD/Day	Occupation	(USD/year)	USD/Day
Security Guard	\$1,734.00	\$5.78	Guard/home	\$1,012.50	\$3.38
	-	-	Guard/business	\$1,710.00	\$5.70
Domestic	\$2,177.00	\$7.26	Domestic	\$1,170.00	\$3.90
Cook	\$2,855.00	\$9.52	Cook	\$1,200.00	\$4.00
Handyman	\$3,430.00	\$11.43	Labor	\$2,419.00	\$8.06
Messenger	\$3,796.00	\$12.65	Messenger	\$1,800.00	\$6.00
Driver	\$5,347.00	\$17.82	Driver	\$3,150.00	\$10.50
Office Staff	\$6,548.00	\$21.83	Receptionist	\$2,500.00	\$8.33
Secretary	\$8,090.00	\$26.97	Secretary	\$4,500.00	\$15.00
Nurse	\$10,150.00	\$33.83	Apprentice	\$2,250.00	\$7.50
Mechanic	\$10,801.00	\$36.00	Nurse	\$2,790.00	\$9.30
Engineer	\$12,777.00	\$42.59	Foreman	\$3,750.00	\$12.50
Acct	\$15,379.00	\$51.26	-	-	-
IT Professional	\$20,310.00	\$67.70	Analyst	\$11,250.00	\$37.50
Office Manager	\$21,267.00	\$70.89	Supervisor	\$5,750.00	\$19.17
Doctor	\$28,306.00	\$94.35	Doctor	\$10,350.00	\$34.50
Program Mng	\$31,672.00	\$105.57	Director bank	\$18,000.00	\$60.00
Executive	\$35,646.00	\$118.82	Director	\$18,500.00	\$61.67

Table 10.3 Entrepreneurial Sector		
Occupation	Year	Day
Minimum wage	\$1,500.00	\$5.00
Agricultural labor	n/a	\$2.50
Construction labor	\$2,635.00	\$8.75
Mason	\$3,750.00	\$12.50
Moto Taxi	\$4,125.00	\$13.75
Vendor	\$4,500.00	\$15.00
Tap tap driver	\$7,500.00	\$25.00

### 10.3 Order of Projects Development

1. Establish a coordination committee with PRODEP, FAES, CAM, AAA, ID, ACF, WFP, and CRS (an effort should be made to assure inclusion of representatives of the local Catholic Church (one of the most powerful institutions on earth and owns resources and has influence throughout the region, to say nothing of the mentioned sisters). This should be done at the local level and among field directors not in the Port-au-Prince offices. The focus should be on strict coordination with agenda sharing, voucher and food aid and location of programs. It should be a short and focused weekly meeting where partners share lists of specific activity areas.
2. Distribute Vouchers to nutritional clinics PEPFAR, and Catholic Sisters who have programs or old age asylums.
3. Begin coordination with Peasant associations
4. Identify and reinforce existing women's organization and form new ones; train in VSLA
5. Identification of partners for seeds programs (CAM in La Source, PROHUERTA and IICA internationally)
6. Seek partnership with TechnoServe and Ethical Fashion Initiative
7. Launch cistern project with MIF
8. Sub-contract for placement of state of the art M&E system

Table 10.4: Key contacts

Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
Asno			Chansolme	Clamir blanc	37715967		
Aib		Ballade	Chansolme	Gelin claudy	37392674	Gina eugene	37400246
APREC		Petit coin	Saint-Louis du Nord	Loriston wikenson	38205630	Alteme rosemane Joseph	36533395
Pa bliye		Centre ville	Chansolme	Techelet louis	37457596	Stephanie nelson	36314848
Opsd		Grande source	Jean-Rabel	Charles jean robert	36213351	Ducla alila	37179273
Tet kole		Ballade	Chansolme	Adema atilus	38381188	Jehovah atilus	33678914
Mopc		Roldof	Mole St Nicolas	Jean moimeme	36088894	Faugue fanelus	36847278
Mouneb		Bassin bleu	Jean-Rabel	Ulysse jerome	36695614	Ulysse robert	36695614
MOOVENCE		Balatier	Saint-Louis du Nord	Chenet carty	37830242	Petit Bozi	37904055
Pwodep		Deroulien	Bassin Bleu	Emile trasilien	47854463		
AFSODO		Odige,morne rond	Bassin Bleu	Mme kertia st vil	38427758		
Tet kole		Pas chech	Bassin Bleu	Moril Exantus	38861639	Exantus Fito	31232171
MSCJR		Nan bois blanc	Bassin Bleu	Jonel Senatus	43176635	Ulisse dieulivert	36623103
Cepar		Blok guest house	Bassin Bleu	Dalien dieuphene	37572126	Charles edouard	36793294
Rose de lima en action		Labe	Bassin Bleu	Jean eli dasli	46808595		
APF		Faligan	Bombardopolis	Etrenne Ervilus	38263108	Iveniel Ternelus	37766783
Ajcb		Ballade	Chansolme	Joseph dilma	36827380	Kerby eugene	37112007
Afvds		Deside	Port-De-Paix	Dormelia senatus	48010260	Boge jhonny	37314522
Opkof		Dame marie	Mole St Nicolas	Laurent aliance	36810404	Garcon olem	37199529
JCA		La coma	Jean-Rabel	Odrange Prince	38174401	Jean Luxon	38639534
AJPPR		Guichard	Saint-Louis du Nord	Sineus Sony	36313830	Louis Marc Donal	33788010
KREP		Faligan	Bombardopolis	Volnik Ervilis	48351844	Atonese Dilejuste	37356673

Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
Mtlb		Leblanc	Jean-Rabel	Phanel Themistocle	36781668	William maxino	36796065
AJSDL		Loterie	Port-De-Paix	Vital Linique	36166665	Dieufait Jacques Jean	37764659
ADLR		Remy lefond	Jean-Rabel	Joseph norisaint	48426239	Exales deus	31952745
COOPECS		Centre ville	Saint-Louis du Nord	Juna Sanon	22141311	Odena Chanoine	31701848
OJDRB		Rivieres des barres	Saint-Louis du Nord	Petion Wilner	37661392/33681252	Micamson Telfort	33551457
Afdeb		Roche fort	Bombardopolis	Elisa philippe	38483073		
ISPO		Creve	Bombardopolis	Telsaint Vilfran	36729710	Alisca Jn Louis	31460438
ODRB		Riviere des barres	Saint-Louis du Nord	Fritnel Polinis	37497349	Joseph Simeon	37310505
KOPNO		Pas chech	Baie-de-Henne	Petit frere Delivrance	37664572	Jean wil Desilis	47412990
APD		Duconge	Mole St Nicolas	Beauplan Michelet	37845525	Dupra Euclenie	38746698
ATRAT		Tifon	Port-De-Paix	Jacque Louis Carlos	32269793/ 38946717	Nelson Rosias	46084834
OFPD		Reserve	Baie-de-Henne	Beaubrun Bernadette	37862480	Rodna Exantus	37499630
Acprodam		Camp pognon	Bassin Bleu	Elionor elma	46258528	Eliner francois	46258513
AMODD		Des granges	Saint-Louis du Nord	Etienne Louverture	38038556	Jean vul St Farlin	37562284
OCD		DOS D 'ane	Baie-de-Henne	Beaubrun Antoine	32920519	Brunel Cesaire	36424387
Scout		Cap rouge	Saint-Louis du Nord	Dumarsais Jonas	47961681/	Velis	36400882
ADEPSCOJ		La coma	Jean-Rabel	Beaubrun Leberceau	33551532	Louissaint Jean Rico	38550771
Coadpo		Creve	Bombardopolis	Laures moise	36562510	Portilus ilaman	36384562
Agroecologie		Kalik	Port-De-Paix	laureus liberis	36710885	Osias pierre	36985742
AIPRB		Bwa Dom	Baie-de-Henne	Elie Jean Ronel	38697016	Dupi wisbert	36791915
Kca komin		Centre ville	Chansolme	Augustin benerick	36327768	Remy joseph	36775125
Areb		Labe	Port-De-Paix	Jesistrat pierre	31053133	Wilda germinal	47352837



Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
FONPCUD		Des granges	Saint-Louis du Nord	Merizier Robert	37917624/ 32771975	Jean Pierre louis	37904055
CJDNO		Dame	Mole St Nicolas	Charles maxen	46089930	Charles Renan	38664485
UJBD		Bois neuf	Jean-Rabel	Charitable leverjuste	36615033	Beldorin wilson	38059976
Mtpm		Camp pognon	Bassin Bleu	Ancy bastien	46258533	Charles isbenie	46966320
APDB		Berger	Saint-Louis du Nord	Cado Simone	37691061	Avena wisny	37356385
Atral		La corne	Port-De-Paix	Xavier alix	38221672	Vagner comete	38327907
APPIBH		Centre ville	Baie-de-Henne	Telus Wilson	31243280	Joseph Wilda	36865949
Coem		Centre ville	Jean-Rabel	Jermanie jean	36276308	Jean vesnel	36276308
CIDEB		Pelicier 1	Bombardopolis	Stinfil Lijonc	37405283	Exeus Amercius	36511735
Tk tet kole		Puis kouzen	Port-De-Paix	Oxon thomas	37674237	Pierre joseph	38308387
MOSODEL		La Plaine	Jean-Rabel	Nelson Walnex	36344501	Anna Louise Dorsainvil	32500359
Apps b		Clenette	Bombardopolis	Fanel dupre	36488654	Renemi francois	36168205
POPS		Chemin desgranges	Saint-Louis du Nord	Wilson Etienne	36195262	Lucas charite	37770319
CAPS		Centre ville	Saint-Louis du Nord	Samuel Denave	38247090	Desravines Frantz	37035202
Fopdel		Odige	Bassin Bleu	Ribert audejeune	36573484	St martin mereus	38346438
ATC		Cabaret	Jean-Rabel	Paul Elysee	32994768	Metayer joas	36941437
Ofpb		Ballade	Chansolme	Gina eugene	37300246	Jonassin lumose	36787319
Ageh		Veille terre	Jean-Rabel	Josafa mercidieu	36493994	Noel clervil	36070065
ADRUH		La coma	Jean-Rabel	Prince Joceline	43166722	Joanes celima	32767088
Odpg		Grivot	Bassin Bleu	Pierre etienne	31682321	Paul ceranes	47961422
Ggc		Kaporal	Port-De-Paix	gereus ertilus	38416442	Wilken branchedor	32994412
Kabm kooperativ		Koray	Jean-Rabel	valery conserve	31015077	Anthony selmon	3665463
Olad		Gran dyab	Anse-Rouge	Manis dilus	38412832	Patricia fatal	38948982

Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
<b>Fradesf</b>		Foison	Port-De-Paix	Audelor fertile	38778697	Veusnor breus	36613923
<b>AJDD</b>		La douceur	Saint-Louis du Nord	Francis Alistene	36219308	Guiliene Monestime	37136865
<b>Crep</b>		La plaine	Jean-Rabel	Anise Desamours	22142270		
<b>Apecar</b>		Blok guest house	Anse-Rouge	Dieuphene dalien	37572126	Elianve merdelus	36910965
<b>AFC</b>		Cap rouge	Saint-Louis du Nord	Joseph Gelda	48197545	Guerrier linda	37122911
<b>Koples</b>		Centre ville bassin bleu	Bassin Bleu	Dumesle colisner	36457973	Smith tirogene	36538092
<b>SOCOREDNO</b>		Centre ville	Jean-Rabel	Moise yonel	37039744	Herrard prisley	48595509
<b>Adpfk</b>		Kademe	Jean-Rabel	Gertha hazard	43159850	Elsina riche	32776374
<b>AGAB</b>		Roulette	Bombardopolis	Jean will Augustin	38414445	Cedieu Jean Henry Claude	36239341
<b>AJDR</b>		Remoussin	Saint-Louis du Nord	Calixte Nickel	37624013	Jonas Ambroise	37852217
<b>KPAL</b>		Dispite	Jean-Rabel	Ilfrat Oxone	48254794	Teralien st preux	32905558
<b>ODESOB/NO</b>		Centre ville	Bombardopolis	Francois Gessler	36825096	Jean Coreck	36530964
<b>Asodeb</b>		Verne	Bombardopolis	Leodil norvelus	36100028	Henry sude	37893686
<b>OPA</b>		Aubert	Port-De-Paix	Joseph Frantz	37795349	Cesaire Wilbens	37500957
<b>APAB</b>		Floxy	Bombardopolis	Jean Ronel Valbrun	36183948/ 32936747	Fernandieu metesier	
<b>APBO</b>		Odige	Jean-Rabel	Loziel Belizaire	31931933	Sainvil Esaie	33551423
<b>Atpb</b>		Creve	Bombardopolis	Iloner alparette	36888691	Macon vernet capricien	37210920
<b>Apl</b>		Lanon	Bassin Bleu	Fertilus ose	46258961	Wilfin jeantinor	48399701
<b>MODELL</b>		La coma	Jean-Rabel	Auguste Odinel	36312851	Cineus Monfort	37134703
<b>KED</b>		Dupre	Baie-de-Henne	Simon Vilnocien	36536706	Etienne Erikes,met blan	36484278
<b>CBEG</b>		Guinaudee	Jean-Rabel	Naces melidor	32994666	Joales desamours	31042645
<b>crep</b>		Nan rosier	Chansolme	Simeon elidieu	37067217	Francois luc filias	38051650
<b>Kopare</b>		Larezev	Jean-Rabel	Dieujuste lumenes	33759970	joseph odonel	36751352

Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
APFW		Kafilip	Jean-Rabel	Ilfrat josner	42664553	Mme poline Beauchamp	32861139
AJBDNO		Hass	Bombardopolis	Meteus Sudieu	36426172	Ternelus Icindes	37896463
OPD		Dame	Mole St Nicolas	Wilmon loudior	37843349	Cadet benisca	38378720
Usaid champ konbit pou lavi miyo		Centre ville	Jean-Rabel	Kenol previsno	36184841	Nelson paulvic	37735211
Koperajr		Cente ville	Jean-Rabel	Jean baptiste etzer	36213525	Merdar sy hilaire	36429233
Welt hunger hilfe		Centre ville	Jean-Rabel	Fedner lesperance	36167444	Rainer schmid	28107425
GRAF		Mare Rouge	Bombardopolis	Theramene Bernexes	37400954	Cesaire Saturnet	38077849
Mtsj		Coicou	Jean-Rabel	Paul noder	36542692	Yslaine jean marie	31151747
ACF		Centre ville	Anse-Rouge	Destin	38167961		
Ajdlm		Ka godet	Jean-Rabel	Joseph fenelien	38560670	Pierre amilus	36473044
ACF			Nord-Ouest	Samir Maleh	2245-1886		3550-5035
AMG			Artibonite Ouest	Jean Wilner PAUL	2246-1065		
ACTED			Gonaïves Ennery, Passe-Rène, Mapou Sou)	Fanny DEVOUCOUX	.2257-3564		2527-0672
AAA		Jean Rabel	Nord'OuestArtibonite	Michael KUEHN	257-3962		513-5690
ASDC			Nord - l'Ouest	Bernard ZAUGG	2249-1193		
AG			Jean-Rabel Mole Saint-Nicolas	Jackson VOLTAIRE	3402-2119		3455-0760
EEIUH			Mare Rouge, Jean-Rabel	Francinor HYPOLITE Cazeau OBIERGE KénCAZIMIR			
EPT			St Louis	M. Déliaire DOCILET	510-8237		
GAPEL				Mme Denise C. ANOVAL Ketelie A. DOMERSANT Raymond ETIENNE	2516-0286		3448-7648
NWHCM		St Louis	St Louis	Janeil OWEN	2268-5810		2268-4794

Nom de l'organisation	Full Name	Localite	Commune	Contact 1	Telephone/ email	Contact 2	Telephone/ email
SAO			Port-au- Prince	Mme Marie Gabrielle VINCENT			
P&A			Ouest Artibonite	Eris LABADY	2246-2105		2249-3797
ID/ADEMA		Jean Rabel	Artibonite Nord'Ouest	Isabelle FAUCON	2510-8845		
CAM		La Source			2257-9550		
IMF				Steve and Faith Leach			
		CREVE	Bombardopolis	Precois Norcilus -	903-372-3675		
Hands Together			Gonaives		413-731-7716		
Much Ministries			Gonaives	Beaver Brooks			
2Story			Gonaives	Kathy Brooks			
Omaha Rapid Response			Gonaives	Brian Smith			
				Keziah Furth Nurse			
Much Ministries			Gonaives				
Isaac Gardner			Gonaives				
Store owner			Gonaives	Maxime Doris	3 621 0532		
					3 720 4976 / 3 353 6288		
SOS			Gros Morne	Julien Gerard			
Catholic Priest,			Gros Morne	Father Wilne			
AFAGM	Assoc. Femme Action de Gros Morne		Gros Morne	Nadal Odeus			
Gros Morne Hospital			Gros Morne	Nanci Vital (nurse)	3 122 13 95		navitou08@yahoo.com
Gros Morne Hospital			Gros Morne	Dieus Francoise (Directrice System Comunitè)	Francoise.deus@yahoo.fr		
FAV	Fanm Vigilante		Basin Bleu	Zidor Belancia Tanis	3 635 2349 / 3 297 3924		Zidorbelanciatanis@yahoo.fr

<b>Nom de l'organisation</b>	<b>Full Name</b>	<b>Localite</b>	<b>Commune</b>	<b>Contact 1</b>	<b>Telephone/ email</b>	<b>Contact 2</b>	<b>Telephone/ email</b>
<b>AFALIBAG</b>	Assoysasyon Fanm nen Aksyon Limit Bassin Bleu		Limit Bassin Bleu		3 496 28 66		
<b>FMC</b>	Faith Medical Clinic		Mare Rouge	Carol Anne	geo_cat1986@yahoo.com		

## 11. ANNEX

### What Everyone Involved in this Project Should Know

#### The History and Context of Development in the NW

##### Food Aid

The overseas foreign aid and that we call "Development" is almost entirely a post WW II phenomenon. For most of that time the industry has been heavily conditioned by food aid. This is especially true of US funded development efforts. By far the dominant developed world donor, US aid has at times comprised more than half of all overseas development aid. Much of that aid came in the form, not of cash, but food. Food security and relief was achieved through the distribution of the food in the wake of natural disasters and war. Food monetization (the selling of the food in developing countries) funded more enduring development strategies.<sup>xix</sup>

In the 1990s an increasing chorus of critics pointed to food aid as anathema to the objectives of long term development. Oxfam likened food relief and monetization to "dumping" on largely agricultural economies of the developed country beneficiaries we were trying to help (Oxfam 2005). In Haiti, circumstantial support for that argument comes from the fact that during the years of USG's greatest food relief efforts and monetization programs--1980 to the present -- Haitian agricultural production and export revenues plummeted. Accounting for 52 percent of Haitian exports in 1980, agriculture products were 24 percent of exports in 1987, 21 percent in 1990, and by the mid 1990s the only produce coming out of Haiti were a few mangos and a trickle of coffee. Over the same period GDP declined precipitously, falling at 2.5 percent per year between 1980 to 1985; it fell in half between 1986 to 1991, going from \$419 to \$225 (UN Globalis 2006). The process continued in the early 2000s.<sup>xx xxi</sup>

In 2008 petroleum prices increased and with it so did global food prices, precipitating riots in developing countries around the world, not least of all Haiti. With that unrest came a wide spread agreement that food aid may indeed be anathema to development. A concomitant and abrupt about face in development policies ensued. The same year the USG launched its new program, *Feed the Future, Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative*. The goal was to make countries "food sovereign", meaning self-sufficient. It was a radical change from 10 years earlier when USAID website assured visitors that food-aid helped move developing countries away from being food producing countries and into being food consuming countries that bought US produce.

##### The UN and WFP

The UN and WFP also changed strategies. Since its inception in 1961 the primary goal of the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has been to provide food assistance to those most vulnerable to hunger, usually women, children, the sick and the elderly. Similar to the USG, with the 2008 Global Food Crisis WFP made what it called a "historical shift" from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency. WFP now strives to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, but

with the ultimate goal in mind of eliminating the need for food aid itself. WFP's strategic plan for 2008-2013 lays out five objectives for the organization:

1. Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
2. Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures
3. Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations
4. Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase

In September 2008 WFP launched a program that helps small farmers access agricultural markets and to become competitive players in the market place. It reinforced programs that improved agricultural production, post-harvest handling, quality assurance, group marketing, and agricultural finance. WFP then signed contracts for more than 207,000 metric tons of food valued at US\$75.6 million, all from producers in 20 developing countries. Haiti was not one of them.

In Haiti WFP provides an excellent example of the difficulty in changing practices and honing them to promote production. While there has been much talk of purchasing locally, in the year following the earthquake WFP imported over 300,000 tons of surplus food from developed countries. The cost of the operation in food and money spent on transport and administration was US\$475 million. They bought no Haitian rice. But it would have been a good deal: it sold for US\$13.27 per sack in 2010, two thirds what it sold for before the earthquake.<sup>xxii</sup>

None of this is to say that WFP does not want to buy local. In November 2011, high level WFP directors in Washington and the WFP/Haiti country declared an interest in purchasing locally. The problem, they pointed out, is organizing dependable supply systems. CARE is well suited and has the experience to make serious and aggressive contribution in supporting WFP in helping local farmers meet food assistance needs for the most vulnerable in Haiti.

## CARE

CARE in fact was one step ahead of donors with its 2006 white paper distancing itself from food monetization as not compatible with the interests of the people it sought to help. In Haiti CARE soon withdrew from monetization. As a consequence CARE no longer had the funds for its other programs, and thus withdrew from most of its NW activity zone. CARE reconfigured its aid strategy, partnering with the Haitian government organization PRODEP and focusing on Community Driven Development, disaster relief, and assistance to HIV infected individuals and their families.

Since that time CARE has developed a voucher system discussed in the main body of the text and VSLAs focused on vulnerable women's groups. These programs have been effective, giving CARE confidence to expand and more specifically, re-enter the Northwest--an area in need. With this in mind, the fact that we are embarking once again on what could be the third massive effort to bring significant development to the region, it is useful to look at history of development and CARE and USAID involvement in the region.

### Missionaries, NGOs, and CARE in the North West and upper Artibonite

Missionaries from the US launched the first post WWII development era projects in the North West and Upper Artibonite region. In Port-de-Paix it was US missionaries from Philadelphia's Unevangelized Field Missions (UFM: Edward Brown), in Bombardopolis the Haiti Baptist Mission (Pastor Shreve). Later the Mennonite Central Committee drilled wells and put in water works throughout the region. The International Federation of the Red Cross showed up in 1956 in response to an earthquake that had damaged the Village of Jean Rabel. The Catholic Church became more active in 1963-1964, when Priest Marel Cornet installed a water system in the village of Jean Rabel. In 1975, the newly formed Catholic organization Caritas, began building health clinics throughout the region and established the hospital in Jean Rabel. But it was in 1965 that a comprehensive State-NGO-International development effort for the entire North West began. CARE was a major part of it.

### HACHO

CARE first came to Haiti in 1954 after Hurricane Hazel but significant involvement in the North West began in 1965 when US Vice President Hubert Humphrey's personal physician happened to visit the region. When the doctor returned to Washington he briefed Humphrey on the poverty in the region and the near total absence of any significant services or development. The Vice President sent the word down that NW Haiti was to be developed. USAID soon sent out a call for proposals. CARE, CRS and World Church Service bid on the contract. CARE won.

HACHO<sup>2</sup> was the organizations subsequently formed to develop North West, Haiti. HACHO was a largely USAID funded alliance of GOH and NGO partners. CARE became the principal US party. Not unlike its current relationship with PEPDEV, CARE staff worked with, trained and advised government counterparts who shared the same office space with them.<sup>3</sup> CARE also partnered with organizations such as German Fonds Agricole (the precursors to later PISANO and AgroActionAlemande). Infrastructural Projects were conceptualized as "self-help" and carried out by organizing and partnering with "community councils." The HACHO development program was comprehensive. It included work in health, education, governance training, small enterprise, agriculture extension services, micro-credit, reforestation, water and sanitation projects, rehabilitation of roads and irrigation works and emergency food relief. HACHO helped feed people and save lives during droughts in 1965-68, 1974-77, 1978-79, and after Hurricane David in 1979. The scale of work was such that CARE director Tim Lavelle (1977 to 1979), likened HACHO to a "quasi-government" (Lavelle notes that the State was essentially absent in any other 'developmental' form). In its 15 years of existence (1966-1979) Hacho gave the North West,

- 280 miles of rural roads improved and maintained
- 107 miles of major road reconstructed

<sup>2</sup> Initially called the Haitian-American Community Health Organization the name was later changed.

<sup>3</sup> Government partners included ONAAC (Office National d'Alphabetisation et d'Action Communautaire, focused on literacy); PIRNO (Programme Integree de Rehabilitation du Nord-Ouest – was infrastructure program), and PDAI (Projet de developpement agricole integree – was agriculture)



- 60 rural potable water systems built and maintained
- 24 irrigation systems
- 2 million plus tree seedlings planted
- 540 miles of soil conservation-related rock walls
- 8 supervisory credit schemes launched with community councils
- 129 community councils supported and nurtured
- 15 handicrafts production centers
- one beekeeping center established in Jean Rabel
- 9 hospitals and dispensaries improved and maintained, which included the 38-bed Jean Rabel Hospital
- 6 nutrition centers

In 1979 USAID cut funding to HACHO. The reasons are not entirely clear. Officially, USAID had been trying vainly for several years to get the GOH to assume full responsibility for the organization. However, in a 1983 post-project evaluation of HACHO, USAID evaluators criticized its centralized decision making, the remoteness of the central office from targeted beneficiaries, and not least of all, the "tension between HACHO's relief programs and its development objectives that skewed its development efforts toward non-sustainable programs requiring outside subsidies to keep them operating." Perhaps more important than anything, they cited lack of accountability, lack of M&E, and absence of institutional memory, concluding that, "HACHO had little capacity to identify in any systematic way where it had been, what it had done, and where it should go." (p 8). Ten years later, CARE would embark on a successor program far larger than HACHO. But what occurred in the meantime brought important lessons.

#### The Interim Years and Revolutionary Development

The years following the closing of HACHO were tumultuous throughout Haiti. In Port-au-Prince and other cities--notably Gonaives--they were years of increasing popular uprisings and in 1986 the Duvalier (son) regime was overthrown. In the North West there was a parallel but distinct movement. It was agrarian, it was closely linked to development, and it is critically important in understanding the feverish hope that development and reform can ignite among impoverished farmers. And it failed miserably. Indeed, it ended in tragedy.

For purposes of this review, here are the most salient points: Just as HACHO was being shut down in 1979, a swine flu epidemic swept through Haiti. To combat it, the OAS sponsored the eradication of all Creole pigs in the country. US veterinarians accompanied by military attaches swept through the region and slaughtered the pigs. Peasants were scheduled to be compensated but corruption meant that most were not. Many peasants saw this as a type of attack on their livelihoods.

At the same time Haitian Catholic priests working with the Catholic relief organizations Caritas had begun to work in the area. Supported with 20 tons of flour, 30 tons of powdered milk and 4,800 pounds of butter per week from the European Community (according to then Caritas administrator), they organized farming cooperatives, built irrigation works, and led a development and agrarian reform initiative that sought to empower peasant farmers. With the backdrop of events on the national level--the fall of the government and promise of widespread social change--a wave of revolutionary fervor swept through the Far West. It was focused in Jean Rabel but it was a movement that engulfed the entire region. From Port-de-Paix to Mole St

Nicolas and Anse Rouge, there was an electric unity in the belief that change could and would come from development linked to community action campaigns.

The movement took on a tone of increasing hostility. To many peasants the recent pig eradication was symbolic of economic aggression and trickery veiled in the guise of foreigner led "development". In one case, a group of peasants cut the throats of all the pigs at an IICA porcine re-population center. The movement began to take on the dimensions of a revolution. As a priest present at the time explained, "to progress it is sometimes necessary that the people break the hand that holds them down." According to many people living in the area, aggression came principally from rural farmers and their animosity and demand for change was widely interpreted among villagers, protestant missionaries, non-Catholic NGOs, and large land owners as a very real threat to their own safety and living standards.

In 1987, with the complicity of the military, counter-reform minded farming groups allied with villagers and some of the few large landowners in the area attacked and massacred 139 of those associated with Caritas peasant development groups. The movement was quelled. Caritas withdrew from the region. Frightened and disappointed peasants went back to their little agricultural plots.<sup>xxiii</sup>

#### CARE: NW Quasi-Government Era

In the early 1990s CARE became the primary vector of post-Duvalier USAID funded development for the region. Just as HACHO before them, they worked at a comprehensive array of development activities becoming a type of quasi government. CARE activities included everything from agricultural extension services to rehabilitation of road, and irrigation works. CARE touched almost every aspect of people's lives. Latrine building, contraception, water, nutritional aid to children and lactating mothers, and conducting long term educational development planning and school assistance (DAP I and DAP II). CARE was also were the single greatest source of emergency food relief. During and after the 1992 drought CARE spent 18 months providing daily rations of USAID food aid to 708,200 of the North West and Upper Artibonite's 860,972 people. Between 1995 and the early 2000s its school feeding program provided daily meals to children in 2000 of the regions primary schools. In the 7 weeks following the 2004 Gonaives flood, CARE distributed 2,249 MT of food to 160,000 people.

By the time of the Gonaives flood, CARE had carried out more regional relief and development projects than any other organization before or since and was far and away the most influential foreign organization working in the region. Where in 1979 HACHO had employed 200 Haitian national staff maintained 15 vehicles including trucks and 2 Caterpillar bulldozers; in 1999 CARE employed 700 nationals, had 158 motorcycles, 60 SUVs, 25 freight trucks, 2 dump trucks, 1 back hoe, and 12 generators ranging from a 6.5 kW that could run a U.S. household to a 150 kW that could run an entire village. Where in 1999 HACHO had a main office in Gonaives and field offices in Jean Rabel, Bombardopolis, Anse Rouge and Terre Neuve; by 2004 CARE had expanded to Pas Catabois, Port-de-Paix and Gros Morne and delivered food as far away as St Louis du Nord. At that time CARE was bigger and had more resources at its disposal than the corresponding Haitian government institutions or all the other NGOs in the region combined.

But results were mixed. For example, CARE's 1994 to 1996 feeding program was the most massive and concentrated feeding program in Haitian history. But CARE researchers found that child nutritional status worsened. Both chronically and acutely malnourished children increased more than 20 percent. And it was not because of the drought--it had ended in 1994. Overall, studies indicated that real per capita income for local farmers had fallen from a per capita 1977 index of US\$54 to a mid-1990s level of US\$22.<sup>xxiv</sup>

CARE was not alone in noting that development did not seem to be working. The German government had a similar widespread quasi-government operation in the region. Managed by organizations PISANO and AgroActionAllemande (reincarnations of Fonds Agricole that was present during the Hacho era), they too were rehabilitating roads and irrigations works, providing health and agricultural extension service, and distributing massive quantities of food aid. Together, the two organizations were distributing 10% of all German overseas food aid in the North West. But they noted the same trends that CARE found: dramatic increase in malnutrition occurring over the same period they were providing relief and carrying out widespread development and health programs.<sup>xxv</sup>

The same was true for the French. The French Government also had quasi-government programs run through Initiative Developpment (ID). Between 1993 and 1998, ID capped 67 water sources and took over financial and administrative responsibility for the Jean Rabel hospital paying the salaries of 25 of the 54 State employees employed there. ID also created a support network of over 115 regional health auxiliaries, another network of barefoot veterinarians, and engaged in agriculture and livestock support programs throughout the Far-West. But ID staff also noticed that development wasn't having the intended impacts. Peasants showed little interest in ID's project to reintroduce the creole pig; and the ID farmer supply store went into the red. In 1993 the ID country director documented the plummeting local price of corn with every new shipment of French corn that his organization monetized on the local market (the French were bringing food too). Adding the all too familiar insult, in 1999 a chanting hospital staff closed a meeting between ID and CARE with chants of "CARE, CARE, CARE," which paid higher salaries and they earnestly hoped would take over administrative and financial responsibility from the effective but frugal French. In 2000 ID pulled out of all its programs, including support to the hospital, and re-focused on education.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Looking back on the 1990s, what had become a painfully obvious failure in long term development strategies was also evident in health and reproductive statistics. Data from Faith Medical Clinic, one of CARE's partners in the 1990s, illustrates the point. A comparison of 1980s data with health data collected in the mid to late 1990s showed a 20% decrease in contraceptive use (from 6.9% to 5.5% of reproductive aged women); a 2- year decline in the average of the mother's age at first birth (from 22 to 20 years of age); and a 5.9 month decline in the average length of a woman's first inter-birth interval (from 29.5 to 23.6 months). In effect, while three of the world's most powerful governments--the US (CARE), the Germans (PISANO and AAA), and the French (ID)--where conducting what amounted to a massive contraception and maternal health campaign, women were using fewer contraceptives, have children younger, and getting pregnant more often. As if that was not gloomy enough, premature births over the same period went from 3.4% to 10.0% of all births.<sup>xxvii xxviii xxix</sup>

Table 11.1: Percent Of Child Population  
Malnourished In CARE Activity Area<sup>xxx</sup>  
(CARE 1997; CARE et al. 1996)

Indicator of Malnutrition	Year	
	1994	1996
General (WAZ) <sup>1</sup>	16.7	21.6
Stunting (HAZ) <sup>2</sup>	19.8	23.9
Wasting (WHZ) <sup>3</sup>	3.8	4.7
Normal	69.7	50.8

<sup>1</sup>Weight for Age <sup>2</sup>Height for Age <sup>3</sup>Weight for height

Table 11.2: Chronic (HAZ) Nutritional Status by Age: PISANO Survey c. 1990

Age in Months	Nutritional Status (n= 348)		
	1990 (n=348)	1997 (n=474)	Change in malnutrition
0 thru 6	3.1%	13.8%	10.70%
6 thru 12	20.0%	12.1%	-7.90%
12 thru 24	34.9%	43.5%	8.60%
24 thru 36	34.3%	34.5%	0.20%
36 thru 48	27.2%+	41.5%	14.30%
48 thru 72	37.7%	75.8%	38.10%
Total	29.9%	45.9%	16.00%

Table 11.3: Changes in Fertility Patterns Coincident with Nutritional Health Programs

	Before nutrition programs began	After nutritional programs had begun
Contraceptive use (% of reproductive age females)	6.9%	5.5%
Age at first birth (in years)	20.	22
First Inter-birth Interval (in months between births)	29.5	23.6
Premature births (percent of all clinic births)	3.4%	10.0%

\* See end notes for explanation of samples and sample population

Not only was aid during those years not being effective in the long run, it was engulfed in conflict, particularly regarding food distribution. Sacking of CARE trucks and warehouses were common place. Estimates of embezzlement in school feeding programs ran as high as 90%. On at least two occasions' during the 1990s revelations of corruption prompted CARE to dismiss its entire staff working in food distribution. And once again, CARE was not alone in its frustrations. PISANO had similar problems with embezzlement, theft and seemingly ungrateful beneficiaries.

On at least two occasions AAA staff tried to cut food for work projects and found themselves quite literally under attack. In 1997 local peasant leaders took to the airwaves and threatened the life of the field director. In year 2000 a peasant group marched on AAA headquartered in Boucan Patriot and Haitian National Police had to be called in to rescue the staff. With 1987 in the background such incidences were not taken lightly.

Indeed, no one working in the area can be left out of the equation. The World Food Program came to the area three times during the 1900s. In every instance corruption, logistic complications and poor administration meant that aid missed its mark. Twice the aid, sent for emergencies, was delivered a full year after the crisis and in the midst of bumper harvests. In 1998 a WFP rented warehouse was sacked in Jean Rabel (disappointed pillagers found the food was spoiled).

Nevertheless, whether other international organizations were present or not, CARE was the biggest of all the organizations and it was seen and is still remembered by most people in the area-- including its own staff--as a wasteful and inefficient giant that was encouraging corruption and enriching the greedy and immoral. These factors together with the influence over daily operations of its massive US sponsored food distribution caused CARE to question the long term impact of its most significant programs. In 2007 CARE closed most its programs in the region. Citing entrenched politics and widespread corruption, and frustrated with continually declining regional living standards and their own institutional dependency for funding on monetization of US surplus food aid as well as the apparent ineffectiveness of the food, CARE decided to reduce its North West activities.<sup>xxx</sup>

### Conditions Since CARE Left

As seen in the main body of the text, overall there does not appear to have been an enduring negative nutritional impact from CARE's 2007 withdrawal from the region. Missionaries in the Far West report a 2008 spike in cases of malnutrition, but rates subsequently continued to fluctuate within normal bounds.

At least part of the reason that nutritional status in the region did not change for the worse is that the World Food Program (WFP) stepped in and took over the distribution of food aid to the region. The delivery of food under WFP is reportedly similar in both efficiency and impact to when CARE managed the programs. In a survey of 8 community leaders throughout the region, most saw little difference between CARE distribution in the 1990s and early 2000s and recent WFP food distribution. In a November 2011 interview the country Director of AAA-- who with 10 years working in the Far-West is the longest standing country director in the region and perhaps all of Haiti--complained that poor coordination between WFP and his organization, a lack of sensitivity on the part of WFP for how long a crisis endured, use of multiple partners that also do not



Bugs in WFP Food

coordinate, and excessive food relief efforts with respect to the local market undermined his organizations programs and undermined market prices for the farmers. On an equally discouraging note, nutritional clinics also reported problems with the quality of the WFP food. The food is often infested with bugs, something that two clinic directors spontaneously elaborated on as discouraging recipients from coming to the nutritional clinics. None of this is to say that needs in the region have diminished. On the contrary: The conclusion that warrants emphasis is that there *continues* to be chronic unmet needs. <sup>xxxii</sup>

### Long Term Development

Since CARE reduced its presence in 2007 AAA has continued to be a major organizer of road and infrastructural works in the Far West, much it funded with WFP food and cash for work. ID continues to work in Education as a partner with Ministry of Education and spawned a sister organization ADEMA, that works in infrastructure and agriculture. ACF has moved in the region with plans to become a major presence on par with CARE of the 1990s. Government organizations FAES and PRODEP have given the GOH a respectable presence that did not exist 10 years ago. And some one dozen missionary organizations, most of them with decades working in the region, continue to do infrastructural work; CAM, UEBH, and NWHBM have exponentially increased their work efforts becoming as or more significant in terms of effective aid than corresponding government institutions and far more effective in the field of health than any other secular organization (indeed there are no secular organizations in the region working in health care.).

Regionally, the UN has accomplished a series of major undertakings. Where 10 years ago not a single bridge existed in the entire North West, the UN has built a dozen modern bridges. Only two of the major river crossings along the entire route from Gonaives to Port-de-Paix and to Jean Rabel do not have now have a bridge. Gonaives, destroyed in the 2004 flood and then again in the 2008 floods, is once again a city with at least one consistently paved road bisecting it.

In Gonaives there are several major projects, including a water availability and urban farming project. And AAA and ACF have projects throughout the region. Nevertheless, the needs are as great or greater today than 10 or even 20 years ago. The road linking Jean Rabel and Port-de-Paix--arguably the best rural road in Haiti in 2007 -- is today impassable for most vehicles. Outside of the urban centers little has changed. The same roads, in little better condition, the same people, more of them, struggling, facing increasing ecological stress.

There is a definitive opportunity for CARE to return to the region and, equipped with the lessons it learned in the past and new strategies for the present, partner with those organizations that are working in the region to make a contribution to the health, education and futures of 1 million people who currently live in the area and the millions who will be born in the generations to come.

Thus, in lieu of the past failure and in helping Haitians to define strategies to augment food production and help local governments and the GOH take ownership of their own means of food security, it behooves us to remind ourselves, as we once again increase activity in the region, exactly what are the most important features of Haitian food production system.

### Haiti and Peasant Economy

Haiti is unique in the Western hemisphere in the degree to which peasant economy and peasant livelihood strategies prevail. Having won independence early on (1804), the ex-slave majority who had won the revolution with plantation owning "mulatto" class, subsequently resisted attempts on the part of the ruling class to return them to plantations in serf type status. They did so by turning to petty and diversified cropping strategies. Within 30 years small holders producing primarily for the regional economy had entirely supplanted the colonial plantation economy. This system prevails until the present.

### Farming and Livelihood Strategies Today

Today, 60% of Haitians continue to depend on traditional farming livelihood strategies. And yes, they need help. They have been outcompeted for four decades by heavily subsidized and sometimes free US farm produce. In desperation they tend to sell their high nutritional value protein products--chickens, eggs, pigs, cows, and beans--and buy cheaper high carbohydrate foods or consume lower quality garden crops. They do this so that they can pay medical bills, pay for their children's schooling, or pay for the process of immigrating out of the region. But the consequences are that those who do not chose the route of emigration and escape are sicker more often and their children suffer from nutritionally induce growth complications that affect their ability to learn. Today, those who remain behind are the poorest and most malnourished segment of the Haitian population. But we should not overlook the fact that in colonial times Haiti was the most agriculturally productive colony on earth, that it was the slaves on small subsistence plots using the same technologies and strategies they use today that fed most of the colony; that after independence it was those cropping strategies that fed Haitians and sustained the population through centuries peppered with wars, embargoes, and natural disasters. In lieu of this and the new respect that donors have for food sovereignty, it is valuable to look at just what are the principal characteristics of the Haitian peasant farming strategy,<sup>xxxiii</sup>

- 1) To begin with, Haitian farmers are best described not as *subsistence producers*, but *subsistence oriented* producers who sell surplus
- 2) The market oriented economy they depend on and is made possible by,
  - a) microclimates that allow for complementary harvest seasons (the microclimates themselves are caused by
    - altitude differences-- as between mountain and plain--and
    - the fact that Haiti is located at the interface point between different continental climate systems)
  - b) a vigorous regional system based on rotating open air markets that are held in different locals on different days of the week giving families access to at least 2 markets per week within walking distance of their homestead,
  - c) rural women who make careers of medium and long-distance itinerate trade; they purchase local produce in one area and transport it to regional markets or urban markets and, not least of all,

- d) an array of diversified cropping strategies adapted not so much to production for income but also production for survival and security (i.e. planting of hardy drought and hurricane resistant crops that tend to have maximum harvest durations, providing near continual harvest of crops throughout the year)--see Section 7.5 Follow).

Figure 11.1




Table 11.4: General Price Ranges Estimated by Jean Rabel Merchants 1993

Crop	Measure	Price	
		Low	High
Corn	mamit	3.6	15.0
Millet	mamit	4.0	15.0
Beans ( <i>rache</i> )	mamit	16.0	33.0
Pigeon Peas	mamit	8.0	25.0
Plantains	regime	17.0	27.0
Sweet Potatoes	sack	8.0	25.0
Peanuts	mamit	5.0	15.0
Cow Peas	mamit	10.0	32.0
Coffee	mamit	12.5	25.0
Tomatoes	each	.7	1.0
Cabbage	each	1.3	2.0

SCID and Auburn University 1993





Table 11.7: Regional tree cycles (H = harvest)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Avocado							H	H	H	H	H	
Mango				H	H	H	H	H	H			
Bread nuts	H	H	H			H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Bread fruit	H	H	H				H	H	H	H		
Kenep							H	H	H	H		
Oranges (sweet)	H	H	H	H				H	H	H	H	H
rapefruit	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Limes	H	H			H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Oranges (sour)	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Coconut	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Papaya	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Corosol	H				H	H	H				H	H
Grenadia			H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H

Table 11.8: Average daily labor requirements for principal household tasks

Task	Frequency per day	Days per week	Avg # hours per performance	Avg. time per week (hours of adult labor)	
				Min	Max
Morning house cleaning	1	6	1-2	6.0	12.0
Weekly house cleaning	1	1	3-6	3.0	6.0
Water carrying	1-4	7	1.2	8.4	33.6
Morning meal	1	7	1-2	7.0	14.0
Afternoon meal	1	7	2-4	14.0	28.0
Gathering fire wood	1	7	1-3	7.0	21.0
Laundry	1	2	6-12	12.0	24.0
Walk to garden +harvesting	1	3.5	2.5	8.8	8.8
Trip to market	1	2	4	8.0	8.0
Total	—	—	—	74.2	155.4

3) And important features of the peasant livelihood strategy that derives from the type of market economy described and the microclimates are that the most efficient means of storage is money,

4) Dependence on money, scarcity of money, and the lack of storage means that most farmers purchase seed for planting rather than storing it, something that often gives way to wide fluctuations in price between harvests when markets are glutted and planting time when seed is scarce and must be sought elsewhere.

5) Production and income strategies are organized around the household rather than the workplace,

6) It is the household and not the State that provides a safety net for individuals.

7) Household service strategies--providing water, cooking food, cleaning cloths, and maintaining hygienic sleeping and food space--are low cost but labor intensive,

8) Gender based division of labor and the household livelihood strategies: As a cultural rule, the household is the domain of women. In the rural areas men plant gardens on behalf of women and in the name of the children they have together. Women are regarded as the owners of the produce. They do the harvesting, sell the harvest and manage the money. Moreover, in many cases, especially true in rural Haiti, it is also around the household that labor and production are organized. Household members participate in a wide range of productive income or food generating activities, such as agricultural production, livestock rearing, and fishing. And again this is true for all members of the household, even young children.

Table 11.9: Adult sexual division of labor (N = 1,482)

Task	Male	Female	Both	Male, female, and both	Neither	Total
Housework	5.4%	86.0%	6.7%	98.1%	1.8%	100.0%
Cooking	5.6%	87.6%	4.6%	97.8%	2.4%	100.0%
Childcare	5.3%	77.1%	7.4%	89.8%	10.3%	100.0%
Carry water	6.7%	79.1%	7.8%	93.6%	6.4%	100.0%
Sell produce	6.1%	75.2%	4.6%	85.9%	14.2%	100.0%
Sell livestock	24.4%	34.6%	22.3%	81.3%	18.8%	100.0%
Tend livestock	58.4%	11.7%	16.4%	86.5%	13.5%	100.0%
Garden work	58.7%	13.8%	20.9%	93.4%	6.6%	100.0%
Wage labor	24.4%	5.8%	3.0%	33.2%	66.9%	100.0%

Note: Neither means no children in the household perform the task. Includes households with no children and only toddlers.

Table 11.10: Child sexual division of labor (N = 1,482)

Task	Male	Female	Both	Male, female , and both	Neither	Total
Housework	11.7%	49.2%	14.8%	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
Cooking	12.4%	46.9%	13.5%	72.8%	27.2%	100.0%
Childcare	9.8%	40.4%	12.3%	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
Carry water	13.4%	28.7%	31.5%	73.6%	26.4%	100.0%
Sell produce	10.9%	10.6%	10.1%	31.6%	68.4%	100.0%
Sell livestock	5.1%	22.1%	5.7%	32.9%	67.1%	100.0%
Tend livestock	40.7%	5.6%	10.2%	56.5%	43.5%	100.0%
Garden work	39.1%	4.4%	9.2%	52.7%	47.3%	100.0%
Wage labor	5.6%	1.2%	1.5%	8.3%	91.7%	100.0%

Note: Neither means no children in the household perform the task. This includes households with no children and only toddlers.

9) Child labor: Even very young members of the household may contribute to livelihood security by fetching fire wood and water, running errands, washing clothes, preparing meals, and selling goods. The point being that whether UNICEF, World Vision, CARE, or donors would like to see children playing rather than working we should respect the importance they have to food security and livelihood, keep programs realistic and perhaps even target some programs to help children deal with their labor tasks rather than unrealistically insisting they should not work or, worse, pretend that they do not. Perhaps more importantly than anything else in understanding the household as the basis for livelihood strategies and the role that children play is that for both urban and rural areas children stay home and perform basic domestic tasks and care for younger siblings thereby freeing adult women (mothers, sisters, aunts and cousins) to pursue income generating activities outside the homestead (itinerant trade, and to migrate to villages, towns and urban centres where they work for months and sometimes years as domestics servants).<sup>xxxiv</sup>

Table 11.11: Households reporting that Children are primary performers of specific domestic chores

Activities	
Task	% of Households
Housework	75.7%
Cooking	72.8%
Childcare	62.5%
Carry water	73.6%
Sell produce	31.6%
Sell livestock	32.9%
Tend Livestock	56.5%
Garden work	52.7%
Wage labor	8.3%

\*Includes households with no children and those with only toddlers

Table 11.12: Number of Children Resident in House by Whether or Not Woman is Engaged in Marketing (n = 132; children 7 to 25 years of age)

				Woman Markets		Total
				No	Yes	
Age Categorie s	20 – 34	Children resident in the house	0 – 3	8	8	16
			4 – 6	4	12	16
			7+	0	2	2
			Total	12	22	34
	35 – 49	Children resident in the house	0 – 3	5	6	11
			4 – 6	4	18	22
			7+	0	13	13
			Total	9	38	47
	50+	Children resident in the house	0 – 3	8	11	19
			4 – 6	3	17	20
			7+	4	7	11
			Total	15	36	51

10) Response to Crisis: The greatest threat to livelihood security is, as seen, droughts and hurricanes—both called *siklons* by locals. Hurricanes are not as severe because mountains protect the region from the Southeast to Northwest moving storms, breaking up the winds and usually leaving only heavy rains as a threat. Many crops, such as manioc, sweet potatoes, and arrowroot survive and even benefit from the abundant rainfall. Prolonged droughts are more devastating. Only the hardiest crops and livestock survive. When a drought strikes, demands on household labor increase precipitously. The principal feature that determines the success with which a household can cope with the drought is not how few mouths it has to feed but how many able bodies it can put to work. Crop failure turns many households to charcoal production and, as a consequence, local wood supplies dwindle and household members must travel farther and farther to find wood for fuel.<sup>xxxv</sup> But most problematic is the water supply. Water sources dry up and people have to travel farther to fill their buckets. In the Far-West, the temporal distance to and from the nearest secondary water source goes from 70 to 120 minutes. Springs are packed with crowds of pushing, shoving and cursing women and children. People get up at midnight so they can arrive at a distant spring before it becomes too crowded and they spend hours waiting to fill a single water jug. Some people, particularly young children, return to the house teary eyed, trodden and bruised, having failed to procure any water at all. During a drought washing clothes becomes problematic as well. Women must travel great distances to find clean water and a vacant place to sit and scrub. Animals have to be watered more frequently since the desiccated fodder dehydrates them. Fodder itself becomes scarce. So farmers are traveling farther and farther into remote areas to graze their animals or to cut grass for them, and then they must lead the animals more frequently in the other direction, into more peopled areas where adequate water sources are more common and tend not to dry up. All of this additional effort translates into more labor and the need for more workers, because rain or no rain, people must eat and they must drink. Food still must be cooked, water found, clothes washed, and at least some animals must be kept alive so that when the drought finally ends there will be something with which to start producing again..<sup>xxxvi</sup>

Table 11.13: Distance to and from water


	N	Round Trip Distance in minutes		
		Min	Max	Mean
When there is rain	124	1.00	240	67
When there is no rain	124	1.00	360	120

Table 11.14: Major Natural Disasters in NW and Upper Artibonite since 1921

1921: drought (name forgotten)
1931: unnamed hurricane devastated crops and killed livestock
1938 – 1939: severe drought called <i>twa ribon</i> . Elders remember banditry, gangs of people watching roads and paths to steal whatever supplies a traveler might be carrying
1944-45, drought and food shortages;
1950: drought (no details)
1954 (October 12): Hurricane Hazel wrecked crops and killed livestock. Locals called it <i>douz oktob</i> (October Twelfth), and it is a major milestone in temporal reckoning for people in Jean Rabel and all over Haiti.
1957-59: it is not clear if this was really a crisis year. Several old-timers in Jean Rabel remember the year as a drought period and report going to the nearby island of La Tortue to buy manioc for relief. An earthquake destroyed houses in the village and was serious enough that American Red Cross volunteers showed up to evaluate and Pastor Brown of UFM (Unevangelized Field Missions) gave tents to displaced villagers.
1965: drought that is poorly remembered because of the severity of the ensuing drought in 1967-68.
1967 – 68: drought called <i>dechouke</i> (Uproot) and <i>plan dijans</i> (Emergency Plan). The latter name stuck because food aid was distributed in the form of a road project that opened a direct route to capital city of Port-au-Prince. The food some report was <i>rapadou</i> , a crude sugar that comes wrapped in banana leaves.
1974-77: drought called <i>goldrin</i> after a <i>blan</i> named Gorden who was reportedly responsible for regional food relief under HACHO.
1979: Moderate drought and then Hurricane David devastated crops, tore roofs off houses, and caused flooding in low-lying areas. The incident is not recollected by most farmers
1991 – 1993: a drought called <i>dekore</i> (Let Loose) and <i>twa zorey</i> (Three Ears). Some people at the time called it the <i>dèziem imbago</i> (the second embargo--the first embargo being imposed by the United Nations in 1992, this second embargo was imposed by God). Reportedly much banditry occurred. USAID/CARE relief effort begun in earnest towards the end of the drought.
1997: Drought – no name
2004: Drought,
2004: Hurricane Jeane, Gonaives Flood
2008: Hurricanes Ike and then Hanna, Gonaives Floods
2008: Drought
2012: Drought (Hurricanes Isaace and Sandy but do not qualify as historic disasters for the region)

11) High fertility and the demand for children: An important consequence of the high labor demands and need to adapt to crisis seen above is that, despite what many development practitioners and healthcare workers believe, having many children is economically logical from farmers in the region. Congruently, they tend to be radically pronatal; they want children, and at 6.0 to 7.1 births per woman fertility in the rural areas is perhaps the highest rate biologically possible given the prevalence of infectious diseases, low-calorie diets, high rates of female malnutrition, high female labor demands, and high rates of male absenteeism. Despite all these limiting factors, fertility in the rural areas is equivalent to the second-highest country birth rate in the world and almost as high as 19th and early 20th century Hutterites, who had the highest sustained fertility levels ever documented.

Figure 11.3: Completed fertility in Jean Rabel for women over 45 yrs (n = 787; Source: Schwartz 2001)





What locals call *Chicken corn*: yields in 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> months



Bean garden coming up in Gwo Sab, Jean Rabel after rains from Hurricane Sandy





Head of Millet outside of Gonaives



Catholic Churches Clarke Family Ranch outside of Gonaives: A struggling Farmers School




Table 11.15: Purchases in Market vs Garden

	Market	Garden	50/50
Plantain	61%	2%	23%
Greens and fruit	16%	41%	34%
Corn	56%	5%	36%
Sorghum	68%	5%	16%
Manioc, sweet potato, yam	31%	11%	44%
Haricot*	37%	7%	43%
Rice*	70%	1%	0%
Meat and fish	96%	4%	0%

### Adaptive Cropping Strategies

To understand the security situation and how it articulates with peasant livelihoods it is important to understand the crops Haitian farmers plant and the extent to which they are adapted to drought.

**Sweet potato** go into a state of dormancy during drought and then come back vigorously at first rain and may yield as much as twelve metric tons per acre on as little as four inches of rainfall. The more it rains, the more the vine produces (see Bouwkamp 1985; Onwueme 1978).

**Manioc** is one of the most productive tropical food plants on earth in terms of calories produced per square meter, surpassed only by sugar cane and sugar beets. It needs more rain than sweet potatoes to grow, but it is more tolerant of drought, easily surviving dry periods longer than six months and it grows in marginal soils. Unlike sweet potatoes, cassava has the unique ability to be stored in the ground and is hurricane proof because it can lose all its leaves and its branches may break but the root, which is where the food is, will not die. After drought or hurricanes the plant draws on carbohydrate reserves in the roots to rejuvenate itself (see Toro and Atlee 1980; Cock 1985).

**Pigeon peas** are a bush-like plant with roots reaching six to seven feet beneath the surface, deeper than cassava, making the plant highly drought resistant. When drought does strike, pigeon peas shed all their leaves and go into a state of dormancy just like cassava, coming back to life when the rains return (see Nene et al. 1990). Moreover, its stalks provide an excellent fodder for livestock.

**Millet** is another wonder crop that yields with minimum rainfall. The roots reach more than eight feet beneath the surface, enabling the plant to withstand over two months of drought. When the crop is entirely lost to drought or has been harvested, the stalks can be cut back and with the first rains the plant will begin growing again; it can potentially yield 10,000 seeds for every seed planted, it grows on land otherwise lost to salinization, and its hard kernels store as well or better than wheat (see Nzeza 1988).

**Peanuts** are even more drought resistant than millet, and in NW and Upper Artibonite they are planted in sandy soil and in the chaparral where only cacti and xerophytic plants are found. It is also the premier high yield cash crop in the mountains, taking over the role that corn and beans fill on the plains (see Nzeza 1988).

The other lesser but still important crops all fit into an agricultural strategy that is clearly selected more for eking out a living in the face of an unpredictable market and natural environment than for participating in the world economy: **Lima beans**, which are inter-cropped with corn, are nitrogen fixing and begin to yield two to three months after harvest and continue to yield for as long as there is sufficient rainfall. **Pumpkins** and **squash** also yield continually as long as there is rain. The most popular **yam** in the mountains of the North West (yam reyale) can be planted during dry spells and will begin to grow with the first rains. Like cassava, it can be stored in the ground indefinitely, serving as an important food during droughts and other crises. Sugarcane endures for years, propagates itself without human intervention, can be harvested at any time after it is mature, and will grow back after being cut. Perhaps most importantly with regard to **sugarcane**, the hard fibrous exterior locks in water while the roots extend some eighteen feet underground, making it a completely drought-resistant source of water and high-energy food for both people and animals.

### **Nutrition, Calories, Yields: Manioc, Millet and Peanuts**

Regarding these crops and the new strategy of farmer led decision making, we should listen to the peasant but we should also take into consideration what we know scientifically about nutrition and crop yields for specific crops and what we know from elsewhere in the world. And most importantly in this respect is the fact that Manioc and Millet are two of the most important tropical food crops on earth and highly suited for cultivation in Haiti.

**Manioc**, a food that most Americans think of as a tasteless and nutritionally vacant root is the 3rd most important tropical crop: 500 million people eat it. Its leaves are a good source of protein and iron that Africans chop, boil, season and then eat like people in North America and Europe eat spinach. Its roots are the source of most its carbohydrates and can be pounded into a flour that is easily shipped and stored. The flours can be mixed with other flours and/or corn meal to make bread and a host of other durable comestibles. It is also used to make at least a half dozen other comestibles, including Chikwangue, a fermented and savory paste that ships well and stores at ambient tropical temperatures for up to two weeks. Yet, with all these possibilities, Haitians do not make powder flour with manioc (foufou), they do not mix it with other flours to make cakes, only a few make chikwangue, and they do not eat its high protein leaves, all a rather startling summary for a population highly anemic and close to the caloric margin.

**Millet** is similar. North Americans think of as bird seed but it is one of the tropics most eaten foods and nutritionally on par or superior to corn and wheat. It can also be used to make a wide assortment of storable and marketable comestibles, including bread. Haitians eat it and they grow it. And the environmental and edaphic practicality and adaptability of millet--and manioc--mean that Haitians depend on it--as they do manioc. But similar to manioc they make none of the mentioned foods--delicacies in some parts of the world-- and they eschew millet for rice, wheat, and corn, high prestige cereal foods that have been intensively marketed by US interests (corn followed by wheat are the two premier US exports with a long history of highly sophisticated in-country marketing support from US interests).<sup>xxxvii</sup>

**Peanuts** are another product suitable for massive cultivation in Haiti and it is a nutritional super-food highly appropriate for specific nutritional needs of impoverished Haitians. Peanuts blow the top off the charts in terms of calories and protein and, as or more importantly, fat content. Regarding fat, while western NGOs employees, most of who struggle with too much fat in their diets, tend to look with jaundiced eye on food with high fat content, most Haitians do not get enough of it. Edible oils are a critical component in the human diet: necessary in building cell membranes; regulating hormone, immune, cardiovascular, and reproductive systems. USDA recommends that daily fat/oil intake not exceed 30% and not fall below 20% of total daily calories fat.<sup>xxxviii</sup> As seen in Table 3.1, below, low income countries tend to dip beneath the recommended minimum; Haiti is among them.<sup>xxxix</sup>

Table 11.16: Nutritional Comparison of Common Staples

	Calories	Carb (Grams)	Fat	Protein
Peanuts	567	16.13	49.24	25.8
Wheat	342	75.9	1.71	11.31
Millet	206	41.19	1.75	6.12
Blackeyed Peas	193	33.62	4.34	5.24
Rice	193	41.41	0.83	3.6
Plantain	122	31.89	0.37	1.3
Black Beans	91	16.56	0.29	6.03
Corn	86	19.02	1.18	3.22
Soy	60	5.57	0.1	10.51

<http://www.twofoods.com/compare/query/c295/cGVhbnV0>

Table 11.17: Estimate of Percentage of Calories per day from fat (pop = 8.5 million)

	Calories per day from fat <sup>1</sup>	Total calories per day <sup>2</sup>	% of daily calories from fat
North America & EU <sup>3</sup>	1305	3,380	0.39
Latin America and the Carib.	711	2,830	0.25
Near East	630	2,910	0.22
North Africa	576	3,180	0.18
East and South East Asia	468	2,660	0.18
Sub – Saharan Africa	405	2,190	0.18
South Asia	405	2,400	0.17
<b>Haiti (unlikely) best case</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>2,830</b>	<b>0.25</b>
<b>Haiti (probable) mid case</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>2,190</b>	<b>0.18</b>
<b>Haiti (possible) worst case<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>342</b>	<b>2,086</b>	<b>0.16</b>

1 = Total FAT calories per day from FAOSTAT 2003

2= Total Calorie per day from FAO 2001

3 = North America and EU is Average from FAOSTAT 2003

4= From FAO, cited in CRS Report for Congress 2007

If Haitians are to produce carbohydrates and proteins in quantities competitive with US production of crops best suited to the North American climate and soils then they will have to begin by doing the same that US farmers do, focus on crops best suited to be grown in Haiti.




Figure 11.6





Figure 11.7



## 12. Questionnaires

### Organizations

Commune	Specify
Section	Specify
Habitation	Specify
Type of organization	Specify
Name of organization	Specify
Years operant in the commune	Specify
Members in the commune	Specify
Activities in the commune	Specify
Sections where activities are	Specify

### Farmer Questionnaire

What crops do farmers grow most in this area?	Crops & fruits
Do people here usually use fertilizer?	Yes/no
What is the food security situation in the area compared to an average year?	Not good at all/Not good/No change/Better/Terrific
How is the harvest compared to a typical year	Not good at all/Not good/No change/Better/Terrific
What locality has had the best harvest this year	Specify
What are the two biggest problems you have with agriculture in the area?	Specify
What are the two biggest problems you have with livestock rearing?	Specify
What assistance do farmers in the area most need?	Specify
Do people in the are usually store food?	Yes/no
If we could guarantee that if you stored food it would not rot would you store your harvests?	Yes/no
Would you invest in the food storage yourself?	Yes/no
Are you familiar with manioc flour?	Yes/no
Would you like to eat manioc flour?	Yes/no
Are you familiar with breadfruit flour?	Yes/no
Would you like to eat breadfruit flour?	Yes/no
Do you think there are many people in the area who are hungry?	Yes/no
What Commune around here has the greatest amount of hunger?	Specify
What Section has the greatest amount of hunger?	Specify

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## 14. Notes

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<sup>i</sup> Schwartz 2001; Mamadou 2002

<sup>ii</sup> The probability of catastrophic disasters are increasing with urbanization, habitation of vulnerable flood plains and ravines, the use of cement for building, and the failure to enforce building codes. But disaster is nothing new to Haiti. Excluding the 2010 earthquake, natural disaster killed more people in the early 20th century than recent decades. For example, counting only the three major storms in the 28 years between 1935 and 1963-- when Haiti had a population one third its current size-- 20,000 people were killed. But in the 28 years spanning 1980 – 2008--a period aid agencies consider rife with disaster-- 65 hurricanes, tropical storms, and thunderstorms killed less than half that figure, 8,165 people. If we compare human caused disasters we find a similar trend. The two Duvalier regimes (1957-1986) are widely cited as having killed 20,000 to 40,000 people. If we add to that figure to a liberal total of 10,000 killed by all the ensuing regimes combined (1986-2013) then between 1957 and 2013, a period of 56 years, Haitian governments killed a total of 30,000 to 50,000 people. But in the 20 years between 1917 and 1937 the US and the Dominican Government outdid them. US Marines and the Haitian "Genadernarie" killed 15,000 men women and children between 1917 and 1922 (people who were either identified as rebel combatants or who died as a result of "collateral damage") ; they hacked, shot or beat to death another 5,000 men when they tried to escape forced labor camps; and in 1937 the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo ordered 20,000 to 37,000 Haitians massacred . That's a 20 year total of 40,000 to 57,000 people killed (80% most of the Dominican killings took place in 3 days. Moreover, the massacre was only part of the disaster. The resulting flood of refugees from the Dominican Republic--known as the Kouri Kouto (run from the knife)--led to famine on the border areas where the refugees quickly wiped out garden stocks.

### Disasters from 1980 - 2008:

No. of events: 65  
 No. of people killed: 8,165  
 Average killed per year: 282  
 No. of people affected: 7,220,916  
 Average affected per year: 248,997  
 Economic Damage (US\$ X 1,000): 823,906  
 Economic Damage per year (US\$ X 1,000): 28,411

<sup>iii</sup> The dates: Ike on September 2nd and 3rd and then Hanna on September 7th . Quote from CHAN delegation,

Many of the thousands of people who fled to rooftops, balconies and higher ground went without food for days, and safe drinking water was in short supply as the fetid carcasses of drowned farm animals bobbed in soupy floodwaters.

Businesses were closed — both because of flooding and for fear of looting.

People in water up to their knees shouted to peacekeepers to give them drinking water, and women on balconies waved empty pots and spoons.

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The Argentine soldiers have plucked residents from rooftops that were the only visible parts of their houses, but had little capacity to deliver food and water.

"It is a great movement of panic in the city," Interior Minister Paul Antoine Bien-Aime told the AP from a U.N. speedboat.

<sup>iv</sup> Gonaives was not the most destructive flood of the 2004. Four months before earlier, on May 5 2004 were the Jimani and Mapou Floods. The floods killed at least 2,000 in the border town of Jimani and probably closer to 3,000 because Haitians on the Dominican side of the border were not counted. On the Haitian side some 1,500 people were killed. More than 1,000 bodies found in Mapou. Some 500 in Fonds Verette. To be exact, Haiti's death toll stood at 1,660; including 1,000 in Mapou, 500 elsewhere in Haiti's Southeast region, 158 in the riverside town of Fond Verettes, and two in the south, at Port-a-Piment. This was a flashflood that came from a midnight storm in dry mountains between Jimani, on the Dominican side, and Fonds Verette and Mapou on the Haitian side

For the people in Jimani an avalanche-like flood of boulder, gravel, water, and uprooted trees hit at 4:01 a.m. Most people were in bed. Deforestation was blamed, which means the Dominicans blamed the Haitians.

But the fact is that these flash floods/avalanches have been occurring precisely in this area for thousands of years. There are some important lessons that could or should have been learned from them.

The flood on the Dominican side passed over an area that is forty feet deep gravel—evidence of the thousands of years that this has been occurring.

In the early 1900s the US marines constructed a bridge over the area. It was subsequently wiped out in the thirties by a similar avalanche-flood.

In the 1960's the Dominican Government began construction on a new bridge. They never finished it but the remains were still there in 2004 when I was doing a social impact assessment for the area.

In the 1970s CARE International partnered with the Dominican government and began building low income housing in the historic path of the avalanche-floods. I don't know what they were thinking or why they didn't note the bridge. More people came and built in the area and by 2004 there was neighborhood of more than 2,000 people.

If we can say anything good about CARE and the Government it is that some of the houses were sufficiently well built that a few walls and foundations survived.

Most of the people who lived in the neighborhood didn't.

Amilcar, of Amilcar Groceries, built on the edge of that neighborhood claims that there were at least 2,000 Haitians living there. The Dominican government reported 658 Dominican dead. Nothing about Haitians. Haitian survivors were moved to an internment camp on the border.

U.S.-led peacekeeping force flew helicopter loads of bottled water, fruit and bread to the town of Fond Verette, where the storm washed out the winding mountainside road from Port-au-Prince and cut off ground transportation to the town of 40,000,

<sup>v</sup> "réellement partie des plus pauvres"

<sup>vi</sup> L'approche d'habilitation des capacités adoptée par excellence..." and "ce symbole d'engagement de l'État Haïtien vers la décentralisation..."

<sup>vii</sup> [http://www.woccu.org/about/intlcusystem/icus\\_country?c=HT](http://www.woccu.org/about/intlcusystem/icus_country?c=HT)

<sup>viii</sup> [http://www.animhaiti.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=33](http://www.animhaiti.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=33)

<sup>ix</sup> The information on FONKOZE elite investors comes from another consultant who writes in an email,

"In my conversations with Fonkoze the only big Madam Sara group they support (so far) are 36 women all associated with ACSI. They receive 50,000 USD each every three months, while ti madan sara may borrow 3.000 gourdes (75 USD) per group of 5 women, every three months."

The information on total loans comes from FONKOZE's webpage

<http://fonkoze.org/aboutfonkoze/keystatistics.html>

The exact figures are 438,537,782 gourdes in outstanding loans = US\$10,318,536

<sup>x</sup> In a 2006 white paper presaging the overhaul of overseas food relief and development police the US State Department noted that,

In the past, our efforts have been undermined by a lack of coordination, limited transparency, uneven monitoring and evaluation, and relationships with recipient countries based more on patronage than partnership. (p 3: SEEKING A WORLD WITHOUT HUNGER, <http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity>)

<sup>xi</sup> Goals as defined by FTF,

Overall objective: increase food security in targeted geographic corridors

Intermediate objectives

- Integrating agricultural production, environmental management,
- Strengthen value chains and promote entrepreneurship
- Build national capacity for improved training, extension, applied research, and market information systems, and
- Target food assistance programs to the country's most under-nourished

or

IR 1: Increase Agricultural Productivity

IR 2: Stabilize Watersheds above Selected Plains 20

IR 3: Strengthen Agricultural Markets

IR 4: Deliver Nutrition Messages and Services

Particularly attractive to the USG is promotion of Mangos, Haiti's third largest export, and Cocoa,

"Cocoa also exhibits a large amount of growth potential, with import demand increasing 3 percent per year since 1990. Haiti exported \$10.1 million worth of cocoa in 2008, a figure that has been growing in past years. In the near future, global cocoa demand is expected to outgrow supply, with only a few countries producing substantial quantities. Foreign processors have expressed interest importing greater quantities from Haiti. Approximately 20,000 Haitian households are producers, mostly in the north and the southwest. Investments in cocoa production

are projected to raise household incomes by up to an average of \$500 per year. As with mangoes, cocoa trees grow on hillsides and can help reduce threats to the productive plains." (p 10)

The USG strategy (Dahlberg)

<sup>xii</sup> Drawbacks in the USG plan are 1) it is targeted to three specific corridors and 2) USAID has been slow in shifting to purchases. But note that in the 2011 Belmon analysis, Fintrac recommended that USAID import no major commodities (no wheat, corn, or vegetable oil) citing the unfair leverage that a few market actors use to collude in fixing prices. In the case of beans they recommended no monetization because they interfere with domestic production.

<sup>xiii</sup> DESCRIPTION DES ACTIONS 'ABA GRANGOU' EN 2012

Les programmes mis en oeuvre par ABA GRANGOU s'articulent autour de 3 axes stratégiques:

1. Programmes de filets de sécurité sociale visant à améliorer l'accès à la nourriture des plus vulnérables

#### 1. AMÉLIORER L'ACCÈS À LA NOURRITURE

- 1.1. Appui aux politiques économiques, fiscales et tarifaires favorables aux populations les plus vulnérables
- 1.2. Recensement national des ménages vulnérables et Base de Données Unique-BDU
- 1.3. Programme d'Alimentation Scolaire
- 1.4. Filet de sécurité sociale à travers des transferts monétaires et de biens alimentaires et non-alimentaires
- 1.5. Création d'emplois en situation d'urgence
- 1.6. Achats Locaux pour alimenter les programmes d'amélioration de l'accès à la nourriture
- 1.7. Stocks de nourriture d'urgence (rotating, i.e. after each hurricane season they can be used in canteen scholar)
- 1.8. Surveillance de la sécurité alimentaire et la nutrition

#### 2. AUGMENTER LA PRODUCTION AGRICOLE

- 2.1 Appui aux politiques agricoles favorisant une croissance accélérée du secteur Programme de multiplication de semences QDS (Quality Declared Seeds)
- 2.2 Stabilisation de l'approvisionnement d'engrais Sécurisation du foncier pour une utilisation optimale des terres cultivables

#### 3. AUGMENTER LES SERVICES ET INFRASTRUCTURES DE BASE

- 3.1 Amélioration des infrastructures familiales de stockage des récoltes
- 3.2 Prévention de la malnutrition et prise en charge de la malnutrition aigue et modérée
- 3.3 Amélioration de la production de sel en Artibonite et le Nord-Est
- 3.4 Amélioration de l'accès à l'eau traitée à travers la construction de citernes en zones défavorisées
- 3.5 Développement du réseau National d'Agents de Développement Polyvalents - ADP
- 3.6 Renforcement des capacités institutionnelles des Maires et des CASEC
- 3.7 Renforcement de la participation des citoyens et de la société civile à travers le 'Conseils d'Appui au Développement Participatif-CADEP' au niveau des communes (COPRODEP)

#### 4. COMMUNICATION, SUIVI ET EVALUATION

- 4.1 Communication
- 4.2 Suivi et Evaluation

<sup>xiv</sup> But there are a potential pitfalls in the application of the plan. It must be more than ideas on paper. Specifically, 1) If past policies of feeding the population with imported surplus from overseas continues to take precedence over purchase and distribution of local food stuffs in its nutritional program then local production will suffer from the below market availability of produce, 2) there must be a concerted effort to promote staples that can be

competitively produced in Haiti, 3) the agricultural extension services called for in the Aba Grangou program must be real:

<sup>xv</sup> In November 2011, high level WFP directors in Washington and the WFP Haiti country declared an interest in purchasing locally. And more recently WFP website claims to be making local purchases. But as WFP staff explained in November of 2011,

<sup>xvi</sup> WFP Strategic Plan 2008 - 2013

<sup>xvii</sup> Even before the 2010 earthquake, directors AgroActionAleman (AAA) of the German Government funded organization that works in Far West, Haiti--part of CARE's former activity zone and where WFP took over food distribution after CARE left the region--complained that uncoordinated and poorly monitored WFP relief activities had undermined agricultural production and prices that farmers were receiving in the markets. In Haiti the WFP is an excellent example of the difficulty in changing practices and honing them to promote production. Directors are conscious of the negative impact on the local market that imported food has and they want to move toward reinforcing local production through domestic purchasing programs. But the difficulty of locating and consolidating large supplies of local produce and the problems with storing the unprocessed foods and then packaging them in a manner that facilitates transport and redistribution means that they have continued to import massive quantities of food from industrial producers in developed countries.

<sup>xviii</sup> In September 2008 WFP launched a program that helps small farmers access agricultural markets and to become competitive players in the market place. Efforts included reinforcing programs that improved agricultural production, post-harvest handling, quality assurance, group marketing, and agricultural finance. WFP signed contracts for more than 207,000 metric tons of food valued at US\$75.6 million, all from producers in 20 developing countries. Haiti was not one of them.

<sup>xix</sup> An example of what could be construed as largely failed development policies, in 2010 the USGs strategy noted that,

- 80% of Haiti's population lives in poverty, 54% in abject poverty
- Under- and malnourishment are severe - 40% of households are undernourished (3.8m people) - 45% of women are anemic - 30% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition

<sup>xx</sup> Oxfam International 11 April 2005 [Food Aid or Hidden Dumping?: Separating Wheat from Chaff](http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/food-aid-or-hidden-dumping) <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/food-aid-or-hidden-dumping> (accessed November 20th 2012)

<sup>xxi</sup> Although a poor showing of agriculture in the 1990s it was still 40 percent of GDP. By the 2010 earthquake it was only accounted for 25 percent of GDP (USG 2011)

<sup>xxii</sup> Even before the 2010 earthquake, directors AgroActionAleman (AAA) of the German Government funded organization that works in Far West, Haiti--part of CARE's former activity zone and where WFP took over food distribution after CARE left the region--complained that uncoordinated and poorly monitored WFP relief activities had undermined agricultural production and prices that farmers were receiving in the markets.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Jean Marie Vincent--priest, Liberation Theologist and close colleague of later president Jean Bertrand Aristide--came to live in the village of Jean Rabel. Father Vincent worked with Catholic development organization Caritas.

<sup>xxiv</sup> This calculation is based on the US consumer price index, which went from 62.1 in 1977 to 168.3 in 1999 (Global Financial Data 2000). The data for 1977 comes from USAID (1977) . They measure something but I do not believe that either of these estimates can be considered as accurate.

xxv

Table I1: Distribution in Jean Rabel 13 months  
September 1996 to October 1997: Crisis

	Date	Srgh	Corn	Rice	Bean	Oil <sup>1</sup>	Total
AAA	09/96-10/97	4.2	9.1	1,050.0	499.8	170.5	1,733.6
ID	09/96-10/97	0	350.0	0	0	0	350.0
PISANO	09/96-10/97	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total wt	09/96-10/97	4.2	359.1	1,050.0	499.8	170.5	2,083.6
Per month	09/96-10/97	<b>0.3</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>80.8</b>	<b>38.5</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>160.3</b>

Table I2: Distribution in Jean Rabel for 4 Months,  
December 1998 – March 1999: No Crisis

	Date	Srgh	Corn	Rice	Bean	Oil <sup>1</sup>	Total
AAA	12/98–02/99	0	0	115.5	29.4	18.5	163.4
ID*	02/99–03/99	0	350.0	0	0	0	350.0
PISANO	01/99–03/99	0	00.0	150.0	75.0	0	225.0
Total wt	11/99-03/99	0	350.0	265.5	104.4	18.5	738.4
Per month	11/99-03/99	<b>0.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>66.38</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>4.63</b>	<b>184.6</b>

ID food aid was delivered but not completely distributed until June

<sup>xxvi</sup> In the summer of 1997, a United Nations construction team came to the village with a dazzling array of heavy equipment, including air support from helicopters, to renovate the local high school. In 1997, the Voice of America donated equipment that made the founding of a village radio station possible.

<sup>xxvii</sup> In 1989 FMC was the only clinic providing contraceptive services in the immediate region and had 581 women using contraceptive pills and Deprovera. The population rose from 45,000 to a 2000 level of about 60,000 with three clinics providing chemical contraceptives. The total number of users for all three clinics in year 2000 was 660 women. Thus while the overall population had increased by almost 50% the number of contraceptive users has increased by only 20%, a net decline in users from 6.5% to 5.5% overall.

<sup>xxviii</sup> The difference in mean age at first birth is statistically significant (c.i. = .95). The difference in birth intervals is not significant and a larger sample size is necessary to clarify the importance of these changes. However, this should not distract the reviewer from the fact that if these changes are approximately correct--and the overwhelming statistic probability is that they are— they indicate an alarming increase in fertility among a group of young women who already had alarmingly high fertility levels. And at the very least, the data indicates no decrease in the length of birth intervals and no increase in the age at first birth, observations that suggest minimal receptivity to reproductive health educational efforts sponsored over the past decade by international intervention agencies.

Table i3: Changes in Age of Mother at First Birth and Length of First Birth Interval

Report

		IBI between 1st and 2nd childbirth	Age of mother at f first birth
Bef ore programs	Mean	29.52	22.32
	N	46	60
	Std. Error of Mean	1.92	.43
Since programs	Mean	23.62	20.62
	N	29	29
	Std. Error of Mean	1.66	.41

<sup>xxxix</sup> The data is 20 out of 581 women to 21 out of 210 (sample is from parity of women on family planning lists).

<sup>xxx</sup> I'm not certain but Expenditures for all the programs in the Northwest AAA, PISANO, CARE, and ID probably exceeded \$120 million. The Germans alone had spent 39 million

<sup>xxxix</sup> CARE was not alone in its frustrations. Similar problems in 1998 led ADRA to freeze and then abandon involvement in food aid. Up until 1999, German organizations AAA and PISANO--which had been working in the North West since the 1970s in the form of Fonds Agricole-- distributed food and cash to farmers as payment for work done around their own homes (retention ponds), and in their own fields (erosion-control walls and ditches). On at least two occasions in 1997, politicized farmer groups benefiting from AAA food-for-work projects threatened to run AAA out of the area for trying to disassociate project interventions from food payments. In the most dramatic of these incidents, AAA reduced its emergency food relief after the 1997 drought and a group of farmers went on public radio and broadcasted a death threat aimed at the AAA director. AAA initially opted for a short-term solution by leaving the food-for-work program in place. But in 1999 the director again announced that the practice of paying farmers to work on their own fields was being stopped. On a Sunday in January 2000 a group of farmers once again marched on AAA's rural Jean Rabel headquarters. This time it looked as if the farmers would become violent. AAA staff barricaded themselves inside the building and radioed for the police (who arrived in PISANO vehicles and quelled the uprising).

<sup>xxxix</sup> Some respondents remarked that CARE was more effective in reaching intended beneficiaries. One noted reason respondents gave was that CARE involved people in the localities as participants: as one respondent said, "yes there was waste, but at least the most vulnerable people got some food."

<sup>xxxix</sup> It was local that carried independence fighters to freedom through 13 years of war, that fed the country through 100 years and 102 insurrections, civil wars and invasions. These strategies have enabled them to survive 200 years of hurricanes and famine (indisputably more devastating in the past than currently).

<sup>xxxix</sup> To drive the point about the importance of children home. The labor of children is so important in making households productive entities that without them the household does not exist. In a 1,586 randomly selected sample of rural households in the North West, only 53 households did not have children, and these were overwhelming households in the yards of our households that did have children (Schwartz 2000). When asked, rural respondents repeatedly drove the point home explaining why they want children with references to work and the chores they perform. Typical were comments such as, "If you don't have children, dogs will eat you," "you need children," "children are the wealth of the poor," and ,

If I did not have them, things would be worse for me. You need a little water, they go to the water. You need a little fire wood, they go get wood. The boys work in the garden for you. They look after the animals.<sup>xxxix</sup> (thirty-three-year-old mother of eight)

<sup>xxxix</sup> Charcoal is bagged and sold to intermediaries who ship the product on trucks or by boat to urban centers, most notably Port-au-Prince. Rural Jean Rabeliens generally do not use charcoal themselves—they use wood. In almost any region one finds an on going production of charcoal with a handful of specialists and intermediaries engaged in the industry and they are considered among the poorest, lowliest people in an area, although the money earned at charcoal production can compare favorably to other occupations. But for most individuals charcoal production is something that occurs when a special need arises, as when someone wants to build a house or finance a new garden and charcoal production is most conspicuously bound with times of drought and crop failure. In Mole Saint Nicolas, for example, is a shipping point for charcoal and there are usually several dozen sacks stacked on the wharf. But during the 1996-97 drought, the entire wharf was covered with thousands of sacks of charcoal stacked as high as the houses.

<sup>xxxix</sup> The same increased labor demand associated with crises is true of marginal regions. The poorest people usually live in the most marginal areas, which in Jean Rabel are by definition those areas farthest from water and markets, thus increasing household labor requirements.



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<sup>xxxvii</sup> Evidence of the influence on Haitian gustatory preferences of the politico-marketing power of US food interests can be gleaned from the history of wheat. Studies of nutrition in Haiti prior to the founding of the Minoterie d'Haiti (the only mill in Haiti, the contemporary Le Moulen d'Haiti, LMH), suggest that wheat flour was rare in Haiti, particularly in rural areas (Bernadotte et. al). The 1958 establishment under the first Duvalier regime of the Minoterie, a government monopoly, changed that. A team of Columbian nutritionists wrote in 1963,

Although no wheat is produced in Haiti, white wheat bread is a preferred item and is eaten whenever it can be obtained. The construction of a large flour mill in 1958, where imported wheat could be milled, made white wheat flour available in Haitian cities, but the Haitian peasant obtains little white wheatbread because of lack of money, fuel and baking facilities. [King et. Al., 1963]

Since that time wheat bread has become a ubiquitous staple even in the most remote areas.

The Dominican Republic shares a mill-monopoly history similar to Haiti. The first mill was constructed in 1961, three years after the LMH, under then dictator Leonidas R. Trujillo. It remained a state owned monopoly until it was semi-privatized (50% if it was sold) in 1998, the same year that LMH was privatized. Today there are four mills in the Dominican Republic: Molinos del Ozama (the former State mill), Molinos del Cibao (source of much of the flour imported into the North of Haiti), Molinos del Higuamo y Molinos Cesar Iglesias. All the mills are currently importing flour into Haiti.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> According to the 2005 USDA Dietary Guidelines for Americans, "A low intake of fats and oils (less than 20 percent of calories) increases the risk of inadequate intakes of vitamin E and of essential fatty acids and may contribute to unfavorable changes in high-density lipoprotein (HDL) blood cholesterol and triglycerides." For children the recommendations are 25 to 35 percent.

<sup>xxxix</sup> In a WHO (2009) summary: The richer a country the more fat its people consume. Of the 24 countries found above the maximum recommendation of 35%, the majority of were in North America and Western Europe. The population of the only 19 countries on earth that consume an average of less than 15% fat in their diet were in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Much of the population of Haiti would fall in this latter group.

How FAO arrives at per capita consumption and how they arrive at recommended per diem fat consumption is beyond the scope of this report. It is be assumed that the prevailing methodologies are logical and sufficiently supported by academic research.